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Abstract 
In my dissertation, I investigated a systematic interaction between the perfective aspect 
of a clause-embedding verb and a truth-oriented interpretation of embedded 
propositions in Polish. I demonstrated that the so-called reveal-type predicates (‘prove’, 
‘reveal’, ‘show [that]’) are in complementary distribution with respect to triggering 
truth-related meaning of their sentential complements. Whereas perfective variants 
enforce embedded propositions to be true, imperfective counterparts are almost only 
compatible with false (or neutral) propositions. I further showed that clause-embedding 
reveal-type predicates exhibit an incremental structure and can therefore be treated by 
analogy to verbs that combine with nominal incremental themes. In the former case, we 
have a gradual creation of a proof, whereas in the latter case, we have a gradual creation 
of an object like ‘wardrobe’ (maximality of evidence = maximality of a wardrobe). I 
proposed a novel analysis of incremental theme verbs that combine with either nouns or 
clauses. According to my analysis, one possible realization of a partial-total 
affectedness of an incremental theme is a gradual creation of a proof for an embedded 
proposition. In order to obtain empirical evidence for the (non-)veridicality of 
(im)perfective reveal-type predicates in Polish, I conducted an acceptability judgement 
study with 51 Polish native speakers. I further conducted a corpus-based analysis of the 
frequency of investigated lexemes, which completed the interpretation of results. Apart 
from Polish, I provided evidence from other Slavic languages (Czech, Russian) and 
some non-Slavic languages (Austronesian languages, French, Hungarian). 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der wahrheitsbasierten Bedeutung 
perfektiver satzeinbettender Prädikate im Polnischen, i.e. mit dem Zusammenhang 
zwischen Aspekt und Wahrheitsinferenz. Den Kern meiner Dissertation bilden 
sogenannte ‚reveal-type predicates‘ wie ‘beweisen’, ‘zeigen’ oder ‘offenbaren [dass]’. 
In Abhängigkeit von deren aspektueller Markierung bringen sie entweder eine 
maximale (bei perfektiven Verben) oder eine partielle Evidenz (bei imperfektiven 
Verben) für die Wahrheit einer eingebetteten Proposition mit sich. Nur wenn die 
Evidenz maximal ist, wird der dass-Satz notwendigerweise als wahr interpretiert. Ich 
habe gezeigt, dass maximale Evidenz einer totalen Affiziertheit eines nominalen 
inkrementellen Themas (wie z. B. in ‘einen Schrank bauen.PFV’) entspricht 
(Maximalität von Evidenz = Maximalität vom Schrank). Somit sind reveal-type 
predicates inkrementell. Außerdem habe ich eine Akzeptabilitätsstudie mit 51 
polnischen MuttersprachlerInnen geplant und durchgeführt, die die Veridikalität des 
Perfektivs und die Neutralität des Imperfektivs bestätigt hat. Die Interpretation der 
Ergebnisse wurde um eine Korpusuntersuchung ergänzt. Basierend auf den 
theoretischen Beobachtungen und den Studienergebnissen habe ich eine einheitliche 
Analyse für inkrementelle Verben vorgeschlagen, die entweder ein nominales oder ein 
propositionales Objekt verlangen. Die von mir für das Polnische entdeckten 
Korrelationen gelten auch für andere slawische (Tschechisch, Russisch) und einige 
nicht-slawische Sprachen (austronesische Sprachen, Französisch, Ungarisch). 
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1 Introduction 
This dissertation aims to provide empirical evidence for and theoretic implementation of 
a systematic interaction between the perfective aspect of a matrix verb and a truth-
oriented (factive or veridical) interpretation of embedded object sentences in Polish. It 
can be shown that a that-sentence tends to be interpreted as true if it is embedded under 
a perfective matrix verb, but not if it is embedded under a respective imperfective 
counterpart. The lexical-semantic properties of matrix verbs determine the exact 
parametrization of the truthfulness feature. 
There are at least three different types of perfectivity-dependent truthfulness in Polish: 
truth-presupposition (factivity), truth-entailment (veridicality) and truth-implicature 
(based on Zuchewicz 2018). Truth-entailment is the most prominent and stable type of 
inference; in the acceptability judgement study, it showed the clearest contrast between 
the (im)perfective forms with respect to the interpretation of a complement sentence. 
Furthermore, it systematically applies to a uniform class of verbs. Its occurrence results 
from incrementality on a propositional level. Assuming incrementality for clause-
embedding predicates justifies a uniform analysis for incremental theme verbs 
regardless of the type of complement they combine with. It further suggests a 
relationship between definiteness / quantization and veridicality. 
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2 Truth-presupposition, truth-entailment and truth-implicature 
In this dissertation, I distinguish between the three above-mentioned types of truth-
inference. In this section, I will explain the meaning of each term. First of all, truth-
inference and truthfulness stand for any nearly undefined kind of inference that is 
related to truth. More precisely, truthfulness is a neutral term that can be specified by 
presupposition, entailment or implicature. I will start with presupposition. 
2.1 Truth-presupposition 
2.1.1 Semantic definition of presupposition adopted in this dissertation 
According to Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1970), truth-presupposition is a defining criterion 
for factivity; we should call a verb V that combines with a that-clause p factive iff 
asserting Vp presupposes the truth of the complement p (cf. also Egré 2008: 101). For 
instance, all single assertions in (1) have the presupposition in (2), because (2) seems 
to follow not only from the respective affirmative sentences in (1), but also from their 
negation in (3), the question constructions in (4) and constructions modified by modal 
adverbials in (5); cf. for instance Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet (2000) for the 
diagnostics. These inference patterns constitute the basis for the semantic definition of 
presupposition. 
(1)  Marc forgets / regrets / finds out / discovers that Kate needs a new car. 
 
(2)  Kate needs a new car. 
 
(3)  Marc does not forget / regret / find out / discover that Kate needs a new car. 
 
(4)  Does Marc forget / regret / find out / discover that Kate needs a new car? 
 
(5)  Marc probably / almost certainly forgets / regrets / finds out / discovers that 
Kate needs a new car. 
 
In (1), presupposition is triggered by factive verbs forget, regret, find out and discover. 
According to Levinson (1983), other presupposition triggers include, among others, 
definite descriptions (Strawson 1950), implicative verbs like manage (Karttunen 
1971a), change of state verbs (Karttunen 1973), temporal clauses (Frege 1948) or 
questions (Katz 1972). However, Karttunen (2016) observes that each of the above-
mentioned items might represent a different (sub)phenomenon or at least be dividable 
into different sub-phenomena. He points out that treating them alike has led to the 
creation of incomplete or even incorrect definitions of presupposition (in the sense that 
the term has been used to refer to distinct phenomena). 
Importantly, the aim of this dissertation lies neither in reformulating the notion of 
presupposition, nor in establishing its most accurate definition. The question arises as to 
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how the truth-inferences observed in Polish can be labeled. In other words, which terms 
should be used in order to most appropriately describe these inferences? Since existing 
definitions are applicable to the phenomena in question, there is no need to create new 
notions. Naturally, I will specify how I use each term. 
The projection pattern illustrated in the above examples is the basis for the so-called 
semantic definition of presupposition (or the Strawsonian presupposition: Frege 1948, 
Strawson 1950, Beaver & Geurts 2014). To sum up, according to this definition, 
sentence A presupposes sentence B iff, whenever A is true, B is true, and, whenever the 
negation of A is true, B is true (for the presupposition projection see Morgan 1969, 
Langendoen & Savin 1971, Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 2000). 
However, Karttunen (1971b: 56) pointed out that the restriction of the notion of 
presupposition to presupposition triggers and the exclusive consideration of projection 
patterns provide a simplified picture of a broad class of many related, but not identical 
phenomena. In particular, the mood of the main sentence and the internal structure of 
the complement may affect the meaning of the entire clause and the accessibility or 
‘strength’ of truth-inferences. Compare (6) and its logical form given in (7), both taken 
from Karttunen (1971b: 56). 
(6)  Some senators regret that they voted for the SST. 
 
(7)  For some senators x, x regrets that x voted for the SST. 
 
In (6), in contrast to (1), the complement of regret cannot be treated as a proposition. 
The phrase ‘x voted for the SST’, which realizes the object argument, contains a 
variable that is bound by a quantifier that occupies a position outside the subordinate 
clause. Crucially, the phrase ‘x voted for the SST’ receives its propositional status only 
after being brought into relation with a quantifier; otherwise it can be neither true nor 
false. For that reason, a strict division of (6) into presupposition and assertion as 
proposed in (8) does not make much sense; we cannot assume that (6) presupposes the 
truth of the embedded sentence (cf. Karttunen 1971b: 56). 
 
(8)  ASSERTION: Some senators regret that they voted for the SST. 
 PRESUPPOSITION: ?They voted for the SST. 
 
Karttunen proposes the creation of pairs of axioms (in line with Carnap 1947) that 
specify semantic properties of predicates consisting of factive verbs. Consider example 
(9), adapted from Karttunen (1971b: 58). 
(9)  (∀x)(∀s)[regret(x,s) → s] 
 (∀x)(∀s)[¬regret(x,s) → s] 
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In (9), x ranges over persons (entities), and s over sentences or affirmations (for instance 
over ‘x voted for the SST’). “→” defines the semantic relation of implication or 
entailment (with the latter term being adopted in this dissertation); p → q holds iff, 
whenever p is true, q is true (in accordance with implication as defined in Austin 1962 
or with necessity as defined in van Fraassen 1968). Under the above assumptions, one 
can take any utterance/statement that parametrizes variable s (like ‘x voted for the SST’) 
and realizes variable x by an individual constant a. Then, in any case where ‘a regrets 
that a voted for the SST’ holds, it also holds that a voted for the SST (Karttunen 1971b: 
59). 
However, consider (10) and its logical form (11), taken from Karttunen (1971b: 59). 
 
(10)  Any senator who regrets that he voted for the SST is a fool. 
 
(11)  Any senator, if he regrets that he voted for the SST, is a fool. 
 
Obviously, (11) does not assert that there are any senators that regret that p. More 
specifically, the sentence does not contain any information about holding or non-
holding of the regret-relation that is required for the derivation of the truth-
presupposition (cf. (9)). Therefore, the semantic representation of regret proposed in (9) 
would predict that (10) does not presuppose anything that relates to a complement 
clause. However, (10) strongly suggests speaker’s commitment to the assumption that 
there are senators who voted for the SST (it can, however, still be the case that no one 
regrets it). 
Based on these observations, Karttunen proposes an enrichment of (9). Conditional 
constructions do not assert the truthfulness of their antecedents, but rather 
“conversationally imply” the existence of a logical possibility for them to be true for 
some individuals. As a consequence, (11) contains the following conversational 
implication (Karttunen 1971b: 60): 
 
(12)  For some senators x, it is possible that x regrets that x voted for the SST. 
 
Due to the observation that if it can be the case that there are senators who regret that 
they have voted for the SST, it must be the case that they have actually voted for it. For 
that reason, Karttunen (1971b: 60) proposes the insertion of the possibility operator M 
(= ‘it is possible that’) into the semantic representation of factive verbs. 
 
(13)  (∀x)(∀s)[M(regret(x,s)) → s] 
 (∀x)(∀s)[M(¬regret(x,s)) → s] 
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Another important point noticed by Karttunen concerns the inconsistent behavior of 
some factive verbs in both questions and conditionals. Consider (14) and (15), taken 
from Karttunen (1971b: 63). 
 
(14)  Did you regret / realize / discover that you had not told the truth? 
 
(15)  If I regret / realize / discover later that I have not told the truth, I will confess 
it to everyone. 
 
According to Karttunen (1971b: 63), in (14), the speaker is committed to the truth of the 
proposition in the subordinate clause in the case of regret and probably also realize, but 
not in the case of discover. With the latter, the sentence fits the scenario where the 
speaker does not know whether the addressee has told the truth or not, and where she is 
ready to acknowledge the addressee’s discovery as a fact. Find out and see seem to 
pattern with discover in that they allow for both a factive and a non-factive 
interpretation in questions. Furthermore, in conditionals presented in (15), not only 
discover but also realize can have a non-factive meaning. In the case of these two 
lexemes, it is only a possibility (and not a necessity) that the speaker did not tell the 
truth. In contrast, regret enforces a that-clause to hold in the actual world. As was 
mentioned above, conditional sentences trigger a conversational implication stating that 
the speaker considers it at least possible that the antecedent is true. 
The inferences demonstrated in (14) and (15) suggest that one needs to distinguish 
between verbs like regret on the one hand and discover, realize, find out, see or notice 
(the so-called coming-to-know verbs, cf. Karttunen 2016: 712) on the other. Karttunen 
(1971b: 65) refers to the second class as semi-factives, and proposes distinct semantic 
representations for the semi-factive (16) and the factive group (17). 
 
(16)  (∀x)(∀s)[discover(x,s) → s] 
 (∀x)(∀s)[¬discover(x,s) → s] 
(17)  (∀x)(∀s)[M(regret(x,s)) → s] 
 (∀x)(∀s)[M(¬regret(x,s)) → s] 
 
The above representations make right predictions with respect to the interpretation of 
sentences like (18). 
(18)  It is possible that I will regret / realize / discover later that I have not told the 
truth. 
 Karttunen (1971b: 64) 
 
The possibility-relation established for regret allows for the derivation of the truth-
related meaning of the complement sentence (regardless of whether one regrets that p, it 
is the case that p; the truth of the complement sentence holds independently of the 
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attitude expressed by the matrix verb). In contrast, no such possibility-relation holds for 
the semi-factives. As a result (and as might be desired), the corresponding embedded 
propositions are not enforced to be true in the actual world (the possibility of realizing / 
discovering that p does not imply that p, as opposed to the possibility of regretting that 
p). 
For the scenarios where the truth of propositions embedded under semi-factives is left 
as an open issue, Stalnaker (1974), Gazdar (1979) and van der Sandt (1992) propose a 
pragmatic-based cancellation of truth-presupposition. 
Regarding the classification adapted in this dissertation, I will use the semantic 
definition of presupposition based on projection patterns. The crucial observation 
about Polish is that all perfective clause-embedding verbs that pass the ‘common’ 
projection tests pattern alike (see section 5.2.1.1), even if they differ from the 
inherently-factive regret with respect to their behavior in conditional sentences. 
Compare (19) vs. (20). 
 
(19)  Jeżeli przeczuję / wyczuję / rozgryzę / zgadnę, że to Janek wysyła mi kwiaty 
(a nie Krzysiek), zerwę z nim kontakt. 
‘If sense.1SG.PFV.FUT / sense.1SG.PFV.FUT / work.out.1SG.PFV.FUT / 
guess.1SG.PFV.FUT it right that it is Janek who keeps sending me flowers 
(and not Krzysiek), I will break contact with him.’ 
↛ It is Janek who keeps sending me flowers. 
 
(20)  Jeżeli będę żałować / pożałuję, że to Janek wysyła mi kwiaty (a nie 
Krzysiek), zerwę z nim kontakt. 
‘If regret.1SG.IPFV.FUT / regret.1SG.PFV.FUT that it is Janek who keeps 
sending me flowers (and not Krzysiek), I will break contact with him.’ 
→ It is Janek who keeps sending me flowers. 
 
Furthermore, verbs listed in (19) can take interrogative complements, whereas those 
demonstrated in (20) cannot. 
 
(21)  Jeżeli przeczuję / wyczuję / rozgryzę / zgadnę, kto wysyła mi kwiaty, zerwę 
z tą osobą kontakt. 
‘If sense.1SG.PFV.FUT / sense.1SG.PFV.FUT / work.out.1SG.PFV.FUT / 
guess.1SG.PFV.FUT it right who keeps sending me flowers, I will break 
contact with that person.’ 
‘If I get the right answer to the question Who keeps sending me flowers, I 
will break contact with that person.’ 
 
(22)  #Jeżeli będę żałować / pożałuję, kto wysyła mi kwiaty, zerwę z tą osobą 
kontakt. 
‘If regret.1SG.IPFV.FUT / regret.1SG.PFV.FUT who keeps sending me flowers, I 
will break contact with that person.’ 
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Although there is a clear difference between (19) and (20) and between (21) and (22), I 
will call perfective verbs that pass the negation, adverbial modification and 
question test “factive”. The inference they trigger will be referred to as truth-
presupposition. Regarding Karttunen’s classification, it would, however, be better to 
represent them by the structure in (16). Verbs like (po)żałować ‘to regret’, which are 
inherently factive independently of aspect, will be called inherently-factive 
imperfectives. They seem to trigger the ‘strongest’ truth-inference possible. However, 
inherently-factive imperfectives are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
2.1.2 Pragmatic definition of presupposition 
In line with Beaver & Geurts (2014), the pragmatic notion of presupposition is the most 
significant philosophical alternative to the Frege-Strawsonian account. The most 
prominent work on the pragmatic approach goes back to Stalnaker (1972), Stalnaker 
(1973), Stalnaker (1974) and Stalnaker (1998). Stalnaker’s account is based on the 
hypothesis that presuppositions do not necessarily originate from single language units / 
expressions, but from the speakers’ assumptions that are constantly being made in the 
course of the conversation. More precisely, a pragmatic presupposition of a sentence A 
represents a component of meaning that belongs to the common ground (mutual 
knowledge between speaker and hearer, cf. Clark & Brennan 1991, Stalnaker 2002) 
while uttering A. 
Stalnaker aimed at explaining the inferential split of Karttunen’s semifactives (failing 
the question and/or the conditional test or behaving inconsistently under negation) by 
means of pragmatic principles. Consider examples (23) and (24), taken from Beaver & 
Geurts (2014). 
 
(23)  I don’t know that Mullah Omar is alive. I don’t know if he’s dead either. 
(General Dan McNeill, Reuters, 19 May 2008: Beaver & Geurts 2014) 
 
(24)  Vader didn’t know that Luke was alive, so he had no intentions of 
converting Luke to the Sith. (Web example: Beaver & Geurts 2014) 
 
In (23), there is no presupposition stating that Mullah Omar was alive. In contrast, (24) 
seems to presuppose the truthfulness of the embedded sentence. Crucially, in the former 
case, know occurs with a first person and is marked for the present tense, whereas, in the 
latter case, it appears with a third person and is marked for the past tense. Following the 
semantic account, the above observations provide clear restrictions with respect to the 
conditions that make it possible for know to presuppose p. Due to the fact that the 
presupposition does not always hold, know should be treated as semi-factive (and not as 
factive). The problem is that one would need a motivation (or explanation) for this 
inferential split. Crucially, examples like (23) and (24) are not an issue if considered 
from the pragmatic point of view. In line with Stalnaker, a verb itself does not have to 
enforce its complement to be true. As previously mentioned, we can have speaker-
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addressee-based creation of presupposition. In (23), after an addressee has heard the 
first utterance, she is expected to realize that the proposition embedded under know 
cannot be part of the common ground. If it were part of the common ground, the speaker 
would know about that, and her assumption would turn out to be contradictory (she 
would not know about something that was meant to be taken for granted). This is how 
the lack of truth-presupposition in (23) can be explained. In contrast, an addressee can 
easily infer the truthfulness of p in (24). Since know typically embeds true propositions 
and since there is no indication for not assuming so in this case, (24) should presuppose 
that, in an imaginary world, Luke was alive. 
To sum up, in line with Beaver & Geurts (2014), the cancellation of presupposition that 
was observed with semi-factives might be traced back to the presence of competing 
conversational inferences. Thus, presupposition is the default as long as it does not lead 
to pragmatic inconsistencies. 
Finally, it needs to be explained why I did not decide to adopt the pragmatic definition 
of presupposition in my dissertation. My goal is to establish whether we can find basic 
(related to the meaning of the roots) truth-related differences between the (im)perfective 
pairs of clause-embedding verbs in Polish. I assume that a good starting point for 
getting a solid overview of the phenomenon in question is the investigation of 
inferences that are well-defined. Taking into account distinctions in projection patterns 
makes it possible to divide particular verb pairs into classes that contain verb pairs that 
either project or not (so that we end up with clear boundaries between the classes). 
Furthermore, since the acceptability-judgement study that I conducted (see chapter 9) 
was meant to capture differences between aspectual minimal pairs, the semantic-based 
definition of presupposition seemed to provide the most appropriate foundation for 
preparing the experimental design. However, in order to exhaustively investigate the 
presuppositional status of given lexemes, one would need to integrate the pragmatic 
notions (especially the cancellability conditions) into the semantic account. This would 
be a good follow-up investigation, and therefore it might be a subject for further 
research. 
In the following subsection, I will discuss truth-entailment. 
2.2 Truth-entailment 
The meaning of entailment has already been sketched in the previous subsection. I will 
use the terms to imply and to entail interchangeably. We could say that the first part of 
the semantic representation of semi-factives illustrated in (16) covers an essential 
component of the meaning of an entailment. Its definition can be based on Karttunen's 
(1971a) definition of the so-called implicative verbs. Karttunen (1971a) reserves this 
term for verbs that enforce the truthfulness of their complements in affirmative 
sentences, but not under negation. These postulates can be specified by means of the 
following axioms: 
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(25)  (∀x)(∀s)[manage/remember(to)/succeed/dare(x,s) → s] 
 (∀x)(∀s)[¬manage/remember(to)/succeed/dare(x,s) → ¬s] 
 
Implicative verbs include, for instance, manage, remember (to), dare, succeed, see fit. 
Natural language examples confirm the accuracy of (25). 
(26)  Tom managed / remembered / dared to eat the cake / succeeded in eating the 
cake. 
→ (implies/entails) Tom ate the cake. 
 
(27)  Tom managed / remembered / dared to eat the cake / succeeded in eating the 
cake, #but he did not eat the cake. 
 
(28)  Tom did not manage / remember / dare to eat the cake / did not succeed in 
eating the cake. 
→ Tom did not eat the cake. 
 
(29)  Tom did not manage / remember / dare to eat the cake / did not succeed in 
eating the cake, #but he ate the cake. 
 
Examples (26)–(29), based on Karttunen (1971a: 342–343), show that manage, 
remember, dare and succeed entail (but do not presuppose) the truthfulness of their 
complement sentences. 
Consider again: 
(30)  Tom ate the cake. 
 
(31)  Tom did not eat the cake. 
 
We can identify the following entailment patterns (cf. Karttunen 1971a: 343): 
(32)  (26) → (30) 
 
(33)  (28) → (31) 
 
(34)  ¬(26) → ¬(30) 
 
However, note that (26) and (30) are not logically equivalent, i.e. (26) ≢ (30), because 
we cannot assume that (30) → (26). For instance, in line with Karttunen (1971a), 
manage to p presupposes trying to make p true (and it also conventionally implicates 
dealing with some difficulties in the process of getting to p, a.c.). This inference is, 
however, absent from (30); its negated version (31) remains true if Tom did not make 
any attempt to eat the cake (Tom did not eat the cake, he was not interested in it at all is 
fine, but Tom did not manage to eat the cake, he was not interested in it at all seems 
odd). Based on this, (31) implies (28) only if the above-described presupposition is 
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fulfilled. Furthermore, [x did not remember to p → x did not p] does not imply that [x 
did p → x remembered to p]. For this reason, Karttunen (1971a: 344) adopts the weaker 
notion of implication as proposed by Austin (1962). Following this notion, p implies q 
means that, whereas the speaker is committed to q while asserting p, she is not 
committed to ¬p by asserting ¬q. 
In the following, implicative verbs / verbs that trigger truth-entailment on their 
propositional complements will be referred to as veridical. 
The notion of veridicality was discussed by Montague (1969), and explained by means 
of existence. For example, if a sentence I see a dinosaur is true, it implies the existence 
of a dinosaur, and, as a result, it confirms the veridicality of see. 
To sum up, I will follow Egré (2008: 101) and define veridicality via entailment. I will 
call a verb V veridical if it entails the truth of its complement when used in the 
positive declarative form, i.e. when the following condition is fulfilled: Vp → p for 
all p, where p is a that-clause (cf. also Giannakidou 1994, Giannakidou 1998, 
Giannakidou 1999, Zuchewicz 2018: 479).1 
In the next subsection, I will discuss the notion of implicature. 
2.3 Truth-implicature 
In line with Grice (1975) or Davis (2014) among others, the term implicature refers to 
a component of meaning that can be inferred from an utterance without being said / 
directly communicated. Therefore, in contrast to previously mentioned presupposition 
and entailment, implicature is a pragmatic phenomenon (at least as defined in this 
 
1 It is worth mentioning that Giannakidou (2013) analyzes the progressive as an actualization 
function and defines veridicality via actuality. Giannakidou (2013) shows that the progressive 
entails the partial physical realization of an event in the actual world (partial actualization), 
which can be confirmed by the fact that it does not license negative polarity items. For instance, 
one cannot say: #Tom was crossing any street yesterday, because the progressive form of ‘to 
cross’ implies that there was/is an event e of Tom’s crossing the street in the actual world but it 
was/is not necessarily completed. This shows that actualization can be applied to partial events. 
Similarly, in Polish, the sentence Marek częściowo udowodnił, że to Jarek jest winny ‘Marek 
partly proved.PFV that Jarek was guilty’ means that all steps that were completed by Marek by 
the time of utterance suggest Jarek’s guilt, but the evidence available is too weak to judge an 
embedded proposition as true (the sentence could be followed by but he (Marek) interrupted the 
investigation and changed his job). Interestingly, the imperfective variant of ‘to prove’ seems to 
be very odd (if not ruled out) with częściowo, which results from the fact that the imperfective 
‘prove’ in itself implies the existence of parts. 
The above examples suggest that proof has parts; cf. also Lahiri (2002) who assumes part 
structures of questions based on acceptability of sentences like John partly knows who did well 
on the exam yesterday, cf. Lahiri (2002: 53). I will discuss this issue in the further part of this 
dissertation. 
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dissertation).2 Implicatures can originate from the meaning of certain language 
expressions (in this case, they tend to be ‘stronger’ and their pragmatic status is 
debatable), or from the conversational background. Common implicature triggers are for 
instance metaphor, irony and understatement. Grice (1975) was the first one who to 
analyze cases where the speaker’s intention did not correspond to the literal meaning of 
her utterance. Consider example (35). 
 
(35)  A: Are you going to the cinema tonight? 
B: I am having dinner with my parents. 
 
In (35), B meant (but did not say) that she is not going to the cinema tonight. More 
precisely, she said that she was having dinner with her parents and implicated (or 
indirectly communicated) that she is not going to the cinema; the last mentioned part is 
the implicature. According to Searle (1975) or Davis (2014), if the speaker implicates 
something, she is performing an indirect speech act. In (35), by performing one speech 
act (stating that she is having dinner with her parents), B performed another speech act 
(stating that she is not going to the cinema). 
Furthermore, based on Grice (1975) and Davis (2014), the implicature illustrated in (35) 
is the so-called conversational implicature; it does not result from the conventional 
meaning of any expression, but from the given conversational context. For instance, in 
the dialogue presented in (36), the implicature that appeared in (35) – stating that B is 
not going to the cinema – vanishes. 
 
(36)  A: What are you doing tonight? 
B: I am having dinner with my parents. 
 
An important characteristic of conversational implicatures is their cancellability, as 
illustrated by the following example. 
 
(37)  i. Some dogs bark. 
ii. Not all dogs bark. 
 
(37)i. implicates (37)ii. We can assume that, if the speaker meant that all dogs bark, she 
would have said so. Crucially, in line with Davis (2014), not all is not part of the 
meaning of some. Therefore, not all is not a conventional implicature of some; rather, it 
is conventional to conversationally implicate that some means not all. This reasoning is 
based on the cooperative principle (Grice 1975) that establishes rules for successful 
communication. Speaker and hearer act cooperatively by following four maxims. First, 
there is the maxim of quantity stating that the speaker should be as informative as is 
 
2 However, Abrusán (2011), Romoli (2012) and Romoli (2015) among others suggest the 
possibility of treating some presuppositions as scalar implicatures. This completes the previous 
discussion about presupposition triggers that might in fact represent different (sub)phenomena. 
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necessary for the purpose of the conversation. Second, there is the maxim of quality 
stating that the speaker should not provide any false or non-proven information. Third, 
there is the maxim of relevance that requires participants to say only what is relevant for 
successful communication. Finally, there is the maxim of manner that highlights the 
need for the pursuit of clearness, briefness and organization of information, and the 
avoidance of ambiguities or obscurities. For example, in (37), saying some dogs bark in 
the context where all dogs do would suggest that the speaker does not provide as much 
information as is required, and, as a result, that she is not following the maxim of 
quantity. However, and as mentioned above, the implicature ‘some, but not all’ can 
easily be canceled, for instance after continuing the sentence with actually, all (dogs) do 
or its reformulation as Some, if not all dogs bark. 
Another type of implicature is the already mentioned conventional implicature. It is 
triggered by a particular language unit and does not depend on conversational 
circumstances. For this reason, it cannot be canceled. Davis (2014) refers to this type of 
implicature as semantic implicature. Compare (38), adapted from Davis (2014). 
 
(38)  i. Jill is English and therefore brave. 
ii. Jill is English and brave. 
iii. Jill’s being brave follows from her being English. 
 
In line with Davis (2014), in (38), speakers who utter i. implicate iii. The implicature 
that ‘Jill’s being brave results from her being English’ is activated by therefore (i.e. by a 
particular lexical item). This can easily be confirmed by the fact that, in contrast to i., ii. 
does not implicate iii. 
In addition to lexically-driven implicatures, there are also syntactically-driven 
implicatures. Potts (2005) and Potts (2007) discuss appositive constructions as 
implicature-triggers. Consider the following example. 
 
(39)  Anna, my lovely friend, is coming to the party tonight. 
 
Example (39) implicates that Anna is the speaker’s lovely friend (the speaker implies it, 
but does not say it, cf. Davis 2014). However, the implicature is not implicated if the 
speaker is in conflict with Anna and uses the sentence ironically. In this case, what is 
implicated is the exact opposite of what (39) literally says. 
Obviously, the inference triggered by the semantic implicature is usually stronger than 
(and different in nature from) the one triggered by the conversational implicature. For 
that reason, the question arises whether semantic and conversational implicature should 
be treated as one phenomenon at all. 
A meaningful counterpart to the Gricean notion of implicature is relevance theory as 
proposed by Sperber & Wilson (1986b), Sperber & Wilson (1987) or Sperber & Wilson 
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(2004). Relevance theory focuses on the notion of maximal relevance, which is intended 
to replace the four maxims introduced by Grice. Davis (2014) suggests the following 
Gricean-style formulation of the principle of maximal relevance (based on Sperber & 
Wilson 1986a, Sperber & Wilson 1986b: 46–51;118–71, Sperber & Wilson 1987: 702–
704): 
(40)  Principle of Maximal Relevance (Communicative Efficiency): Contribute 
that which has the maximum ratio of contextual effects to processing cost. 
 
Following Sperber & Wilson (2004: 609), from the set of alternatives (41), (42) and 
(43), (41) is the maximally relevant alternative. This is due to the observation that (41) 
not only contains the meaning of (42), but also provides some additional information. 
Furthermore, there seems to be no difference in processing effort between the two 
sentences. In contrast, whereas (43) is as informative as (41), the former is more 
difficult to process. As a result, (41) is the most appropriate candidate. 
(41)  We are serving chicken. 
 
(42)  We are serving meat. 
 
(43)  We are serving chicken or (72 − 3) is not 46. 
 
Perfective communication verbs in Polish (‘say’, ‘inform’, etc.) seem to implicate that 
the complement sentence is true. This implicature could be explained by means of 
relevance. If the speaker aims at communicating / reporting a statement that she 
considers true, she chooses the perfective, because perfective verbs tend to embed true 
propositions. More precisely, from the set of two aspectual alternatives, the perfective is 
maximally relevant for reporting true statements, although both the perfective and the 
imperfective would be acceptable in such cases. 
The truth-implicature of the perfective aspect in Polish does not pattern consistently as 
suggested by Gricean terminology. On the one hand, it behaves like a conventional 
implicature, since it results from the meaning of the perfective aspect. On the other 
hand, however, it is cancelable, which is the main characteristic of a conversational 
implicature. As a result, we end up with a cancelable conventional implicature, which I 
will call optional pragmatic enrichment. 
The placement of the above-described inference between conventional and 
conversational implicature provides another piece of evidence for the difficulties in 
definitional transparency within the phenomena falling under the term truth-inference. 
Giving the label truth-implicature to the inference that is triggered by perfective 
communication verbs in Polish is based on its cancelability/optionality. 
In the next section, I will briefly discuss the category of aspect.   
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3 The category of aspect: Overview 
In both Slavic and general linguistic literature, the Slavic aspect is considered a 
grammatical category with a specific distribution. For instance, it can be observed that 
only imperfective verbs can occur as complements of phasal verbs like ‘begin’ or 
‘finish’. This is due to the fact that the perfective, in contrast to the imperfective, 
implies temporal delimitation of the events it applies to. Zaliznjak & Šmelev (2000), 
Borik (2002) among others discuss further diagnostic tests for the grammatical status of 
the category of aspect in Slavic languages. 
Apart from the perfective – imperfective distinction, the telic and atelic nature of events 
needs to be taken into account. Telicity refers to the orientation towards reaching a 
natural end point (cf. for instance Garey 1957, Krifka 1989b, Krifka 1992).3 Perfective 
marking tends to favor telic interpretation of events, whereas imperfective marking 
usually leads to an atelic reading. As example (44) illustrates, it is the (im)perfective 
aspect of the complement verb (and not telicity) that determines its compatibility with 
phasal verbs in Polish. Example (45) shows that the (im)perfective marking on the 
phasal verb does not affect the inference pattern. (46) demonstrates that telicity within a 
matrix clause does not matter either. 
 
(44)  Ola zaczęła / skończyła pisać / #popisać 
 Ola started.PFV / finished.PFV write.IPFV.ATEL / write.PFV.ATEL 
 / #napisać tekst. 
 / write.PFV.TEL text 
 ‘Ola started / finished writing a text.’ 
 
(45)  Ola zaczynała / kończyła pisać / 
 Ola started.IPFV / finished.IPFV write.IPFV.ATEL / 
 #popisać / #napisać tekst. 
 write.PFV.ATEL / write.PFV.TEL text 
 ‘Ola was about to start / finish writing a text.’ 
 
(46)  Ola pokończyła pisać / #popisać 
 Ola finished.PFV.ATEL write.IPFV.ATEL / write.PFV.ATEL 
 / #napisać tekst. 
 / write.PFV.TEL text 
 ‘Ola finished writing a text {for now}.’ 
 
The above examples reveal the necessity of distinguishing between perfectivity (the 
(im)perfective marking on a verb stem that causes delimitation in the case of the 
perfective) and telicity (a property of a complex verbal expression that implies its 
orientation towards reaching a natural end point). We saw that phasal verbs can only 
 
3 See also the German term Zeitkonstitution, cf. Francois (1985). 
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combine with perfective complement verbs. The reason why neither po- nor na- 
derivates can cooccur with phasal verbs is that such a cooccurrence would result in a 
double marking of a temporal boundary of events described by the complement, 
regardless of the nature of a temporal delimitation that is enforced by the respective 
prefix (the presence – with na- – or the absence – with po- – of the reaching a natural 
end point). 
In the next subsections, perfectivity and telicity will be discussed in greater detail. 
3.1 Perfectivity 
3.1.1 Comrie (1976) 
One of the first widely-cited definitions of aspect was proposed by Comrie (1976: 3). 
He defines aspect with respect to different ways of viewing the internal temporal 
structure of a situation. With the perfective, a situation is seen as a single whole, 
without being divided into separate phases/parts that characterize that situation. With 
the imperfective, we focus on the internal constituency of the situation. As a result, we 
are looking at an event from the outside in the case of the perfective, and from the inside 
in the case of the imperfective. 
Furthermore, Comrie (1976: 16) notices that, in Russian, perfective and imperfective are 
not complementarilly distributed with respect to the duration of the verbal event that is 
in their scope. Previously it was suggested that the perfective refers to situations with 
short duration and the imperfective to situations with long duration. However, as can be 
seen from the possible Russian realizations of the English sentence I stood there an 
hour; the perfective can refer to events that last either a short or a long time, depending 
on the derivate. 
 
(47)  I stood there for an hour. 
 Ja stojal.IPFV tam čas. 
 → Neutral with respect to the duration of an event. 
 Ja postojal.PFV tam čas. 
 → A subjectively short period is suggested. 
 Ja prostojal.PFV tam čas. 
 → A subjectively long period is suggested. 
 Adapted from Comrie (1976: 17) 
 
Consider the Polish equivalents of (47).4 
 
4 The translation is my own. 
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(48)  I stood there for an hour. 
 Ja stałam.IPFV.ATEL tam godzinę. 
 → Neutral with respect to the duration of an event. 
 Ja postałam.PFV.ATEL tam godzinę. 
 → A subjectively short period is suggested. 
 Ja stanęłam.PFV.TEL tam na godzinę. 
 → Neutral with respect to the duration of an event. 
It seems that the subjectively short duration of an event denoted by the perfective verb 
in both Russian and Polish results from the nature of the delimitative prefix po- (so it is 
more a matter of Aktionsart5 than aspect). An unusual combination of the features 
[+ perfective] and [– telic] might also give rise to the above-mentioned interpretation. 
A crucial point made by Comrie (1976: 18) concerns the frequent characterization of 
perfectivity as denoting a completed (in contrast to complete) action. Following Comrie, 
whereas the perfective does indicate a complete situation (with beginning, middle and 
end), it does not necessarily mark completedness / termination of the situation itself. In 
Polish, many perfective po-derivates do not imply that a situation/an event is completed: 
 
(49)  Ola poczytała książkę, ale jej nie skończyła. 
 Ola read.PFV.ATEL book but her NEG finished.PFV 
 ‘Ola read {some parts of the book}, but she did not finish the whole book.’ 
 
Compare with (50) and (51). 
 
(50)  Ola czytała książkę, ale jej nie skończyła. 
 Ola read.IPFV.ATEL book but her NEG finished.PFV 
 ‘Ola was reading a book, but she did not finish it.’ 
 
(51)  Ola #przeczytała książkę, ale jej nie skończyła. 
 Ola read.PFV.TEL book but her NEG finished.PFV 
 ‘Ola read the book, but she did not finish it.’ 
 
Comrie pointed out crucial properties of perfectivity that hold for languages with and 
without the grammatical category of aspect. However, we need a more fine-grained 
division of features in order to distinguish between different sub-phenomena. 
Essentially, two related types of approach have been applied in Slavic linguistics as 
well. Originally, the perfective aspect was defined via the totality of a situation (cf. 
Koschmieder 1928 for Polish, Maslov 1948, Isačenko 1968 for Russian, and to some 
extent Dickey 2000). Later, the focus was put on reaching a boundary or on selecting a 
 
5 Aktionsart can be seen as a lexical-semantic specification of a verb / group of verbs derived by 
means of a particular affix (cf. Czochralski 1975, Kozłowska-Raś 1987). 
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time span that includes a boundary (consider Vinogradov 1974, Sonnenhauser 2006, 
Sonnenhauser 2008 for an exact definition). 
In the following, I will discuss the notions of (im)perfectivity proposed by Klein (1994). 
3.1.2 Klein (1994) 
Klein distinguishes between three types of situation that constitute a basis for his 
definitions of tense and aspect. Consider example (52). 
 
(52)  Martyna was tired. 
 
Following Klein (1994: 3), based on example (52), the three time-related components of 
meaning can be described as follows. First, there is the time of Martyna being tired, and 
this time can be referred to as time of situation (TSit). Second, there is the time to 
which the assertion in (52) applies (the time for which the assertion was made) that is 
called topic time (TT). Third, there is the time at which the speaker makes her 
utterance, and this time is called time of utterance (TU). The situation itself – 
Martyna’s being tired – belongs to the non-finite component of meaning. As a result, 
TSit is non-finite too. In contrast, TT is finite (in the above example, the reference is to 
the past, so the topic time is located in the past). Different relations can hold between 
TSit, TT and TU. All these relations establish both the temporal and aspectual 
properties of a given expression. For instance, in (52), TU is located after TT. 
Importantly, it cannot be excluded that Martyna was still tired at the speech time; if this 
was the case, TSit would include TU. Therefore, it is rather TT than TSit that is directly 
related to TU (in the sense that it is rather the reference to the past and not the actual 
duration time of a situation that precedes TU). The relation between TT and TU is 
characterized by tense. 
What matters for the purpose of this dissertation is the time-based definition of aspect. 
Klein (1994) and Klein (1995: 24) among others define aspect via the interaction 
between TT and TSit, or, more precisely, via anchoring a situation to the topic time. The 
perfective indicates that the end of TSit and the beginning of time after TSit are 
included in TT, leading to a completeness interpretation. Compare (53) for English. 
 
(53)  X walked to the store → X arrived at the store. 
 
In contrast, in the case of the imperfective, TT is part of TSit, hence the end of TSit is 
not included in TT. This is shown in (54), the imperfective counterpart of (53). 
 
(54)  X was walking to the store ↛ X arrived at the store.6 
 
 
6 These observations go back to Aristotle, cf. Mourelatos (1978). 
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Consider the Polish perfective variants of ‘to go’ / ‘to walk’. 
(55)  Ola weszła do sklepu. → Ola jest w sklepie. 
 Ola went.PFV to store  Ola is in store 
 ‘Ola entered the store → Ola is inside the store (Ola covered the entire 
path).’ 
 
(56)  Ola doszła do sklepu. → Ola jest przy sklepie. 
 Ola went.PFV to store  Ola is by store 
 ‘Ola arrived at the store → Ola is at the store / in front of the store (Ola 
covered the entire path).’ 
 
(57)  Ola wyszła do sklepu. → Ola jest w drodze do 
 Ola went.PFV to store  Ola is in way to 
 sklepu. 
 store 
 ‘Ola went to the store → Ola is on her way to the store (Ola left her primary 
location).’ 
 
In both (55) and (56), the situation can be described as <Ola go to store>. The perfective 
indicates that Ola covered the whole path, i.e. that she is not walking anymore; she 
either entered the store (55) or arrived at the store (56). In (57), the situation can be 
described as <Ola leave her primary location towards store>. Here, the perfective relates 
to the time of Ola’s leaving her primary location; the time of leaving is completed and 
she is already on her way to the store. The above examples show that, regardless of the 
Aktionsart denoted by the respective perfective morpheme (resultative in (55) and (56) 
and inchoative in (57)), the perfective operator in Polish fulfills the same function that 
was attested by Klein for the English perfective; it implies that TT contains the end of 
TSit and the beginning of time after TSit. 
The meaning of the Polish imperfective also patterns with the definition proposed by 
Klein: 
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(58)  Ola szła do sklepu. ↛ Ola jest w sklepie. 
 Ola went.IPFV to store  Ola is in store 
     ↛ Ola jest przy sklepie. 
      Ola is by store 
     ↛ Ola jest w drodze do 
      Ola is in way to 
      sklepu. 
      store. 
     → Ola była w drodze do 
      Ola was in way to 
      sklepu. 
      store. 
 
The difference between (57) and (58) lies in the lack of the pre-state condition in the 
latter case. In the former case, the pre-state condition is realized by marking the left 
boundary of an event. In (58), the reference is only to the event of going that took place 
in the past. TT (past) is part of TSit <Ola go to store>, because the situation is 
temporally unlimited (neither left nor right boundary of an event is marked). For that 
reason, the situation described in (58) could potentially still hold at the speech time. 
It seems that the time-based definition of perfectivity makes it possible to capture the 
difference between the perfective and the imperfective regardless of whether aspect is a 
grammatical category in a language. 
In the following, the terms perfective / imperfective will only be used to refer to 
aspectual marking on the verbal stem. Non-verbal elements within the VP will not 
contribute to the meaning of perfectivity. 
In the next subsection, I will discuss telicity – the notion of aspectuality that includes 
the meanings of both a verb and its non-external arguments. 
3.2 Telicity 
Whereas the perfective – imperfective distinction is established on the basis of morpho-
semantic features of the verb, telicity is an aspectual property of an entire predicate 
(verb and its arguments). The features [± telic] can be subsumed under the term 
temporal constitution (cf. Francois 1985, Krifka 1989a among others). 
I will begin with and focus on Vendler's (1957) classification of aspectual classes, since 
they play a crucial role in triggering the relationship between perfectivity and 
truthfulness in Polish (which means that we need both perfectivity and telicity in order 
to get the truth-inference). 
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3.2.1 Vendler (1957) on four verb schemata 
Vendler (1957) distinguishes between the following verb schemata (aspectual classes): 
activities (59), accomplishments (60), achievements (61), and states (62). 
 
(59)  run, push a cart, think, write, eat 
 
(60)  run a mile, draw a circle, write a letter, eat an apple 
 
(61)  reach the top, win the race, recognize, find 
 
(62)  love, dominate, know, have 
 
Activities and accomplishments can be subsumed under the term processes. Following 
Vendler (1957), activities and accomplishments, in contrast to achievements and states, 
can appear in the progressive, which means that they exhibit an internal (part) structure. 
Consider the following examples. 
 
(63)  Anna is running / pushing a cart / thinking / writing / eating. 
 
(64)  Anna is running a mile / drawing a circle / writing a letter / eating an apple. 
 
(65)  Anna is ?reaching the top / ?winning the race / *finding a key. 
 
(66)  Anna is ?loving it / ?hating it / *knowing it.7 
 
Based on Vendler (1957), what we can conclude from the above examples is that 
activities and accomplishments pattern alike in that they allow for the non-restricted 
occurrence of the verb in the progressive form. How they differ is in their orientation 
 
7 I have put a question mark before some verbs in the examples (65)–(66), because, first, one 
can easily find instances of achievements (especially reach and win) used in the progressive 
form. Importantly, it is not reaching or winning itself that can be extended in time. According to 
Vendler (1957: 147), if one says that it took her two hours to reach the summit, one refers to the 
time of climbing to reach the top; the moment of reaching the top itself is a punctual event that 
is non-extendable. In line with Moens & Steedman (1988), the progressive coerces an 
expression it applies to (for instance a punctual event) to be a process. They refer to this 
phenomenon as aspectual coercion. In contrast, if one reads a newspaper in one hour 
(accomplishment VP), one can say ‘I am reading a newspaper’ at any time during that hour. 
Therefore, it seems that it is not necessarily the progressive, but rather the time span it refers to 
that differentiates between activities and accomplishments on the one hand, and achievements 
on the other. Second, also states allow for the progressive under certain circumstances, which 
can be confirmed by the famous McDonald’s slogan “i’m lovin’ it”. Certainly, however, it is 
more likely (and more natural) for activities and accomplishments to appear in the progressive 
than achievements and states. 
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towards reaching a natural endpoint (telicity); whereas activities are atelic (they do not 
imply a natural endpoint), cf. (67) and (68), accomplishments are telic (they imply a 
natural endpoint), cf. (69) and (70). 
(67)  For how long did Anna run / eat / write? 
 
(68)  *How long did it take to run / eat / write? 
 
(69)  *For how long did Anna run a mile / eat the sandwich / write the poem? 
 
(70)  How long did it take to run a mile / eat the sandwich / write the poem? 
 
Furthermore, the well-formedness of a predicate with either a ‘for an hour’-type 
adverbial (durative adverbial) or with an ‘in an hour’-type adverbial (time-span 
adverbial)8 makes it possible to distinguish not only between activities and 
accomplishments, but also between atelic and telic event descriptions in general. 
Crucially, perfective accomplishment clause-embedding verbs in Polish (where 
accomplishment is realized by the combination perfectivity plus incrementality) are 
systematically veridical. On the interpretational level, they pattern with perfective 
accomplishment incremental theme verbs that take nominal complements and trigger 
their definite or quantized interpretation. This suggests that there is an interaction 
between definiteness and veridicality. 
Coming back to Vendler's (1957) classification, the question remains as to how one can 
formally differentiate between achievements and states (for now we only know that both 
are rather strange with the progressive). Since the former are punctual and the latter can 
extend over time, we can build the following minimal pairs (adapted from Krifka 
1989b: 99): 
 
(71)  At what moment [did you reach the top]? At 2 o’clock. 
 
(72)  *At what moment [did you hate him]? At 2 o’clock. 
 
(73)  *For how long [did you reach the top]? For two hours. 
 
(74)  For how long [did you hate him]? For two hours. 
 
It can easily be seen that achievements and accomplishments are telic, and activities and 
states atelic. 
 
 
8 For the terminology cf. Krifka (1989b: 99). 
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In the next subsection, I will introduce some tests that make it possible to differentiate 
between telic and atelic predicates. 
3.2.2 Telicity tests 
I will start with the adverbial modification test (cf. Verkuyl 1972, Dowty 1979, Hinrichs 
1985). The adverbial modification test was briefly mentioned in the previous 
subsection. Whereas atelic predicates, cf. (75), can only be modified by durational 
adverbials, telic predicates, cf. (76), only combine with time-span adverbials. Consider 
the following examples. 
 
(75)  Inga ate / drank for an hour/*in an hour. 
 
(76)  Inga ate the sandwich / drank the wine *for an hour/in an hour. 
 
We can build similar pairs with imperfective (77) and perfective (78) clause-embedding 
verbs in Polish. 
 
(77)  Ola przez godzinę / * w godzinę 
 Ola for hour /  in hour 
 przewidywała / udowadniała / mówiła, 
 predicted.IPFV / proved.IPFV / said.IPFV 
 że Marek boi się duchów. 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘Ola was predicting / proving / saying for an hour / in an hour that Marek 
fears ghosts.’ 
 
(78)  Ola * przez sekundę9 / w sekundę 
 Ola  for hour / in second 
 przewidziała / udowodniła / powiedziała, 
 predicted.PFV / proved.PFV / said.PFV 
 że Marek boi się duchów. 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘Ola predicted / proved / said for a second / in a second that Marek fears 
ghosts.’ 
 
The above examples show that perfective verbs tend to be telic, whereas imperfective 
verbs are atelic. 
 
 
9 Since perfective przewidzieć is an achievement (it denotes a punctual event), I decided to use 
‘second’ instead of ‘hour’ within an adverbial clause. As a result, the phrase is compatible with 
all perfective verbs independently of the aspectual class they belong to (in the sense of 
Vendler); perfective udowodnić and powiedzieć are accomplishments. 
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Another common test for telicity is the conjunction test (cf. Verkuyl 1972, Borik 2002: 
14): 
 
(79)  Eli was happy on Thursday and on Friday. 
 
(80)  Eli reached the hilltop on Thursday and on Friday. 
 
In the atelic sentence (79), there are two possible interpretations available. First, there 
were two distinct temporally-independent (non-overlapping) situations of Eli being 
happy: one took place on Thursday and the other one on Friday. Second, there was one 
continuous situation of Eli being happy that lasted from Thursday till Friday. In the telic 
sentence (80), however, there must have been two independent situations of Eli reaching 
the hilltop (so that he reached the hilltop twice: once on Thursday and once on Friday). 
The continuous reading is ruled out (cf. also Borik 2002: 14). 
The same observation holds for Polish aspectual pairs investigated in this dissertation: 
(81)  Ola w niedzielę i w poniedziałek przewidywała, 
 Ola on Sunday and on Monday predicted.IPFV 
 że Marek boi się duchów. 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘On Sunday and on Monday, Ola was predicting that Marek fears ghosts.’ 
 
(82)  Ola w niedzielę i w poniedziałek przewidziała, 
 Ola on Sunday and on Monday predicted.PFV 
 że Marek boi się duchów. 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘On Sunday and on Monday, Ola predicted that Marek fears ghosts.’ 
 
In the imperfective variant (81), either two temporally independent predicting situations 
took place (one on Sunday and the other one on Monday), or there was one 
uninterrupted predicting situation that lasted from Sunday till Monday (and probably 
longer). In contrast, in the perfective variant (82), there could only have been two 
distinct predicting situations. For instance, in order to verify if tarot cards told the truth 
on Sunday, the fortune-teller repeated the procedure on Monday and received the same 
message, i.e. that Marek fears ghosts; therefore, she predicted it twice, during two 
different predicting events. 
In the next section, I will discuss the relationship between perfectivity and telicity. 
3.3 The relationship between perfectivity and telicity 
The results of telicity tests suggest that imperfective clause-embedding verbs in Polish 
refer to atelic event descriptions, whereas perfective clause-embedding verbs refer to 
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telic event descriptions. However, regardless of their lack of compatibility with time-
span adverbials, imperfective clause-embedding verbs can fit the telic domain as well. 
Consider a scenario where it is discourse-given that Cory had immigrated to Canada. 
Mila was happy, because she thought that she was the only one who knew about it. 
Until Mark said: 
 
(83)  Ela też mówiła / opowiadała / twierdziła, 
 Ela also said.IPFV / told.IPFV / claimed.IPFV 
 że Cory wyemigrował do Kanady. 
 that Cory immigrated.PFV to Canada 
 ‘Ela was also saying / telling / claiming that Cory had immigrated to 
Canada.’ 
 
In the above context, (83) applies to a situation with a terminal point, despite the 
imperfective marking on the embedding verbs. (83) implicates that the hearer received 
the complete message from the speaker (which is the actual meaning of perfective 
communication verbs). However, out of the blue and without też, (83) could be 
followed by but she was interrupted by a phone call and did not get to the main point 
(in this case, the speaker, in contrast to other addressees of Ela’s message, knew that Ela 
was about to say that Cory had immigrated to Canada). 
It seems that most (if not all) imperfective clause-embedding verbs in Polish are 
compatible with telic event descriptions. This is not the semantic property of the 
imperfective however, but the pragmatic-based extension of its scope; since the context 
makes it clear that the reference is to a telic event, the speaker can use the imperfective 
that is less marked in order to avoid overload of information (telicity would be 
expressed twice by choosing the perfective). A similar observation holds for cases 
where the imperfective aspect receives a factive reading, see chapter 0. 
Furthermore, Borik (2002) shows that the perfective aspect in Russian goes along with 
atelic event description. Consider the following examples, adapted from Borik (2002: 
55). 
 
(84)  Petja poiskal knigu polčasa.  → 
 Peter PFV-look.for-PST.SG.M book-ACC half-hour   
 Petja poiskal knigu 15 minut. 
 Peter PFV-look.for-PST.SG.M book-ACC fifteen minutes. 
 ‘Peter looked for a book for half an hour → Peter looked for a book for 
fifteen minutes.’ 
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(85)  Petja poiskal knigu polčasa  
 Peter PFV-look.for-PST.SG.M book-ACC half-hour  
 / * za polčasa. 
 /  in half-hour 
 ‘Peter looked for a book for half an hour / in half an hour.’ 
 
Reference to atelic events can also be attested for the Polish perfective, but the 
compatibility with durational adverbials (and its lack with time-span adverbials) only 
holds for perfective derivates built by means of the delimitative prefix po- (cf. 
Młynarczyk 2004 among others): 
 
(86)  Ala poczytała (trochę) przez godzinę 
 Ala read.PFV (a little bit) for hour 
 / * w godzinę. 
 /  in hour 
 ‘Ala read a little bit for an hour / in an hour.’ 
 
As example (87) illustrates, the resultative variant of the perfective ‘to read’ only 
combines with a time-span adverbial. 
 
(87)  Ala przeczytała książkę * przez godzinę 
 Ala read.PFV book  for hour 
 / w godzinę. 
 / in hour 
 ‘Ala read the book for an hour / in an hour.’ 
 
The examples presented in this subsection clearly show that there is no 1:1 relationship 
between perfectivity and telicity, although there is a systematic logical tendency for 
perfective verbs to refer to telic, and for imperfective verbs to refer to atelic event 
descriptions. Regarding clause-embedding predicates, the question arises as to which 
category is the actual trigger of truthfulness. 
3.4 What is the actual trigger of truthfulness? 
As was mentioned before, my object of investigation are transitive dynamic clause-
embedding verbs that allow for the telic interpretation of events regardless of the 
(im)perfective marking on a verbal stem. Since the object argument is always realized 
by a proposition (i.e. I do not modify the type of a complement), I do not expect it to 
affect the inference pattern. Crucially, whereas clause-embedding (im)perfective 
minimal pairs differ in the truth-related meaning of their complement sentences, they do 
not necessarily differ in telicity. This suggests that it is primarily perfectivity that 
interacts with factivity / veridicality. Furthermore, it seems plausible that the feature 
[+ perfective], which is cross-linguistically more marked than the feature [– perfective], 
interacts with the more specific features [+ factive/+veridical] (relating to the pair 
[± factive/± veridical]). For that reason, I consider perfectivity a requirement for 
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truthfulness. However, different aspectual classes determine the exact specification of a 
truthfulness-feature (its realization as factivity, veridicality or implicature). 
In the following, I will discuss the influence of aspect on the interpretation of nominal 
arguments. This is the basis for the main topic of this dissertation – the role of aspect in 
interpreting sentential complements.   
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4 Aspect and the interpretation of nominal complements 
4.1 Aspect-dependent interpretation of bare objects in Slavic languages 
Aspectual distinctions affect not only the temporal interpretation of a sentence, but also 
the interpretation of nominal complements of a verb. Wierzbicka (1967) shows that, in 
Polish, a direct object is interpreted as non-limited or indefinite in an imperfective 
sentence like (88), and as definite in a perfective one like (89). 
 
(88)  Ola jadła pierogi / cukierki. 
 Ola ate.IPFV dumpling.PL / sweet.PL 
 ‘Ola was eating dumplings / sweets.’ 
 
(89)  Ola zjadła pierogi / cukierki. 
 Ola ate.PFV dumpling.PL / sweet.PL 
 ‘Ola ate all of the dumplings / sweets.’ 
In line with Filip (2005: 127), the only formal difference between examples like (88) 
and (89) lies in the presence of the prefix z- in the latter case. Regarding semantics, the 
distinction between the two sentences is determined by aspectual semantics only; the 
prefix z- does not carry any unique idiosyncratic meaning of its own, therefore, it does 
not modify the lexical content of an underlying imperfective verb. 
The perfective zjadł(-a) means ‘eating up’ / ‘finishing eating’, i.e. its denotation is 
restricted to completed events. In contrast, the imperfective jadł(-a) is neutral with 
respect to the completion condition. These aspect-dependent differences in the temporal 
restriction of verbal events have an influence on the referential properties of bare object 
arguments too. In (88), with the imperfective jadła, pierogi ‘dumplings’ and cukierki 
‘sweets’ can have the weak-existential (‘some’ / zero article), the definite referential or 
the partitive interpretation (‘some of the dumplings / sweets’). Besides that, iterative 
and generic readings are also possible. Linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts specify 
which interpretation is available in the particular case. In contrast, in the perfective 
sentence (89), the reference is to one object; a certain, definite group of objects – the 
dumplings / sweets (adapted from Wierzbicka 1967: 2238). Following Filip (2005: 
127), the meaning of the NPs ‘dumplings’ / ‘sweets’ as objects of perfective verbs in 
Polish is more or less equivalent to the meaning of the respective English NPs marked 
with the definite article the (the so-called referential definites). We can test for it by 
using the quantifier all or totality terms like whole, entire, total. Combining (89) with 
but she did not finish them {dumplings, sweets} / but there are still some dumplings / 
sweets left leads to a contradiction. The property of bare accusative objects as 
prototypical referential definites under the scope of perfective aspect can be confirmed 
by means of their coreferentiality with anaphoric expressions. (89) can be followed by 
Niestety miały one {pierogi, cukierki} dziwny smak. ‘Unfortunately, they {dumplings, 
sweets} tasted strange’. This means that, in (89), there is a referential identity between 
38 
 
the pronoun and the bare direct object that is the pronoun’s antecedent. However, it 
needs to be pointed out that a pronoun can also be used to refer to objects of 
imperfective verbs; in this case, the definite referential interpretation of nominal 
complements is a possible, but not an obligatory interpretation. 
The relationship between aspect and definiteness also holds for Czech, cf. Filip (1985), 
Filip (1997), Filip (1999) amongst others. Consider the following examples. 
 
(90)  Ivan vypil čaj. 
 Ivan drank.PFV tea 
 ‘Ivan drank (up) (all) the tea / the whole portion of tea.’ 
 Adapted from: Filip (1999: 10) 
 
(91)  Ivan pil čaj. 
 Ivan drank.IPFV tea 
 (i) ‘Ivan drank (some/the) tea’ (… and then went home) 
(ii) ‘Ivan was drinking (some/the) tea’ (… when I came) 
Adapted from ibid. 
 
(92)  Ivan snĕdl jablka. 
 Ivan ate.PFV apple.PL 
 ‘Ivan ate (up) (all) the apples.’ 
 Adapted from ibid. 
 
(93)  Ivan jedl jablka. 
 Ivan ate.IPFV apple.PL 
 ‘Ivan ate / was eating (some/the) apples.’ 
 Adapted from ibid. 
 
Furthermore, Forsyth (1970: 92) observes that, in Russian, the objects of imperfective 
verbs build a “coalesced unit” with a verb, and that they lack a specific reference. In 
contrast, the objects of perfective verbs receive a specific interpretation. Similar 
observations were made by Birkenmaier (1979), Padučeva (1996) or Anstatt (2002). 
The effect of the Russian perfective is illustrated in (94). 
 
(94)  Masha sjela prjanik. 
 Masha ate.PFV ginger.bread.cookie 
 ‘Masha ate (and finished eating) a/(all) the (whole) cookie.’ 
 Adapted from: Filip (2017: 169) 
 
Interestingly, we can find a similar pattern in the non-Slavic language Hindi if we use 
the so-called perfective complex verb form (CV): 
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(95)  # maya-ne biskuT-ko khaa-li-yaa, par us-e puuraa 
  Maya-ERG cookie-ACC eat-take-PFV but it-ACC full 
  nahiin khaa-yaa.     
  not eat-PFV     
  ‘Maya ate a/the cookie, but not completely.’ 
  Adapted from: Arunachalam & Kothari (2011: 28) 
 
However, the inference turns into cancellable implicature if the so-called simple 
perfective verb is used (SV), cf. Singh (1998).10 According to Arunachalam & Kothari 
(2011: 27), the default interpretation of SV is that an event it refers to comes to full 
completion. The cancellation of this inference does not lead to a contradiction though, 
as (96) illustrates. 
 
(96)  maya-ne biskuT-ko khaa-yaa, par us-e puuraa 
 Maya-ERG cookie-ACC eat-PFV but it-ACC full 
 nahiin khaa-yaa.     
 not eat-PFV     
 ‘Maya ate a/the cookie, but not completely.’ 
 Adapted from: Arunachalam & Kothari (2011: 27) 
 
We can conclude that aspect has an influence on the interpretation of accusative objects 
across Slavic languages in general, and that there is evidence for the existence of this 
phenomenon in non-Slavic languages too. The fact that aspect is a grammatical category 
in Slavic languages results in the extension of its area of activity to non-verbal domains 
and / or in its insertion to fill possible gaps in the language system (like the lack of overt 
articles in Polish and Czech). 
Crucially, Krifka (1989a), Krifka (1989b), Krifka (1992) and Filip (2005) among others 
point out that the correlation between the perfective aspect of a matrix verb and the 
interpretation of a direct object as definite / as a single (atomic) whole is not a 1:1 
relationship however; the definiteness / specificity requirement on the object is triggered 
 
10 There are several languages where the perfective aspect seems not to entail the completion of 
verbal events that are under its scope, cf. Ikegami (1985) for Japanese, Singh (1998) amongst 
others for Hindi, Travis (2000) for Malagasy, Pederson (2008) for Tamil, or Koenig & 
Muansuwan (2000) for Thai. However, one needs to distinguish between perfectivity and 
telicity when analyzing cases of perfective non-complete events. It is a common observation for 
Slavic languages that a perfective verb can be atelic when derived by means of delimitative 
prefixes. The two perfective forms in Hindi may also represent the (a-)telic variants of the 
perfective. Since this dissertation deals with Polish (and to some extent with other Slavic 
languages too), I will not discuss this issue in greater detail. The account proposed in this paper 
applies to cases where every perfective verb has its imperfective twin; in other words, where the 
meaning of the perfective is based on the meaning of the imperfective (independently of 
morphological formation patterns). 
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not only by aspect, but also by the properties of the argument and by verb semantics. 
Consider the following examples, adapted from Filip (2005: 128): 
 
(97)  On zjadł dwie oliwki / gruszkę. 
 he ate.PFV two olives / pear 
 ‘He ate (up) two whole olives / a/the whole pear.’ 
 
(98)  Jan przyniósł kaszę / oliwki. 
 Jan brought.PFV porridge / olives 
 ‘Jan brought (some/the) porridge / olives.’ 
 
(97) illustrates that bare singular count nouns (‘pear’) and quantified DPs (‘two olives’) 
do not necessarily need to have a specific referent when they occur under the scope of 
perfective verb, but the totality condition cannot be omitted; (97) entails that two whole 
olives / one whole pear have been eaten up. Therefore, in (97), the object is fully 
affected by the verbal process on the one hand (there is nothing left from the two olives 
/ the pear), but it does not have a specific referent on the other. 
A crucial point is demonstrated in (98). Filip (2005: 128) emphasizes that it is actually 
the verb semantics, and especially the role of the thematic relation between a verb and 
its object, in combination with perfectivity, which triggers a definite / specific 
interpretation of the object (or which influences the object’s interpretation in any way 
possible). For instance, whereas the extent of an eaten object directly corresponds to the 
progress of an event of eating (and vice versa) in (89), the extent of a moved object does 
not define the progress of an event of bringing {something} / does not restrict the 
completion of an event of moving an object towards a goal in (98). According to Filip 
(2005), the completion of an event of moving in (98) results from Jan’s complete path-
covering (Jan has necessarily covered the whole implicit path).11 This, again, suggests 
that the totality condition must be met in order to receive a definite referential 
interpretation of bare nominal arguments in Slavic languages. As was demonstrated in 
(97), this is not, however, a sufficient condition. In (97), a bare singular count argument 
is interpreted as indefinite, in spite of the perfective aspect marking on a verb. 
In the following, I will present Krifka’s implementation of the influence of aspect on the 
interpretation of nominal arguments. 
 
11 However, in Finnish, the accusative marking on the object of a transitive verb of motion, in 
contrast to the partitive marking, implies that the object has reached its destination. From the 
two alternatives: Risto vieritti tynnyriä.PAR / tynnyrin.ACC talolle ‘Risto rolled a barrel to the 
house’, only the partitive variant can be continued by but the barrel has never reached its 
destination. This means that, cross-linguistically, the object of a motion event might participate 
in or even determine the dimension of a (complete) path-covering. I would like to thank Luka 
Szucsich for pointing this out. 
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4.2 Theoretic implementation by Krifka 
4.2.1 Nominal reference 
The well-known assumptions about the analogies between the meanings of nominal and 
verbal expressions constitute the starting point for Krifka’s theory of aspect. It has been 
observed that the mass-count distinction in the nominal domain might correspond to the 
atelic-telic distinction at the verbal level (Leisi 1953, Taylor 1977, Bach 1986). Krifka 
(1989a), Krifka (1989b), Krifka (1989c) and Krifka (1992) describe these dependencies 
in greater detail. Therefore, in what follows, I will concentrate on his account. 
I will begin with some terminological clarifications. Krifka (1989a: 75) points out that it 
is not exactly the mass-count distinction (the distinction between mass nouns like water 
/ wine / porridge on the one hand and count nouns like book / pen / apple on the other) 
that matters for establishing different types of nominal reference. Instead, we should 
consider pairs like water vs. an apple, apples vs. six apples or coffee vs. a cup of coffee. 
The first member of each pair has cumulative reference (cf. Quine 1960); a predicate 
can be applied to both a single entity and to the sum of single entities. For example, if 
we have a predicate coffee and three entities it can be applied to, we can apply this 
predicate not only to each single entity, but also to their collection (coffee, coffee and 
coffee can still be described as coffee). The second member of each pair has quantized 
reference. For instance, a predicate a book only applies to single entities; it cannot refer 
to the collection of a book + a book, because the sum of a book and a book is two 
books. 
In order to formally capture the difference between quantized and cumulative reference, 
Krifka (1989a), Krifka (1992) uses a model of lattices and measure functions based on 
Link (1983). If our representation language contains a certain predicate S that 
characterizes individuals of a particular sort (for instance objects in contrast to events), 
then the extension of S should be a complete join semi-lattice without a bottom element. 
We can define this structure by means of some additional symbols in the representation 
language S. According Krifka, we need a two-place join operation: ∪s, and a two-place 
part: ⊆s, proper part: ⊂s and overlap relation: ∘s. Following assumptions are necessary 
in order to obtain valid interpretations (Krifka 1989a: 77): 
 
(99)  ∀x∀y[S(x) ∧ S(y) → ∃z[x∪sy=z]]  completeness 
 
(100)  ∀x∀y[x∪sy = y∪sx]       commutativity 
 
(101)  ∀x∀y[x∪sx = x]        idempotency 
 
(102)  ∀x∀y∀z[x∪s[y∪sz] = [x∪sy]∪sz]  associativity 
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(103)  ∀x∀y[x⊆sy ↔ x∪sy = y]     part 
 
(104)  ¬∃x∀y[x⊆sy]         no bottom element 
 
(105)  ∀x∀y[x⊂sy ↔ x⊆sy ∧ ¬x = y]   proper part 
 
(106)  ∀x∀y[x∘sy ↔ ∃z[z⊆sx ∧ z⊆sy]]   overlap 
 
(107)  ∀x∀y[x⊂sy → ∃x’[¬x∘sx’ ∧ x∪sx’ = y] relative complementarity 
 
We obtain the following representations for the different reference types (Krifka 1989a: 
78). 
 
(108)  ∀P[SNG(P) ↔ ∃x[P(x) ∧ ∀y[P(y) → x = y]]] 
P has singular reference 
 
(108) expresses definiteness; a predicate with a singular reference applies to exactly one 
entity. 
 
(109)  ∀P[CUMs(P) ↔ ∀x∀y[P(x) ∧ P(y) → P(x∪sy)]] 
P has cumulative reference 
 
A predicate has cumulative reference if it can be applied not only to single entities but 
also to the sum of them. 
 
(110)  ∀P[QUAs(P) ↔ ∀x∀y[P(x) ∧ P(y) → ¬y⊂sx]] 
P has quantized reference 
 
Quantized reference as illustrated in (110) means that if we apply a predicate to two 
entities x and y, then y cannot be a proper part of x. In other words, if an entity x is in the 
extension of a quantized predicate, this extension does not contain y that is a proper part 
of x. 
The most important notions are those of cumulative and quantized reference. The 
characteristics of the two reference types can be summarized as follows. If an extension 
of a cumulative predicate contains two entities x and y, then it also contains an entity 
x⌴y. In contrast, if an extension of a quantized predicate contains an entity x, it does 
not contain y that is a proper part of x (¬y⊂sx). 
The question arises as to how quantized predicates can be derived from mass nouns; in 
particular, how one derives the meaning of a glass of water on the basis of the meaning 
of water. Krifka (1989a) proposes a derivation by means of the so-called measure 
construction. 
43 
 
Following Krifka (1989a: 81), mass nouns like water, gold, porridge carry a basic 
syntactic category N. They should clearly be analyzed as cumulative predicates. 
However, one glass of water, five ounces of gold, ten grams of porridge are quantized 
predicates; for instance, the sum of two entities ten grams of porridge is twenty grams 
of porridge. Therefore, we cannot apply the predicate ten grams of porridge to the 
collection of more than one entity. 
Krifka treats expressions like one glass, five ounces, ten grams as measure phrases that 
are operators on the mass nouns. The semantics of measure phrases is established on the 
basis of a numeral (one, five, ten) and a measure function (cf. Cartwright 1975) that is 
represented by a measure term (glass, ounces, grams). The basic syntactic category of 
numerals is NM. An analysis of a measure construction five ounces of gold is presented 
in (111), cf. Krifka (1989a: 83). 
(111)   ounces[N/N,NM] λnλPλx[P(x) ∧ oz’(x) = n ∧ 
   QMOD12(P,λPλx[P(x) ∧ oz’(x) = n])] 
 5 
  
 five ounces[N/N] λPλx[P(x) ∧ oz’(x) = 5 ∧ 
   QMOD(P,λPλx[P(x) ∧ oz’(x) = 5])] 
 gold’ 
  
 five ounces (of) λx[gold’(x) ∧ oz’(x) = 5 ∧ 
 gold [N]  QMOD(gold’,λPλx[P(x) ∧ oz’(x) = 5])] 
 
QMOD is a relation called quantizing modification. It holds between a predicate and a 
predicate modifier; modifier P turns a cumulative predicate P into a quantized predicate 
P(P). The formal definition of quantizing modification is given in (112), cf. Krifka 
(1989a: 82). 
 
(112)  ∀P∀P[QMODs(P,P) ↔ ¬QUA(P) ∧ QUA(P(P))] 
 
Example (111) shows how quantizing modification changes the reference type of an 
expression that contains a cumulative mass noun; ounce is translated by an extensive 
measure function that gives the modifier λPλx[P(x) ∧ oz’(x) = 5] a quantized 
interpretation (cf. Krifka 1989a: 83). 
 
In this subsection, I have discussed cumulativity and quantization as defining criteria for 
the two types of nominal reference. In the following, I will demonstrate how these two 
properties interact with complex verbal expressions. It will be shown that, in aspectless 
languages like English or German, nominal reference of a direct object translates to the 
 
12 A lattice-structured sort of object. 
five [NM] 
gold [N] 
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entire event description; quantized nominal reference tends to enforce telicity, whereas 
cumulative nominal reference triggers an atelic event description. 
4.2.2 The influence of nominal reference on the interpretation of complex verbal 
expressions in languages that lack the grammatical category of aspect 
As was mentioned above, a verbal expression is atelic if it does not imply a natural end 
point, such as in the case of German and English laufen / run or Äpfel essen / eat apples. 
In contrast, a verbal expression is telic if it implies a natural end point, which applies to 
phrases like zwei Kilometer laufen / run two kilometers or zwei Äpfel essen / eat two 
apples. The activities mentioned in the latter case cannot be carried on for an unlimited 
amount of time; they terminate at some point and can be taken up again. The crucial 
point is that, in phrases that contain direct object arguments, the time constitution of an 
entire expression changes depending on the nominal reference of the object. This is a 
clear argument in favor of analyzing atelic and telic verbal predicates analogously to the 
cumulative and quantized interpretation of nominal predicates, respectively. For 
example, if we have two events that, separately, can be referred to as laufen / run or 
Äpfel essen / eat apples, then their collection can also be referred to as laufen / run or 
Äpfel essen / eat apples (run plus run is run, eat apples plus eat apples can still be 
described as eat apples). Furthermore, the proper part of an event of running / eating 
apples falls under run / eat apples. In contrast, in the case of two single events of zwei 
Kilometer laufen / run two kilometers or zwei Äpfel essen / eat two apples, the 
respective predicates can only apply to single events; run two kilometers plus run two 
kilometers comes to run four kilometers, and eat two apples plus eat two apples 
amounts to eat four apples. Furthermore, the proper part of run two kilometers / eat two 
apples does not fall under run two kilometers / eat two apples. Due to the above-
mentioned similarities to the two subtypes of nominal reference, I will call telic verbal 
predicates quantized and atelic verbal predicates cumulative, cf. Krifka (1989a), 
Krifka (1989b), Krifka (1989c), Krifka (1992). 
Following Krifka (1989c: 236), the notion of a natural endpoint that is a defining 
criterion for telicity can be reconstructed by means of cumulativity and quantization. 
First of all, a definition of a natural endpoint should not be applied to single events, but 
to the way they are described. If we look at a particular running, drinking or eating 
event, it always has a starting and an end point. However, consider an event e that can 
be described as drink. Its atelic / cumulative character results from the observation that 
there are events e’ that last longer than e, that contain e as their proper part, and that can 
still be described as drink. In contrast, if the same event e is described as drink a glass 
of cola, its telic / quantized property results from the fact that there are no events e’ that 
last longer than e, that contain e as their proper part, and that can still be referred to as 
drink a glass of cola. 
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To sum up, drink is cumulative, because there is no direct object argument that could 
restrict the temporal duration of an event. Drink water is also cumulative, because water 
is cumulative, and, as a result, it does not change the event-structural properties of the 
entire predicate. In contrast, drink a glass of water is quantized, because a glass of 
water is quantized, and, as a consequence, this modifies the temporal constitution of the 
complex predicate. 
Verkuyl (1972) and Platzack (1979) capture the influence of nominal complements on 
the time constitution of verbal phrases by means of transferring the so-called specified 
quantity. They provide good descriptions of the above-mentioned phenomena, but no 
explanations (cf. also Hoepelman 1976, Dowty 1979, Hoepelman & Rohrer 1980, ter 
Meulen 1984, Hinrichs 1985, Bach 1986, Dowty 1987 or Verkuyl 1988). In contrast, 
Krifka’s theory based on part structures of objects and events explains the nature of 
transferring nominal reference to verbal predicates. 
In order to apply the notions of cumulative and quantized reference to verbs, one can 
start by defining the meaning of the latter within the framework of event semantics 
(Davidson 1967, Parsons 1980, Carlson 1984). Krifka (1989a: 88) represents syntactic 
relations between a verb and its arguments and modifiers via primitive thematic 
relations (cf. also Castañeda 1967). 
In the framework of event semantics, verbs are predicates over events. For instance, 
drink applies to drinking events, eat to eating events, smile to smiling events etc. 
Consider (113) for the representation of eat (adapted from Krifka 1989c: 238). 
 
(113)  λe eat(e) 
 
The verb’s arguments are combined with these events via two-place relations that 
correspond to thematic roles like agent or patient. Consider the representation of (to) eat 
two bananas (adapted from ibid.); PAT = patient. 
 
(114)  λe∃x[eat(e) ∧ two-bananas(x) ∧ PAT(e,x)] 
 
Further participants can be attached to the verbal stem in the same way as example 
(115) – Anna is eating two bananas – illustrates (adapted from Krifka 1989c: 239); AG 
= agent; tense is omitted. 
 
(115)  λe∃x[eat(e) ∧ AG(e,Anna) ∧ two-bananas(x) ∧ PAT(e,x)] 
 
Finally, an affirmative mode is derived by replacing the lambda operator with an 
existential quantifier, as in (116), adapted from ibid. 
 
(116)  ∃e∃x[eat(e) ∧ AG(e,Anna) ∧ two-bananas(x) ∧ PAT(e,x)] 
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(117) illustrates the semantic structure of eat porridge, adapted from Krifka (1989a: 
88). 
 
(117)  eat [V/NPs,NPo] λe[eat(e) ∧ AG(e,xs) ∧ PAT(e,xo)] 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Starting with the syntactic tree on the left, one can see that verbal predicates have a 
particular set of complements that fulfill specific syntactic functions, like subject or 
object. The specification of a function is marked with a suffix (here, “s” for subject and 
“o” for object). As example (117) demonstrates, an indefinite determiner does not have 
to be expressed overtly. 
In the semantic counterpart on the right, verbs are defined as one-place predicates of 
events. As was explained above, syntactic arguments are combined with events via two-
place relations (AG and PAT in the above example), but they do not occur in the 
immediate semantic representation of a verbal stem (as in ‘drink’), cf. also Castañeda 
(1967), Carlson (1984) among others. Theta roles of syntactic arguments are established 
as part of their lexical entries. 
Now I will discuss the nature of events. Following Krifka (1989a: 90), events are 
represented by individuals and described by means of a predicate E that should be 
disjoined from O. Analogous to O, E has the form of a join semi-lattice without a 
bottom element. The distinction between telic (quantized) and atelic (cumulative) 
predicates can be captured via mapping from events to times (Krifka 1989a: 91). 
Under the assumption that every event e has its terminal time point (the final atomic 
point of the time of its duration), as already outlined above, we do not differentiate 
between telic and atelic events, but between telic and atelic event descriptions. An event 
e of the type φ is expected to have a terminal point t relative to φ iff t is the final 
temporal point of e and if there are no e’ of type φ with either e’⊂Ee or e⊂Ee’ that have 
an earlier or a later final temporal point. Otherwise, e does not have a terminal point. To 
sum up, the terminal point of is a two-place function. It takes both an event e and an 
event predicate φ. This means that a terminal point is a terminal point for an event under 
a particular description. For instance, if t is a terminal point of an event e described as 
run three kilometers, it cannot be a terminal point of e under the description run four 
kilometers. 
eat porridge [V/NPs] 
porridge [N] 
INDEF [NPo/N] 
porridge [NPo] 
λe∃xo[eat’(e) ∧ AG(e,xs) ∧ PAT(e,xo) ∧ 
porridge’(xo)] 
 
porridge’ 
λQλPλe∃xo[P(e) ∧ Q(xo)] 
λPλe∃xo[P(e) ∧ porridge’(xo)] 
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4.2.3 The role of thematic relations in triggering the reference transfer: The notion of 
an incremental patient applied to both nominal and propositional complements 
4.2.3.1 The case of nominal complements 
The crucial point is that the features of nominal reference of syntactic arguments affect 
the entire complex predicate iff an argument bears a certain thematic role. The transfer 
of a reference type can be visualized with a space-time diagram, where one axis 
represents space and the other time. Objects are represented via bands (rather than 
lines), because we need to take their spatial extensions into consideration. Events are 
mapped to the time axis. Example (118), adapted from Krifka (1989a: 91), illustrates an 
interaction between the progress of an event e that is an event of drinking a quantity of 
juice j, and the gradual disappearance of j in the course of drinking. 
(118)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(118) shows that the object can be subjected to the event in a gradual manner. For 
instance, consider two different descriptions of a situation that relates to drinking juice. 
First, let e represent drink juice and j juice. Juice is cumulative, which means that it can 
be applied to its proper part j’. As a result, a predicate drink juice is also cumulative and 
applicable to its proper part e’. Second, j could be described as a glass of juice, and the 
entire predicate e as drink a glass of juice. In this case, however, no proper part of a 
glass of juice can be described with a glass of juice, and, consequently, no proper part 
of drink a glass of juice with drink a glass of juice. 
The transfer of properties of thematic relations can be formalized based on the 
homomorphism from objects to events. The following relations can hold between 
events and objects (Krifka 1989a: 92): 
 
(119)  ∀R[SUM(R) ↔ ∀e∀e’∀x∀x’[R(e,x) ∧ R(e’,x’) → R(e∪Ee’,x∪Ox’)]] 
Summativity 
 
(120)  ∀R[UNI-O(R) ↔ ∀e∀x∀x’[R(e,x) ∧ R(e,x’) → x = x’]] 
Uniqueness of objects 
 
s 
t 
j 
e 
j' 
e' 
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(121)  ∀R[UNI-E(R) ↔ ∀e∀e’∀x[R(e,x) ∧ R(e’,x) → e = e’]] 
Uniqueness of events 
 
(122)  ∀R[MAP-O(R) ↔ ∀e∀e’∀x[R(e,x) ∧ e’⊆Ee → ∃x’[x’⊆Ox ∧ R(e’,x’)]]] 
Mapping to objects 
 
(123)  ∀R[MAP-E(R) ↔ ∀e∀x∀x’[R(e,x) ∧ x’⊆Ox → ∃e’[e’⊆Ee ∧ R(e’,x’)]]] 
Mapping to events 
 
The basic interaction between thematic relations and the join operation is characterized 
by summativity (cumulativity for two-place relations), cf. (119). According to Krifka 
(1992: 43), summativity is the most general property, which holds for all patient 
relations and possibly for all thematic relations in general. In brief, it says that there are 
no restrictions on the size of the entities that are connected to each other via theta roles 
(but this still means that each theta role can be saturated only once). Summativity is an 
intuitive notion; for instance, if there are two distinct events of eating two apples, they 
can be merged into an event of eating four apples (see also the derivation of cumulative 
readings in Scha 1981). 
Under the assumption that summativity applies to the experiencer and the stimulus 
relation (and not only to patient relations), it can capture the meaning of sentences like 
Ania and Maciek admired eight dogs. We can consider the scenario where Ania admired 
five dogs, Maciek admired three dogs, and the two sets of dogs did not overlap. For the 
count noun relation, we need an extensive measure function that is consistent with the 
object lattice. See (124), which is a representation of the above sentence, adapted from 
Krifka (1992: 43). 
 
(124)  admire(e1) ∧ EXP(e1,Ania) ∧ STI(e1,x1) ∧ dog(x1,5) 
 admire(e2) ∧ EXP(e2,Maciek) ∧ STI(e2,x2) ∧ dog(x2,3) 
 ¬[x1 ∘ x2] 
 admire(e1∪e2) ∧ EXP(e1∪e2,Ania∪Maciek) ∧ STI(e1∪e2,x1∪x2) ∧ 
dog(x1∪x2,8) 
 
Uniqueness of objects relates an event to at most one object, cf. (120). This property 
applies for example to an event eating an apple; here, the eating event is connected to 
the particular apple as its patient and to nothing else (in a simplified way, there is 
exactly one apple that a particular event of eating an apple can be associated with). 
The relation uniqueness of events, cf. (121), holds iff an object (patient) can be in a 
thematic relation to only one event. Taking the example of verbs of consumption, for a 
specific apple / plate of soup / glass of water, there is only one eating / drinking event 
available (we cannot have multiple events of eating a particular apple / drinking a 
particular glass of water). 
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Most important for the purpose of this dissertation are the notions mapping to objects 
and mapping to events, cf. (122) and (123). In the former case, every part of an event 
correlates with a specific part of an object; hence, every part of an event eating an apple 
relates to the specific part of this apple, giving rise to the gradual disappearance of the 
apple during eating. In the latter case, the affectedness of an object matches the progress 
of an event; every part of an apple / soup being eaten / a glass of water being drunk 
corresponds to the particular part of the event of eating / drinking, i.e. mirrors progress 
in the realization of that event (Krifka 1989a: 92). 
Based on the homomorphism principle, we can define iterativity, which is an aspectual 
non-obligatory component of meaning, belonging to the area of Aktionsarten. 
Technically speaking, iterativity is a relation between an event e, an object x, and a 
thematic relation R, which states that at least one part of x relates to at least two 
different parts of e. It applies, for instance, to the meaning of the English phrase (to) 
read at least one part of the book twice and its Polish (im)perfective counterparts 
(prze)czytać dwa razy co najmniej jedną część książki (without considering the impact 
of aspect). See (125), taken from Krifka (1989a: 93). 
 
(125)  ∀e,x,R[ITER(e,x,R) ↔ R(e,x) ∧ ∃e’∃e’’∃x’[e’⊆Ee ∧ e’’⊆Ee ∧ ¬e’ = e’’ ∧ 
x’⊆Ox ∧ R(e’,x’) ∧ R(e’’,x’)]] 
 
Since iterativity is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I will not discuss it in further 
detail. 
We still need to define the properties that are necessary for thematic relations to allow 
for the reference transfer from nominal arguments to verbal predicates. Consider (126), 
where sentences of the type read a book / bake a cake are represented by φ, and (127), 
the exemplification of (126); adapted from Krifka (ibid.). 
 
(126)  φ = λe∃x[α(e) ∧ δ(x) ∧ θ(e,x)] 
 
(127)  read-a-book = λe∃x[read(e) ∧ book(x,1) ∧ PAT(e,x)] 
 
In the above examples, α is a place holder for a verbal predicate, δ for a nominal 
predicate and θ for a thematic relation (in our case patient). 
Now, we can define cumulativity for predicates like read books, bake cakes, etc. (Krifka 
ibid.). 
 
(128)  ∀P∀Q∀R[CUMO(P) ∧ CUME(Q) ∧ SUM(R) → CUME(λe∃x[P(e) ∧ Q(x) ∧ R(e,x)])] 
 
In brief, (128) states that φ is cumulative if δ is cumulative and θ is summative. The 
basis for the validity of (128) can be formulated as follows. Consider the situation with 
e1 and e2 (which can be alike), and the corresponding φ(e1), φ(e2). Following the 
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definition of φ in (126), there must be two objects: x1, x2, too. Furthermore, it holds 
that: α(e1), δ(x1), θ(e1,x1), and: α(e2), δ(x2), θ(e2,x2). Due to the cumulativity of α and δ, 
we can assume: α(e1∪Ee2) and δ(x1∪Ox2). Finally, because θ is summative, we obtain: 
θ(e1∪Ee2,x1∪Ox2). As a result, if: φ(e1∪Ee2), then: CUMULATIVE(φ) (Krifka ibid.). 
An essential notion introduced by Krifka is graduality / incrementality. This property 
of an object (and an entire predicate) plays a crucial role in triggering the interaction 
between aspect and veridicality in Slavic languages, which is the major topic of this 
dissertation. Graduality results from the interplay between uniqueness of objects, 
mapping to objects and mapping to events, cf. (129), taken from Krifka (1989a: 96). Its 
intuitive meaning was demonstrated via the space-time-diagram in (118). 
 
(129)  ∀R[GRAD(R) ↔ UNI-O(R) ∧ MAP-O(R) ∧ MAP-E(R)] 
 
A nominal object of a transitive verb can bear one of five different semantic roles. Some 
of these roles implicate a gradual meaning of a complex verbal expression. Four of them 
are subrealizations of patient; three out of four patient types are gradual patients. 
Consider (130), adapted from Krifka (1989a: 96). 
 
(130)  example summativity graduality uniqueness 
of events 
label 
 write a 
poem 
X X X gradual 
effected 
patient 
 eat a carrot X X X gradual 
consumed 
patient 
 read a book X X – gradual 
patient 
 stroke a dog X – – affected 
patient 
 admire an 
orca 
X – – stimulus 
 
In the following, the event-structural differences between non-gradual and gradual 
patients are summarized by means of the space-time diagrams. 
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(131) Non-gradual simultaneous patient (Simultan-Patiens; henceforth, SIM),  
   adapted from Krifka (1989b: 160) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example (131) demonstrates the event-structural properties of see juice (j) / see a glass 
of juice, where the entire predicate is cumulative regardless of the nominal reference of 
a direct object argument. In other words, it is only the cumulativity of see that 
determines the referential properties of the complex construction. The objects juice / a 
glass of juice are not subjected to the event of seeing (something) by degrees and they 
can be seen as a whole regardless of their underlying reference types. Consider (132) for 
the semantic representation of ‘see juice’, adapted from Krifka (1989b: 161). 
 
(132)  = λe∃x[see(e) ∧ juice(x) ∧ SIM(e,x)] 
 
Example (133) illustrates the internal structure of verbs that take gradual patients. 
(133) Gradual (successive) patient (Sukzessiv-Patiens; henceforth, SUK),  
  adapted from Krifka (1989b: 159). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s 
j 
see 
see j 
t 
a glass of j 
see 
see a glass of j 
s 
t 
j 
drink 
drink j 
t 
a glass of j 
drink 
drink a glass of j 
t 
s s 
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In contrast to verbs of perception exemplified in (131), the nominal reference of 
complements of verbs of consumption translates to the reference of the entire predicate. 
The objects of the drinking relation described in (133) are subjected to verbal events in 
a gradual manner; there is a 1:1 relationship between (sub)objects and (sub)events. In 
both cases, the object is disappearing in the course of drinking. As was mentioned 
above, the difference between juice and a glass of juice in examples like (133) lies in 
the restriction on part relations: Whereas the horizontal subbands still fall under juice, 
they no longer fall under a glass of juice. For this reason, we cannot access single parts 
in the case of events with quantized reference. The semantic representation of ‘drink 
juice’ is illustrated in (134), adapted from Krifka (1989b: 161). 
 
(134)  = λe∃x[drink(e) ∧ juice(x) ∧ SUK(e,x)] 
 
Finally, there is a distinction between gradual and gradual effected patient. Consider 
example (135). 
 
(135) Gradual patient vs. gradual effected patient, adapted from 
  Krifka (1989b: 160). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example (135) visualizes different ways of realizing incrementality. Starting from the 
left, the object of the relation read a book is gradually subjected to the reading event, 
but it exists independently of the existence of that event; the book exists before, during 
and after the event of reading happens. The incrementality of read a book results from 
having fewer and fewer pages left in the course of reading. In the case of build a house, 
the object does not exist at all till the beginning of the building event. A house is being 
created in the course of building, i.e. we have the gradual creation of an object. In (135), 
both complex verbal expressions are quantized due to the quantized reference of a book 
/ a house. If the above situations were described as read books / build houses, the 
a book 
read 
read a book 
t 
a house 
build 
build a house 
t 
s s 
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subbands of books / houses would still fall under books / houses, and, consequently, the 
subparts of the respective events would still be describable as read books / build houses. 
In this section, I aimed to show that not every kind of patient implies an incremental 
relation between an object and a verbal event. In the following, I will propose an 
analogous classification for clausal patients. 
4.2.3.2 The case of propositional complements 
Propositional objects can be analyzed analogously to nominal objects as presented in 
(130). For clausal patients, I propose the scheme in (136). It should be pointed out that it 
is not the meaning of the object itself that undergoes an incremental change in the case 
of the clausal arguments investigated in this dissertation. Rather, graduality / 
incrementality of transitive verbs with propositional complements is based on 
collecting evidence / proving supporting pieces of evidence that, collectively, reveal 
proposition p. Incrementality makes it possible to explain the veridicality-related 
differences between the perfective and the imperfective reveal-type predicates in Polish 
(and in many other Slavic and non-Slavic languages, for instance Hungarian). In Polish, 
the perfective dowiódł / pokazał / wykazał, że p ‘(he) proved / showed / revealed that p’ 
denote a complete proving of p (the existence of a proof), whereas the imperfective 
dowodził / pokazywał / wykazywał, że p ‘(he) was proving / showing / revealing that p’ 
imply the presence of partial evidence. Crucially, the presence of a proof gives rise to 
truth-entailment. For that reason, the notion of incrementality that was primarily 
established for nominal arguments should be extended / redefined for clauses. 
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(136)  example summativity graduality uniqueness 
of events 
label 
 prove [that 
Iza is a 
thief] 
X X – gradual 
revealed 
patient 
 show [that 
Iza is a 
thief] 
X X – gradual 
revealed 
patient 
 reveal [that 
Iza is a 
thief] 
X X – gradual 
revealed 
patient 
 guess [that 
Iza is a 
thief] 
X – – revealed 
patient 
 say [that Iza 
is a thief] 
X – – (speech act-
based) 
uttered 
patient 
 
This requires an explanation of why the objects of verbs of communication, which are 
accomplishments, are not treated as gradual patients. There is cross-linguistic evidence 
for the event-structural differences between reveal-type and speech-act verbs. For 
instance, in Finnish, which distinguishes between accusative and partitive case, 
transitive incremental theme verbs combine with nouns marked for either the accusative 
or the partitive, giving rise to quantized and cumulative readings of verbal predicates, 
respectively (cf. Dahl & Karlsson 1976, Karlsson 1983, Tommola 1990, Filip 2001). In 
contrast, an informal investigation among Finnish native speakers13 revealed that verbs 
of communication, for example sanoa ‘say’, only combine with accusative objects – cf. 
(137) vs. (138) – which speaks against their incremental character and supports the role 
of incrementality in triggering truth-entailment. Finnish equivalents of he proved / 
showed it best / right are possible with both accusative and partitive case. 
(137)   Hamlet sanoi sen kauniimmin. 
 Hamlet said it.ACC more.beautifully 
 ‘Hamlet said it best.’ 
 
 
13 I would especially like to thank Dara Jokilehto for his judgements. 
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(138)  * Hamlet sanoi sitä kauniimmin. 
  Hamlet said it.PAR more.beautifully 
 
The object of guess cannot be gradual either, since the verb refers to a punctual event. 
Importantly, all events described in (136) lack the property uniqueness of events. This 
is due to the fact that, in all cases, the same proposition can be proved / shown / 
revealed / guessed / said multiple times and within the limits of different episodes (there 
can be two distinct events e1 and e2 which both reveal the same proposition p). 
In this subsection, I have proposed the transfer of the notion graduality / incrementality 
from verbal phrases with nominal to verbal phrases with propositional complements. A 
more detailed characterization of the mechanism will be given in sections 4.2.4,12.1.2 
and 12.2. 
In the following, I will introduce two aspect-dependent subtypes of an incremental 
patient in Polish. 
4.2.4 Two subtypes of an incremental patient in the case of the perfective and the 
imperfective reveal-type verbs in Polish 
(139) shows the most relevant properties of propositional objects of (im)perfective 
reveal-type predicates in Polish. 
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(139)  example graduality partial 
reveal 
complete 
reveal 
label 
 udowodnić.PFV 
that p ‘prove’ 
X X X completely 
revealed gradual 
patient 
udowadniać.IPFV 
that p ‘prove’ 
X X –  partially 
revealed gradual 
patient 
 dowieść.PFV 
that p ‘prove’ 
X X X completely 
revealed gradual 
patient 
dowodzić.IPFV 
that p ‘prove’ 
X X – partially 
revealed gradual 
patient 
 pokazać.PFV 
that p ‘show’ 
X X X completely 
revealed gradual 
patient 
pokazywać.IPFV 
that p ‘show’ 
X X – partially 
revealed gradual 
patient 
 wykazać.PFV 
that p ‘reveal’ 
X X X completely 
revealed gradual 
patient 
wykazywać.IPFV 
that p ‘reveal’ 
X X – partially 
revealed gradual 
patient 
 
Perfective clause-embedding reveal-type predicates are systematically assigned the so-
called completely revealed gradual patient, whereas their imperfective counterparts 
bear the partially revealed gradual patient. Complete reveal means that there is proof 
for the proposition expressed by the that-clause. Partial reveal means that evidence 
available is not sufficient to establish proof. The complete reveal (CR) is established on 
the basis of partial reveals (PR) (the perfective closes the ongoing process of proving 
that is expressed by the imperfective). Therefore, it holds that: 
 
(140)  [REVEAL-TYPE(P) ∧ PFV(P) → ∃p[PR(p)⊑CR(p)]] 
 
In contrast, only partial reveals can be attested for the imperfective: 
 
(141)  [REVEAL-TYPE(P) ∧ IPFV(P) → ∃p[PR(p)⋢CR(p)]] 
 
In the following, I will present a reverse case of the transfer of reference type to the one 
illustrated in section 4.2.2. It will be explained how the grammatical aspect in Slavic 
languages affects the interpretation of direct object arguments. 
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4.2.5 The influence of aspect on the interpretation of nominal complements in Slavic 
languages 
According to Wierzbicka (1967), Krifka (1989a), Krifka (1989b), Krifka (1989c), 
Krifka (1992) among others, the reference transfer from aspectual operators to bare 
nominals in Slavic languages can result in the correlations perfective aspect, definite 
object on the one hand, and imperfective aspect, indefinite object on the other. This is 
due to the fact that the distinctions in both (im)perfectivity and (in)definiteness interact 
with distinctions in reference type. 
The (in)definite interpretations of bare nominals in Slavic languages can be 
disambiguated through their semantic representations. Consider (142) for Czech, 
adapted from Krifka (1992: 49). 
(142)  víno i.  λx[wine(x)] 
  ii.  λx[x = FU(wine) ∧ wine(x)] 
 hruška i.  λx[pear(x,1)] 
  ii.  λx[x = FU(λx[pear(x,1)]) ∧ pear(x,1)] 
 hrušky i.  λx[pear(x)] 
  ii.  λx[x = FU(pears) ∧ pears(x)] 
Definite noun phrases (the ‘ii.’ variants) are represented as predicates that apply to the 
fusion FU of all elements of a predicate, provided that the predicate itself is applicable to 
the fusion. For instance, the wine applies to the fusion of the whole (contextually given) 
quantity of wine. Since wine is cumulative, ‘the whole quantity of wine’ is also a 
quantity of wine. By analogy, the pears refer to the whole quantity of pears (to the 
fusion of all pears). In contrast, the pear matches exactly one pear. If there is more than 
one pear, however, the fusion of the single objects each falling under (a) pear would not 
fall under (a) pear anymore. This means that, whereas hruška (and its Polish 
counterpart gruszka) are quantized independently of their interpretation, the (in)definite 
readings of víno (Polish wino) and hrušky (Polish gruszki) show different referential 
properties; their definite interpretation, which results in singular reference, implies 
quantization, and their indefinite interpretation implies cumulativity (Krifka ibid.). 
In section 4.1, I assumed that perfectivity triggers definiteness and imperfectivity 
indefiniteness. However, Krifka (1992: 50) points out that a verb marked for the 
perfective aspect allows for an indefinite object, provided that this object is quantized. 
Consider (143), adapted from Krifka (1992: 49). Therefore, Krifka suggests that it is 
quantization and not definiteness that is enforced by perfectivity. 
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(143)  Czech: Snědl hrušku. 
  ate.PFV pear 
  ‘He ate a pear/the pear.’ 
 Polish: Zjadł gruszkę. 
  ate.PFV pear 
  ‘He ate a pear/the pear.’ 
 Russian: On s’jel grushu. 
  he ate.PFV pear 
  ‘He ate a pear/the pear.’ 
 
Krifka assumes that perfective aspect presupposes quantization of an entire verbal 
predicate. The fundamental role of the perfective lies in marking completion of a verbal 
event. However, we can only talk about completion if events in the extension of a verbal 
predicate are not such that their proper parts are in this extension too. In that sense, 
completion translates to a quantization restriction. 
 
(144)  PFV(P) presupposes: P is quantized (Krifka 1989c: 252). 
 
In contrast, the imperfective aspect blocks quantization. 
 
(145)  IPFV(P) presupposes: P is not quantized (Krifka ibid.). 
 
Under the assumption that the scope of aspectual operators covers the complex verbal 
expression (both the verb and its object), we receive two types of interpretations of 
predicates, depending on aspect, cf. (146) and (147), adapted from Krifka (1989c: 252). 
The crucial part of the definition is the restriction on thematic relation TH-REL. 
 
(146)  PFV(λe∃x[VERB(e) ∧ NOUN(x) ∧ TH-REL(e,x)]) 
 
(147)  IPFV(λe∃x[VERB(e) ∧ NOUN(x) ∧ TH-REL(e,x)]) 
 
Krifka (1989b: 187) proposes following semantic representations for a definite 
quantized (148) and an indefinite cumulative (149) interpretation of bare nouns like vino 
(Czech) / wino (Polish) ‘wine’ in constructions of the type ‘PFV-drink wine’ vs. 
‘drink.IPFV wine’.14 
 
(148)  λx[x=MAX(Wein)] 
 
(149)  λx[Wein(x)] 
 
 
14 For possible refinements see the mereotopological notion of border proposed by Grimm 
(2012). 
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According to (146) and (147), the features [± perfective] are being passed on within an 
entire construction. Their function is to control for (a)telicity. Two rules are necessary 
in order to describe this transfer. First, if two expressions λ and β build a well-formed 
unit λβ, and if λ bears a feature m, then λβ also bears a feature m. Second, if λ is a 
sentence radical (a state of affairs; a verbal predicate with no unsaturated argument 
positions, cf. Lewis 1972) with the feature [+ perfective], it can only be semantically 
well-formed if it denotes a quantized expression. The feature [+ perfective] can be 
deleted after the completion of the proving process. In contrast, if λ is a sentence radical 
with the feature [+ imperfective], it can only be semantically well-formed if it denotes a 
cumulative expression. The feature [+ imperfective] can be deleted after the completion 
of the proving process. Consider example (150) (adapted from Krifka 1989b: 187), 
where the Polish perfective incremental theme verb zjeść ‘to eat’ incorrectly combines 
with an indefinite/cumulative reading of an object. 
 
(150)  Marek zjadł kaszę.[][PFV] ‘Marek ate porridge.’ 
 #λe∃x[eat(e) ∧ porridge(x) ∧ SUK(e,x) ∧ AG(e,m)] 
 
Since the verb in (150) is marked for the perfective aspect, the entire predicate must 
denote a quantized expression. However (and as expected), the exact opposite holds for 
the above structure. Let’s consider e1 and x1 in the following constellation: eat(e1) 
∧porridge(x1) ∧ SUK(e1,x1) ∧ AG(e1,m). Due to the divisibility of ‘porridge’ in its above 
representation, we can assume: x2 ⊂ x1, with porridge(x2). Due to the divisibility of ‘eat’ 
and the definition of the SUK-relation15, we can assume: e2 ⊂ e1, with eat(e2) and 
SUK(e2,x2). Finally, it is plausible to assume: AG(e2,m). As a result, both e1 and e2 with e2 
⊂ e1 are in the extension of the verbal predicate, which provides an incorrect 
interpretation of the sentence ‘Marek zjadł.PFV kaszę.’ In order to derive its suitable 
reading, a definite interpretation of the object needs to be used, as illustrated in (151). 
 
(151)  Marek zjadł kaszę.[][PFV] ‘Marek ate porridge.’ 
 λe∃x[eat(e) ∧ x=MAX16 (porridge) ∧ SUK(e,x) ∧ AG(e,m)] 
 
Krifka’s account works well for cases where there is a 1:1 relationship between 
perfectivity and telicity (or between perfectivity and quantization) and where the object 
argument is realized as an incremental theme. See Filip (2001) for the model’s 
extension. 
 
15 SUK(e,x) ∧ x‘ ⊂ x → ∃e’[e’ ⊂ e ∧ SUK(e,‘x‘)] and 
SUK(e,x) ∧ e‘ ⊂ e → ∃x’[x’ ⊂ x ∧ SUK(e,‘x‘)], adapted from Krifka (1989b: 161). 
16 Since there is no x’, there cannot be an e’ either, so that only the complete event can be in the 
extension of the verbal predicate. 
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In the following, I will discuss (non)aspectual factors that determine factivity of clause-
embedding verbs. The main part of this chapter (and of this dissertation) is the role of 
perfectivity in triggering factivity.   
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5 Factive interpretation of clause-embedding predicates 
5.1 Non-aspectual factors that enforce a factive interpretation of clause-
embedding verbs 
5.1.1 Correlates 
Hegarty (1992b: 6) observed that the presence of correlates (object expletives) gives rise 
to discourse-givenness of embedded propositions. Correlates are anaphoric expressions 
that occur in the matrix sentence, but refer to the object argument expressed by the 
subordinate clause. Consider example (152), taken from ibid. 
(152)  I was talking to our agents in Russia yesterday, 
 a. and they noticed that Max went to Moscow last week. 
 b. and they noticed it that Max went to Moscow last week. 
 
Hegarty claims that, in (152), the that-sentences in both a. and b. receive a factive 
interpretation, but differ with respect to their information-structural status: whereas the 
proposition expressed by the that-clause in a. counts as new (the hearer is not expected 
to know about Max’s trip to Moscow), the one in b. is established as known / discourse-
given (the sentence is odd in a scenario where the hearer does not know about Max’s 
trip to Moscow). However, consider the following examples. 
 
(153)  They noticed that Max went to Moscow last week. 
 → Max went to Moscow last week. 
 
(154)  They did not notice that Max went to Moscow last week. 
 ↛ Max went to Moscow last week. 
 
(155)  They did not notice it that Max went to Moscow last week. 
 → Max went to Moscow last week. 
 
It seems that notice is veridical rather than factive; (154) could be followed by 
Fortunately, our colleagues in France noticed that he went to Paris though, so we are 
on his trail again, which shows that the truth-inference from (153) does not survive 
under negation. Interestingly, (155), which is enriched by the expletive pronoun, 
presupposes that the complement sentence holds in the actual world. This suggests that 
correlates might trigger both discourse-givenness and factivity, and, even more 
importantly, that there is a relationship between these two.17 Hegarty (1992a: 45) 
observed such a parallel for accept, confirm and verify. He noticed that these verbs 
 
17 The interaction between discourse-givenness and factivity can be seen as a clausal equivalent 
to the interaction between perfectivity and definiteness. It also provides another argument for 
the relationship between definiteness and factivity. 
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presuppose the truth of their sentential complements when the latter are introduced by 
correlates, cf. (156) vs. (157), adapted from ibid. 
 
(156)  They don’t accept that loneliness causes cancer. 
 They didn’t confirm that loneliness causes cancer. 
 They didn’t verify that loneliness causes cancer. 
 ↛ Loneliness causes cancer. 
 
(157)  They don’t accept it that loneliness causes cancer. 
 They didn’t confirm it that loneliness causes cancer. 
 They didn’t verify it that loneliness causes cancer. 
 → Loneliness causes cancer. 
 
The influence of correlates on the veridical / factive interpretation of matrix verbs was 
also attested for German, cf. Sudhoff (2003), Schwabe (2013), Schwabe & Fittler 
(2014). According to Schwabe (2013), the es-correlate in German can, but does not 
have to trigger factivity. Verbs that become factive when combined with es are for 
instance hören dass ‘to hear that’, bedauern dass ‘to regret that’, sich freuen dass ‘to be 
pleased (about) that’, and verbs that do not beweisen dass ‘to prove that’ or erreichen 
dass ‘to achieve that’. 
Furthermore, in Albanian and Greek, clitic pronouns that double a clausal complement 
trigger factivity of originally non-factive verbs. Compare (158) vs. (159) for Albanian, 
and (160) vs. (161) for Greek, adapted from Kallulli (2006: 212). 
(158)  Besova se Beni shkoi (por në fakt ai nuk 
 believed-I that Ben left (but in fact he not 
 shkoi). 
 left 
 ‘I believed that Ben left (but in fact he didn’t).’ 
 
(159)  E besova se Beni shkoi (*por në fakt ai 
 itCL,ACC believed-I that Ben left (but in fact he 
 nuk shkoi). 
 not left 
 ‘I believed the fact that Ben left (*but in fact he didn’t).’ 
 
(160)  Pistepsa oti o Janis efije (ala stin pragmatikotita 
 believed-I that the Janis left (but in.the reality 
 den ejine kati tetio. 
 NEG happened something such 
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(161)  To pistepsa oti o Janis efije (*ala stin 
 itCL,ACC believed-I that the Janis left (but in.the 
 pragmatikotita den ejine kati tetio. 
 reality NEG happened something such 
 
However, the correlate-based factivity is mostly context-dependent. Consider example 
(162), where factivity of to notice it that vanishes after providing an appropriate 
scenario. 
 
(162)  Some people have claimed that Max could have gone to Moscow last 
week, which would have caused serious problems. However, neither of our 
agents noticed it that Max went to Moscow last week. He probably went to 
Rome. 
 
It seems plausible to assume that a discourse-given proposition tends to be established 
as true, i.e. acknowledged by the participants. To put it more precisely, if a proposition 
is not at-issue, it is not meant to be verified with respect to its truthfulness; it simply 
functions as a discourse referent that is picked up in the course of the conversation. 
The above examples show that discourse-givenness can, but need not go along with 
factivity. Verb semantics and contextual properties play an important role in this 
transition too. 
Interestingly, in some languages, correlates can only refer to non-factive complement 
sentences. For instance, the correlate azt in Hungarian always appears in the focus 
position of an embedding verb. As a result, the embedded proposition it relates to 
cannot be presupposed. This pattern was discovered by Cuba & Ürögdi (2001); see 
examples (163) and (164), adapted from Cuba & Ürögdi (2010: 44). 
 
(163)  Péter (*azt) sajnálja, hogy havazik. 
 Peter DEM-ACC regrets that snows 
 ‘Peter is sorry that it’s snowing.’ 
 
(164)  Péter azt mondta, (hogy) havazik. 
 Peter DEM-ACC said that snows 
 ‘Peter said that it’s snowing.’ 
 
It is worth-mentioning, though, that azt is optional with non-factives. Consider (165) 
and (166), adapted from Cuba & Ürögdi (2010: 44). 
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(165)  János azt állította, (hogy) Mari megnyerte 
 János DEM-ACC claimed that Mari won 
 a lottót.       
 the lottery-ACC       
 ‘John claimed that Mary won the lottery.’ 
 
(166)  János állította, hogy Mari megnyerte a lottót. 
 János claimed that Mari won the lottery-ACC 
 ‘John claimed that Mary won the lottery.’ 
 
According to the authors, both (165) and (166) could be uttered in the following 
scenario: All of a sudden, Mary ended up with a lot of money, but nobody knew how 
(ibid.). The complement proposition is presupposed neither in (165) nor in (166). 
However, whereas the information focus is put on the complement sentence in (165), it 
is put on the matrix verb in (166). At the same time, the authors assume that this 
information-structural split does not correspond to novelty vs. givenness, which opens 
the question concerning how information focus is to be understood there (cf. for 
instance Kiss 1998, who claims that information focus conveys new information). 
Cuba & Ürögdi (2010) suggest that the difference between pairs like (165) and (166) 
lies in the (non)referentiality of the complement, i.e. in the presence or absence of an 
illocutionary force within a subordinate clause. Since this topic is beyond the scope of 
my dissertation, I will not discuss it in greater detail. 
Regarding (im)perfective clause-embedding verbs in Polish, it seems that perfective 
rather than imperfective variants occur with correlates. The reason for this might lie in 
the need for maintaining the ‘factivity-balance’ of a complex expression; if correlates 
require that the utterances they correspond to hold in the actual world, they should 
rather combine with verbs that only embed true propositions. However, depending on 
the semantic class a matrix verb belongs to, a correlate can fulfill multiple functions; it 
can signal discourse-givenness of a true proposition (proposition embedded under a 
factive verb), cf. (167), or discourse-givenness of a neutral proposition (regardless of 
aspectual marking on a matrix verb), cf. (168). Sometimes a correlate contributes to 
factivity when combined with an imperfective non-factive verb (especially in the case of 
imperfective counterparts of perfective presuppositions verbs; these imperfective verbs 
seem to have both a factive and a non-factive interpretation, see experimental results), 
cf. (169). 
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(167)  Nawet Ola tego nie przeczuła / wyczuła 
 even Ola it.GEN NEG sensed.PFV / sensed.PFV 
 / przewidziała / żałowała, że Marek jest zdrajcą. 
 / predicted.PFV / regretted.IPFV that Marek is traitor 
 ‘Even Ola did not sense it / predict it /regret it that Marek is a traitor.’ 
 → Marek is a traitor. 
 → The proposition ‘Marek is a traitor’ is discourse-given. 
 
(168)  Nawet Ola to powiedziała / mówiła / ogłosiła 
 even Ola it.ACC said.PFV / said.IPFV / announced.PFV 
 / ogłaszała, że Marek jest zdrajcą. 
 / announced.IPFV that Marek is traitor 
 ‘Even Ola said it18 / was saying it / announced it / was announcing it that 
Marek is a traitor.’ 
 ↛ Marek is a traitor. 
 → The proposition ‘Marek is a traitor’ is discourse-given. 
 
(169)  Nawet Ola tego nie przeczuwała / wyczuwała 
 even Ola it.GEN NEG sensed.IPFV / sensed.IPFV 
 / przewidywała, że Marek jest zdrajcą. 
 / predicted.IPFV that Marek is traitor 
 ‘Even Ola was not sensing it / predicting it that Marek is a traitor.’ 
 → Marek is a traitor. 
 → The proposition ‘Marek is a traitor’ is discourse-given. 
 
To sum it up, it seems that correlates interact with factivity in the sense that discourse-
givenness can indicate the establishment of a proposition as true. However, this is only 
a possible, but not a necessary function of object expletives. Their primary role is to 
mark any kind of givenness. If a proposition is established as given, it is often not meant 
to be verified regarding its holding or non-holding, hence it tends to be acknowledged 
as true. We have seen that, in German, the correlate es can, but does not have to enforce 
a clausal complement of a non-factive verb to be true. It can further be combined with 
an (inherently) factive verb in order to mark discourse-givenness of an embedded 
proposition. However, in contrast to English, German or Polish, clitic pronouns in 
Albanian and Greek make non-factive verbs like ‘believe’ factive. This reveals a cross-
linguistic variation with respect to the relationship between discourse-givenness and 
factivity. In Polish, the correlate can mark discourse-givenness of a proposition 
embedded under a factive verb like przeczuć ‘sense.PFV’ or a ‘neutral’ verb like 
powiedzieć ‘say.PFV’. It can finally trigger both factivity of a matrix verb and discourse-
givenness of a clausal complement, especially in the case of imperfective twins of 
presupposition verbs like przeczuwać ‘sense.IPFV’. 
 
18 English native speakers prefer the version without it; announce, in contrast to say, can be 
followed by the fact. 
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In the next subsection, I will discuss the relationship between prosody and factivity, i.e. 
the way the former affects the latter. 
5.1.2 Prosody 
According to Kallulli (2006), deaccenting an embedded sentence can give rise to a 
factive or veridical interpretation of a non-veridical matrix verb. Consider (170) for 
English and (171) for German, both adapted from Kallulli (2006: 215). The author 
claims that believe and glauben receive a factive interpretation, because they carry a 
nuclear pitch accent. 
(170)  I didn’t see John leave my party, but then he called me from his home 
phone. Now it was obvious. I BELIEVED19 that John left. 
 
(171)  Ich gab bekannt (die Tatsache), dass Peter verstarb. Zuerst wollte Hans 
nichts davon wissen. Dann zeigte ich ihm die Todesanzeige, und nun sah er 
die Sache anders. Er GLAUBTE, dass Peter verstarb. 
‘I made known (the fact) that Peter died. At first Hans didn’t want to hear 
of it. Then I showed him the death certificate and now he saw the matter 
differently. He believed that Peter died.’ 
 
A similar pattern holds for Polish, as demonstrated by Danielewiczowa (2002) (see also 
chapter 0 of this dissertation). In a nutshell, some epistemic imperfective non-factive 
verbs ‘become’ factive if they carry the primary stress. However, it does not work for 
wierzyć ‘believe’, but it does, for instance, for podejrzewać (see chapter 6.1 for a 
detailed discussion). Examples (172) and (173) illustrate the contrast in question. If 
uttered out of the blue, (173), as opposed to (172), presupposes that the complement 
sentence holds in the actual world. 
 
(172)  Jan podejrzewa, że go zwolnią, ale nie ma racji. 
‘Jan suspects.IPFV that he will be fired, but he is not right.’ 
↛ Jan will be fired. 
 
(173)  #Jan PODEJRZEWA, że go zwolnią, ale nie ma racji. 
‘Jan suspects.IPFV that he will be fired, but he is not right.’ 
→ Jan will be fired. 
 
As in the case of correlates, the stress-bound factivity can vanish in suitable scenarios 
(cf. for instance Ishihara & Ürögdi 2011). It seems that deaccenting a that-clause 
primarily signals its givenness in the discourse, which, in some cases, corresponds to its 
acknowledgement as true. 
 
19 Upper case indicates the nuclear pitch accent. 
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In the next subsection, I will discuss the role of the type of embedding in triggering 
factivity. 
5.1.3 Embedded questions and the notion of parts of propositions 
Following Karttunen (1977: 387), questions denote sets of propositions that express 
their true answers.20 Karttunen (ibid.) argues for this definition with the aid of the 
meaning of question-embedding verbs like to depend on. Consider example (174). 
 
(174)  Who is elected depends on who is running. (Karttunen 1977: 387) 
 
In (174), the true answer to the question from the subject position depends on the true 
answer to the question from the object position. The adequate interpretation of to 
depend on can be predicted if one assumes that indirect questions denote sets of 
propositions that, taken together, reveal a true and complete answer to the question. 
Another argument for the assumption that questions denote true propositions is provided 
by verbs of communication. Karttunen (1977: 387) observed that tell, indicate, etc. are 
non-veridical when combined with a that-clause, cf. (175), but veridical when combined 
with an indirect question, cf. (176). 
 
(175)  John told Mary that Bill and Susan passed the test. (Karttunen 1977: 387) 
 
(176)  John told Mary who passed the test. (Karttunen 1977: 387) 
 
(176), in contrast to (175), suggests that John was telling the truth. Under the 
assumption that the subordinate clause who passed the test denotes a set of true 
propositions, (176) is true iff John told Mary every proposition that is contained in that 
set.21 A similar (but slightly weaker) contrast seems to exist in Polish, as illustrated in 
(177) and (178). Crucially, this contrast arises especially in the case of a direct 
comparison between the declarative and the interrogative variant, which will become 
clear later. 
 
20 See also the very influential theory of Hamblin (1973) who proposes a denotation of 
questions based on their possible (not necessarily true) answers. Accordingly, direct wh-
questions like Who ate a banana? denote the set of propositions expressed by ‘Tom ate a 
banana’, ‘Marc ate a banana’, ‘Nicole ate a banana’, etc. Direct yes-no questions like Is it dark 
outside? denote a set of contradictory answers ‘It is dark outside’ and ‘It is not dark outside’, cf. 
Karttunen (1977: 387) As will be shown later, Polish and English data speak in favor of the 
adoption of Hambling’s theory of questions. 
21 However, not every wh-clause needs to be interpreted exhaustively. For instance, the sentence 
Katie knows where one can get nice English food in Berlin is already true if Katie knows/lists 
one or two good English restaurants in Berlin (she does not have to mention all of them); for the 
(non)exhaustive readings of wh-questions see Groenendijk & Stokhof (1982) among others. 
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(177)  Jan powiedział nam / poinformował nas,  
 Jan said.PFV we.DAT / informed.PFV we.ACC  
 że Iza śpi, ale się pomylił. 
 that Iza sleeps but REFL was.wrong 
 ‘Jan told us / informed us that Iza was sleeping, but he was wrong.’ 
 ↛ Iza was sleeping. 
 
(178)  Jan powiedział nam / poinformował nas,  
 Jan said.PFV we.DAT / informed.PFV we.ACC  
 kto śpi, # ale się pomylił. 
 who sleeps  but REFL was.wrong 
 ‘Jan told us who / informed us about who was sleeping, but he was wrong.’ 
 
As mentioned above, perfective communication verbs in Polish do not entail (but at 
least implicate) that their sentential complements are true. This is shown in (177). 
However, as (178) demonstrates, if they embed a wh- instead of a that-clause, the 
answers to the wh-question must denote true propositions, cf. Karttunen (1977), 
Groenendijk & Stokhof (1982). 
Imperfective communication verbs that take a wh-clause seem to be rather neutral with 
respect to veridicality. Consider example (179). 
 
(179)  Jan mówił nam / ?informował nas,  
 Jan said.IPFV we.DAT / informed.IPFV we.ACC  
 kto śpi, ale raczej zgadywał, niż wiedział. 
 who sleeps but rather guessed.IPFV than knew.IPFV 
 ‘Jan told us who / informed us about who was sleeping, but he was rather 
guessing; he did not actually know this.’ 
 
See also (180) where a wh-sentence embedded by imperfective communication verbs 
can refer to false answers too: 
 
(180)  Jan is a horrible liar, so we never believe what he says. Yesterday, mówił 
(nam) / ?informował nas, who was coming to the party. As expected, it 
turned out that he had made everything up; every single name that he 
mentioned was wrong. 
 
It is worth mentioning, however, that informować is ‘more veridical’ than mówić, which 
is why its acceptance in contexts like the one above would need to be empirically 
verified (this is also why a question mark is placed before informować in the above 
example). 
Furthermore, it has been observed that accusative objects are most affected by the 
verbal process compared to other object types. Relating to the above examples, the 
accusative-marked recipient of ‘inform’ is more strongly associated with an event than 
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the dative-marked recipient of ‘say’ (only the latter can be omitted). Thus, it might be 
less likely for a proposition embedded under ‘inform’ not to be acknowledged by the 
addressee, cf. (181). 
 
(181)  Lekarz mówił mu1 / ?informował go1, 
 doctor said.IPFV he.DAT / informed.IPFV he.ACC 
 że jest chory, ale on1 nie chciał przyjąć tego do 
 that is sick but he NEG wanted take it.GEN to 
 wiadomości.        
 information        
 ‘The doctor kept telling him / kept informing him (about the fact) that he 
was sick, but he did not want to take note of it.’ 
 
This, in turn, makes a proposition embedded under ‘inform’ a good candidate for being 
interpreted as true, and the embedding verb a good candidate for being (optionally) 
veridical. In other words, if the speaker has a choice between the stronger ‘inform’ and 
the weaker ‘say’, she would prefer the weaker form unless she takes the truth of a that-
clause for granted (cf. Heim 1991 for Maximize Presupposition). 
The role of verb semantics in triggering veridicality/factivity in wh-environments is 
elaborately discussed by Karttunen (1977), Lahiri (2000), Egré (2008) or Spector & 
Egré (2015). 
According to Spector & Egré (2015: 1732), a responsive predicate22 is veridical 
regarding its interrogative complement iff it is veridical regarding its declarative 
complement. For instance, to know wh- means that an answer to the wh-question is the 
true answer to that question. This is so because to know that implies that a proposition 
embedded under know holds in the actual world. 
Spector & Egré (2015: 1743) assume a unified semantic rule for embedded 
interrogatives that can be subsumed as follows: For any responsive predicate P, a 
sentence that consists of X (an individual-denoting expression), P and Q (an 
interrogative clause) is true in a world w iff the referent of X is in the relation denoted 
by V to some proposition A that is a potential complete answer to Q (there is a world 
w’ in which A is the complete answer to Q in w’), adapted from ibid. The general 
meaning postulate can be formalized as in (182). 
 
 
22 Responsive predicate is a predicate that takes both declarative and interrogative 
complements, cf. Lahiri (2002). For instance, one can say Marc knows / remembers that Jack is 
the winner and Marc does not know / remember whether Jack is the winner. In contrast, one 
cannot say Marc investigates / asks #that Jack is the winner (compared to Marc is investigating 
/ is asking whether Jack is the winner). Verbs that belong to the former group are responsive 
predicates. 
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(182)  〚Pint〛w = λQ. λx. ∃p ∈ pot(Q)〚Pdecl〛w (p)(x) = 1 
Adapted from: Spector & Egré (2015: 1744) 
 
(182) predicts that, if a responsive predicate is veridical, then it is veridical with respect 
to its declarative and interrogative complement. By analogy, if it is non-veridical, it is 
non-veridical with respect to both a that- and a wh-clause. More precisely, the potential 
answer to Q is its true answer only if the proposition embedded under a declarative V 
holds in the actual world. For instance, the sentences Eli knows / remembers who stole 
the car are interpreted such that there is a potential complete answer to the question 
Who stole the car? that is known / remembered by Eli. This answer must be the true 
answer since know and remember are factive verbs. In contrast, in the case of Michael 
and Eli agreed on / were certain about who stole the car, Michael and Eli must have 
agreed on / have been certain about a potential complete answer to the question Who 
stole the car. Since agree on and be certain about are neither factive nor veridical, the 
complete answer Michael and Eli agreed on / were certain about need not be the true 
answer, though. 
Spector & Egré (2015) demonstrate that the previously outlined factivity-based contrast 
between tell wh- and tell that (with the former being veridical and the latter non-
veridical) is only a tendency and not an obligatory correlation, so that it does not 
provide a counterexample to their hypothesis. The non-veridical reading of tell wh- has 
already been attested by Tsohatzidis (1993) by means of the validity of the following 
inferences: 
 
(183)  Old John told us whom he saw in the fog, but it turned out that he was 
mistaken 
(the person he saw was Mr. Smith, not Mr. Brown). 
 
(184)  Old John told us whom he saw in the fog, and it turned out that he was not 
mistaken 
(the person he saw was indeed Mr. Brown). 
 
Tsohatzidis (1993) points out that neither does (183) express a contradiction nor is (184) 
redundant, which speaks against the inherent veridicality of tell wh-. 
However, it still follows from (183) that Old John believed that he was right; it seems 
odd to continue the sentence with but he lied / did not believe it. In contrast, the subject 
could have made the false statement in the case of tell that: Old John told us that he saw 
Mr. Brown, but he lied is perfectly fine. These observations suggest that, whereas 
answers to tell wh- do not need to be true answers, it necessarily holds that the speaker 
believes what she says, but this requirement is absent with tell that. 
As further evidence of the truth-related neutrality of tell wh-, consider (185)–(188), 
taken from Spector & Egré (2015: 1737). 
71 
 
 
(185)  Every day, the meteorologists tell the population where it will rain the 
following day, but they are often wrong. 
 
(186)  # Every day, the meteorologists know where it will rain the following day, 
but they are often wrong. 
 
(187)  I believe that Jack told you which students passed; but I don’t think he got 
it right. 
 
(188)  I believe that Jack knows which students passed; # but I don’t think he got 
it right. 
 
Spector & Egré (2015: 1737) further show that other communication verbs in English 
pattern with tell wh- in that they are not necessarily veridical / factive with questions: 
 
(189)  Every day, the meteorologists predict/announce whether it will rain the 
following day, but they are often wrong. 
 
(190)  I know that Jack predicted/announced which students would pass, but I 
don’t think he got it right. 
 
In Polish, there is a similar contrast between most (im)perfective communication verbs, 
cf. (191), and factive / veridical perfectives, cf. (192). 
 
(191)  Meteorolodzy mówili / powiedzieli, gdzie będzie padać, 
 meteorologists said.IPFV / said.PFV where FUT rain 
 ale się pomylili. 
 but REFL were.wrong 
 ‘The meteorologists were saying / said where it was gonna rain, but they 
were wrong.’ 
 
(192)  Meteorolodzy zgadli / przewidzieli / wyczuli 
 meteorologists guessed.PFV / predicted.PFV / sensed.PFV 
 / udowodnili, gdzie będzie padać, 
 / proved.PFV where FUT rain 
 # ale się pomylili. 
  but REFL were.wrong 
 ‘The meteorologists guessed / predicted / sensed / proved where it was 
gonna rain, but they were wrong.’ 
 
As expected (and as a further argument in favor of Spector & Egré 2015's theory), the 
respective imperfective non-factive counterparts to verbs listed in (192) are compatible 
with but they were wrong. 
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(193)  Meteorolodzy zgadywali / przewidywali / ?wyczuwali23 
 meteorologists guessed.IPFV / predicted.IPFV  sensed.IPFV 
 / udowadniali, gdzie będzie padać, 
 / proved.IPFV where FUT rain 
 ale się pomylili. 
 but REFL were.wrong 
 ‘The meteorologists were guessing / predicting / sensing / proving where it 
was gonna rain, but they were wrong.’ 
 
Furthermore, the meaning of inherently factive imperfectives and the respective 
perfective derivates taking wh-complements corresponds to their meaning with respect 
to declarative complements. In both cases, there is an obligatory relation to the true 
proposition / the true answer to the wh-question. Because the imperfective stem is 
factive, the perfective automatically inherits the factivity-feature. Consider (194). 
 
(194)  Żałowałam / pożałowałam tylko tego, gdzie 
 regretted.1SG.IPFV / regretted.1SG.PFV only it.GEN where 
 się poznaliśmy. 
 REFL met 
 ‘The only thing I kept regretting / started regretting was where we got to 
know each other.’ 
 → There is a place in the actual world where the speaker and the addressee 
got to know each other in the actual world. The speaker regrets the fact that 
the get-to-know happened at this particular place and not somewhere else. 
 
Due to the inherent factivity of the imperfective base żałować, both the imperfective and 
the perfective variant embed true propositions when used with a that-clause. For that 
reason, the wh-sentence can only access true answers to the wh-question. 
Crucial for the purpose of this dissertation is the parthood relation for embedded 
questions that was proposed by Lahiri (2000) and Lahiri (2002) among others. Lahiri 
(2000) claims that the so-called quantificational variability effect in embedded 
interrogatives involves quantification over parts of answers. Consider the following 
examples, taken from Lahiri (2000: 329). 
 
 
23 In some environments (depending on the scenario), wyczuwać seems to be ambiguous 
between a factive and a non-factive reading. Since there is a tendency for wh-clauses to denote 
sets of true propositions, the combination wyczuwać + wh-clause might favor the factive 
interpretation of the former. This, in turn, confirms that there is a correlation between wh-
embedding and veridicality / factivity. However, as was shown throughout this chapter, this 
correlation vanishes if an appropriate context is provided. We can conclude that, in Polish, the 
meaning of a wh-clause is predictable from the meaning of a that-clause. Out of the blue, a wh-
embedding tends to favor a veridical interpretation of a non-veridical verb, especially in the case 
of perfective communication verbs. This observation requires a solid empirical justification, 
though, which will be the subject of future research. 
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(195)  Mary knows, in part, Beethoven’s fifth symphony. 
 
(196)  Mary mostly knows Beethoven’s fifth symphony. 
 
(197)  The boys that live around the corner are, for the most part, idiots. 
 
According to Lahiri (2000: 329), the meaning of (195) is such that Mary knows part of 
Beethoven’s fifth symphony, the meaning of (196) such that Mary knows most of 
Beethoven’s fifth symphony, and the meaning of (197) such that most of the boys that 
live around the corner are idiots. There are two different realizations of the part-whole 
structure in the above examples. (195) and (196) are instances of partitivity to the object 
that gives rise to extended atomic objects: Beethoven’s fifth symphony is divided into 
well-defined parts that are familiar to the speaker. In contrast, in (197), single parts are 
elements of the set that realizes subject DP (the boys that live around the corner). In 
particular, in (197), the subject DP is a sum individual that consists of individual boys 
that live around the corner (with each boy being an atomic part of that sum), cf. for 
instance Link (1983). Sum individuals can also occur in object position, cf. (198). 
 
(198)  Mary mostly knows John’s children. 
 
The meaning of (198) is such that, for most x (for more than 50% of individuals 
realizing x) such that x is John’s child, Mary knows x. 
Lahiri (2000: 329) proposes a semantics of answers that operates on their natural part-
structure. For that reason, the quantificational variability effect presented in (195)–(197) 
is expected to arise with know-like predicates (predicates that take both declarative and 
interrogative complements, for instance know, be certain, remember, indicate, realize, 
list, record, guess, decide), but not with wonder-like predicates (predicates that take 
only interrogative complements – rogative predicates according to Lahiri's (2002) 
classification, for instance wonder, ask, investigate). More precisely, in order to trigger 
the quantificational variability effect, sentences like the ones in (199), with the structure 
given in (200), must be compatible with truth-conditions specified in (201). 
 
(199)  Jack mostly/partly/largely knows / remembers / realizes / guesses / decides 
who comes to the party. 
 
(200)  a mostly/partly/largely Vs wh-Q. (Lahiri 2000: 329) 
 
(201)  For most/some/large “relevant” part of an answer to Q, a Vs that part of 
that answer to Q. (Lahiri 2000: 329) 
 
Hence, question-embedding know-type predicates receive interpretations like the ones 
illustrated in (202) and (203): 
 
74 
 
(202)  i. John knows, for the most part, Q. 
ii. most p[ANS(p, Q) ∧ C24(p)][John knows that p] (Lahiri 2000: 
351) 
 
(203)  i. John is certain, for the most part, (about) Q. 
ii. most p[ANS(p, Q) ∧ C(p)][John is certain that p] (Lahiri 2000: 
351) 
 
As was mentioned above, in the case of wonder-type predicates, adverbs of 
quantification cannot access the meaning of the interrogative. Consider (204), adapted 
from Lahiri (2000: 345). 
 
(204)  i. John mostly asks / wonders which students came to the party. 
ii. John asked / wondered most of the time which students came to 
the party. 
iii. For most relevant part of an answer to Q: Which students came 
to the party?, *John asks / wonders that part of that answer to 
Q. 
 
Lahiri (2000: 371) explains the quantificational variability effect of wh-clauses 
embedded under know-type predicates by means of the amount quantification over the 
algebra of answers to the wh-question. The quantificational variability effect arises if a 
predicate combines with a that-clause by default and allows for a (secondary) 
interrogative embedding. If such a predicate takes a wh-clause, it causes a type 
mismatch so that the interrogative must be raised at LF. This so-called interrogative 
raising results in the quantificational variability effect. In contrast, wonder-type 
predicates that only take questions do not cause any type mismatch. As a consequence, 
they do not rise and do not exhibit the quantificational variability effect. 
5.1.3.1 A unified partition-based analysis of factive and non-factive responsive 
predicates 
In this subchapter, I will show how to integrate the reference to parts of answers into the 
semantic representation of factive and non-factive responsive predicates. I will start 
with the former. 
 
 
24 C represents a contextual variable that picks up (true) propositions = (possible) answers to the 
wh-question, cf. Lahiri (2000: 337). The choice of C(p) = ˇp (the situation where C picks out 
only true propositions) is lexically determined, cf. Lahiri (2000: 352). In line with Lahiri (2000: 
353), C(p) = ˇp is a default case for factive predicates and some communication verbs (tell, 
communicate), but not for non-factive verbs like be certain (about), conjecture (about), agree 
on. 
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(205)  λQλxQU25(λp[p∈Q ∧ ˇp]) (P(p)(x)) 
QU(λp[p∈〚who came〛∧ ˇp]) (know(p)(John)) 
QU(λp {p | ∃x [person(x) ∧ p = came(x)] ∧ ˇp}) (know(p)(John)) 
 
In (205), a quantifying expression QU is inserted into the semantic representation of 
questions. QU can be realized by an existential quantifier (206), a universal quantifier 
(207) or any other quantifying expression. The requirement ˇp ensures that an 
embedding predicate is factive, i.e. that the set of answers to a wh-question is restricted 
to true propositions. 
 
(206)  ∃p{p | ∃x [person(x) ∧ p = came(x)] ∧ ˇp} (know(p)(John)) 
For some proposition p that is a true answer to the question ‘Who came’, 
John knows p (non-exhaustive reading). 
 
(207)  ∀p{p | ∃x [person(x) ∧ p = came(x)] ∧ ˇp} (know(p)(John)) 
For all propositions that, collectively, constitute a complete true answer p 
to the question ‘Who came’, John knows p (weakly-exhaustive reading). 
 
The strongly-exhaustive answer (saying that the subject’s beliefs do not support any 
wrong propositions) can be represented as follows. 
 
(208)  ∀p{p | ∃x [person(x) ∧ p = came(x)] ∧ ˇp ∧ ¬p(p | ∃x [person(x) ∧ p = 
came(x)] ∧ p∉ˇp)} (know(p)(John)) 
For all propositions that, collectively, constitute a complete true answer p 
to the question ‘Who came’, John knows p. For every p that is a wrong 
answer to the question ‘Who came’, John knows that p is a wrong answer 
to that question (strongly-exhaustive reading). 
 
Non-factive responsive predicates lack the ˇp condition. As a result, the set of answers 
to a wh-question contains potential true answers to that question. 
 
(209)  λQλxQU(λp[p∈Q]) (P(p)(x)) 
QU(λp[p∈〚who came〛]) (certain(p)(John)) 
QU(λp {p | ∃x [person(x) ∧ p = came(x)]}) (certain(p)(John)) 
 
By analogy to factive verbs, QU can be parametrized as follows. 
 
(210)  ∃p{p | ∃x [person(x) ∧ p = came(x)]} (certain(p)(John)) 
∀p{p | ∃x [person(x) ∧ p = came(x)]} (certain(p)(John)) 
 
In the following, I will briefly discuss QVE in Polish. 
 
25 QU represents any quantificational expression (all, most, some, few, etc.). 
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5.1.3.2 QVE in Polish 
Examples (211)–(213) show that Polish patterns with English with respect to licensing 
quantificational variability effect. 
 
(211)  Kasia częściowo wie / zgadła / udowodniła 
 Kasia partially knows / guessed.PFV / proved.PFV 
 / powiedziała, kto przyjdzie na imprezę. 
 / said.PFV who comes to party 
 ‘Kasia partially knows / guessed / proved / said who is/was coming to the 
party.’ 
 For partially relevant part of an answer to Q: Who is coming to the party?, 
Kasia knows / guessed / proved / said that part of that answer to Q. 
 
(212)  Kasia częściowo zgadywała / udowadniała / mówiła, 
 Kasia partially guessed.IPFV / proved.IPFV / said.IPFV 
 kto przyjdzie na imprezę. 
 who comes to party 
 ‘Kasia was partially guessing / proving / saying who is/was coming to the 
party.’ 
 For the partially relevant part of an answer to Q: Who is coming to the 
party?, Kasia was guessing / proving / saying that part of that answer to Q. 
 
(213)  Kasia częściowo ?dziwiła się / ?zdziwiła się 
 Kasia partially wondered.IPFV REFL / wondered.PFV REFL 
 / #pytała / #zapytała, kto przyjdzie na imprezę. 
 / asked.IPFV / asked.PFV who comes to party 
 ‘Kasia was partially wondering / partially wondered / was partially asking / 
partially asked who was coming to the party.’ 
 For the partially relevant part of an answer to Q: Who is coming to the 
party?, *Kasia was wondering / wondered / was asking / asked that part of 
that answer to Q. 
 
Both perfective (plus ‘know’) (211) and imperfective (212) clause-embedding verbs 
investigated in this dissertation allow for two types of embedding (declarative and 
interrogative). Furthermore, regardless of the factivity of the matrix verb, both aspectual 
variants are compatible with the adverb częściowo as a quantifier over answers to the 
wh-question.26 In contrast, rogative verbs illustrated in (213) do not license the 
quantificational variability effect. However, from the semantic point of view (and still 
under QVE-reading), the adverb appears better with (z)dziwić się than with (za)pytać, 
which might result from the exhaustive interpretation of the latter in the above scenario. 
 
26 Interestingly, częściowo appears somewhat redundant in (212), which suggests that at least 
some imperfective verbs exhibit an inherent part-structure; this might be a direct consequence of 
the meaning of imperfectivity as non-completedness. 
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Crucially, Polish data speak in favor of the adoption of part structure of answers to wh-
questions embedded under responsive predicates. Since licensing a particular type of 
embedding does not systematically correlate with (non)factivity (both perfective 
veridical/factive and imperfective non-veridical/non-factive verbs allow for the two 
types of subordinate clauses), the explanation of the truth-entailment of the perfective 
cannot be based on selectional restrictions. Instead of that, I propose that it is the part 
structure of proofs that captures veridicality-related differences between (im)perfective 
reveal-type predicates in Polish. 
In the next subsection, I will briefly discuss perfectivity-bound exhaustivity of 
embedded questions in Polish. However, all observations should be considered a 
tendency. A detailed empirical investigation on this topic will be a subject for future 
research. 
5.1.4 Exhaustivity of perfective question-embedding verbs in Polish 
Some perfective question-embedding predicates in Polish favor an exhaustive 
interpretation of wh-questions. Consider example (214). 
 
(214)  Pani powiedziała, kto przeszedł dalej w 
 lady said.PFV who got.through.PFV further in 
 konkursie. 
 competition 
 ‘Our teacher told us who got through to the next round.’ 
 
(214) is felicitous in a scenario like (215). 
 
(215)  There is a list of pupils who participated in a competition. Their teacher 
knows not only who got through but also who did not. Therefore, she can 
make a statement about every pupil from the list. Everyone who was not 
part of the set of answers to the wh-question in (214) must act on the 
assumption that she/he did not go through. 
 
Certain (im)perfective minimal pairs of communication verbs exhibit clear contrast with 
respect to exhaustivity, cf. (216) and (217). 
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(216)  Jan rozpowiedział, kto przeszedł dalej w 
 Jan spread.news.PFV who got.through.PFV further in 
 konkursie. 
 competition 
 ‘Jan spread the news about who got through to the next round.’ 
 For every x that got through to the next round, Jan has mentioned x. 
= ∀x [pupil(x) ∧ got.through(x) → mentioned(x,j)]27 
 
(217)  Jan rozpowiadał, kto przeszedł dalej w 
 Jan spread.news.IPFV who got.through.PFV further in 
 konkursie. 
 competition 
 ‘Jan was spreading the news about who got through to the next round.’ 
 For some x that got through to the next round, Jan has mentioned x. 
= ∃x [pupil(x) ∧ got.through(x) → mentioned(x,j)] 
 
Assuming part structures for wh-questions makes it possible to treat the latter in a 
similar way to nominal arguments. In Polish, where the perfective aspect makes it more 
likely that the incremental nominal object is totally affected by the verbal process, it can 
be expected that perfective responsive predicates with comparable event-structural 
properties require an exhaustive set of answers to a wh-question. 
It is a matter of debate as to whether an exhaustive or a non-exhaustive interpretation of 
wh-questions is the elementary one. Groenendijk & Stokhof (1982) assume a basic 
exhaustive reading and derive a non-exhaustive answer as a pragmatic special case. In 
contrast, Hamblin (1973) proposes a non-exhaustive semantics of questions with 
exhaustive pragmatic enrichment (cf. also Krifka 2011). The fact that in some languages 
(for instance in German, see examples (218) and (219)) an exhaustive interpretation can 
be explicitly marked by a quantifier speaks in favor of the latter option. 
 
(218)  Anna weiß, [wer alles ins Kino gegangen ist]. 
 
(219)  Anna weiß, [wo überall man in München gute Bücher finden kann]. 
 
However, as was shown above, the set of answers to the wh-question can also be 
modified by adverbs like ‘partially’, which excludes exhaustivity. The resulting 
 
27 The pair rozpowiedzieć – rozpowiadać ‘to spread the news’ seems to trigger truth-
presupposition when combined with an interrogative complement. Both lexemes strongly 
suggest that the sentence subject has knowledge about the underlying p, but this effect vanishes 
/ is much weaker with a declarative complement. This, again, indicates a relationship between 
question-embedding and factivity. In line with assumptions that are made in this dissertation, 
factive meaning is ‘more stable’ (less modifiable) in the perfective (216) than in the 
imperfective (217). 
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constructions are not redundant; consider the non-exhaustive alternatives to (218) and 
(219). 
 
(220)  [Anna weiß zum Teil], wer ins Kino gegangen ist. 
 
(221)  [Anna weiß zum Teil], wo man in München gute Bücher finden kann. 
 
Crucially, zum Teil does not modify the meaning of a wh-sentence, but the meaning of a 
matrix verb; it actually cannot be placed within the subordinate clause. This suggests 
that the modification of exhaustivity takes place at the T-level and does not depend on 
p. As a result, we have another argument for the inherent non-exhaustivity of questions. 
In Polish, perfectivity seems to be an explicit device to mark exhaustivity. A non-
exhaustive interpretation can still be achieved by using for instance ‘teilweise’ in a way 
equivalent to German. 
 
(222)  [Pani częściowo powiedziała], kto przeszedł dalej 
 lady partially said.PFV who got.through.PFV further 
 w konkursie. 
 in competition 
 ‘Our teacher partially told us who got through to the next round.’ 
 For some x that got through to the next round, our teacher has mentioned x. 
= ∃x∃y [pupil(x) ∧ teacher(y) ∧ got.through(x) → mentioned(x,y)] 
 
(223)  Pani powiedziała, [kto #częściowo przeszedł dalej 
 lady said.PFV who partially got.through.PFV further 
 w konkursie]. 
 in competition 
 ‘Our teacher told us who partially got through to the next round.’ 
 
It is worth mentioning that the modification with all / everywhere as presented in (218) 
and (219) for German is not possible in Polish. If this was the case, one would expect 
incompatibility of the above quantifiers with the imperfective variants (or at least a 
tendency towards a slight degradation in grammaticality compared to the combination 
with perfective counterparts, depending on the semantics of the matrix verb). The fact 
that Polish systematically encodes perfectivity on verbal stems explains the absence of 
the above-mentioned construction in the language system; the meaning of all seems to 
be somehow included in the meaning of perfectivity, which makes the perfective an 
explicit exhaustivity marker. For that reason, the introduction of any additional lexical 
exhaustivity triggers seems redundant. In contrast, German uses alles / überall as 
compensation for the lack of the grammatical category of aspect. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss aspectual factors that enforce a veridical / factive 
interpretation of that-clauses. This relationship is the main topic of my dissertation. 
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5.2 Aspectual factors that enforce a factive interpretation of clause-embedding 
verbs 
5.2.1 Aspect and the interpretation of embedded propositions in Polish28 
5.2.1.1 The perfective as a presupposition trigger 
I will begin with cases where the perfective aspect of a matrix verb triggers the truth-
presupposition (factivity in the common sense) on a complement sentence. As was 
discussed above, truth-presupposition holds when the inference remains under negation, 
after the insertion of a modal adverbial or in question constructions (again, for the 
semantic definition of presupposition see for instance Strawson 1950). Truth-
presupposition arises with the perfective przewidzieć ‘predict’, as can be seen in the 
following examples. ‘≫’ marks presupposition.29 
First, consider (224) for an affirmative sentence, showing the presence of the truth-
entailment in the case of the perfective form. 
(224)  Ola przewidziała, że Marek boi się duchów. 
 Ola predicted.PFV that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘Ola predicted that Marek was afraid of ghosts.’ 
 → Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
Furthermore, following (224) by but she was not right in the end causes a contradiction, 
which confirms the presence of the truth-entailment: 
(225)  # Ola przewidziała, że Marek boi się duchów, 
 Ola predicted.PFV that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ale ostatecznie nie miała racji.   
 but finally NEG had.IPFV right   
 ‘Ola predicted that Marek was afraid of ghosts, but she was not right in 
the end.’ 
The inference is absent when we embed the same proposition under the imperfective 
‘predict’: 
 
 
28 This chapter is based on Zuchewicz (2018). 
29 Marking embedded verbs for the imperfective aspect and using the present tense are intended 
to excludethe influence of perfectivity and past tense morphology within the subordinate clause 
on the truth inferences observed. 
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(226)  Ola przewidywała, że Marek boi się duchów, 
 Ola predicted.IPFV that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ale ostatecznie nie miała racji.   
 but finally NEG had.IPFV right   
 ‘Ola was predicting that Marek was afraid of ghosts, but she was not right in 
the end.’ 
 ↛ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
Examples (227) and (228) demonstrate the complementary behavior of the feature 
[± perfective] with respect to the enforcing of a factive meaning of their complement 
sentences. Whereas the perfective variant presupposes the truth of its sentential 
argument, the imperfective does not. After the insertion of a sentence negation or a 
modal adverbial, it still follows from (227) that Marek is/was afraid of ghosts. Sentence 
(228) only states that Ola was guessing / tried to predict that Marek fears ghosts, but it 
leaves it open whether she was correct or not. 
(227)  Ola nie / prawdopodobnie przewidziała, 
 Ola NEG / probably predicted.PFV 
 że Marek boi się duchów. 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘Ola did not predict / probably predicted that Marek was afraid of ghosts.’ 
 ≫ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
 Adapted from: Zuchewicz (2018: 480) 
 
(228)  Ola nie / prawdopodobnie przewidywała, 
 Ola NEG / probably predicted.IPFV 
 że Marek boi się duchów. 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘Ola was not predicting / was probably predicting that Marek was afraid of 
ghosts.’ 
 ≫̸ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
 Adapted from ibid. 
The truth-presupposition observed in (227) also appears in question constructions: 
(229)  Czy / kiedy Ola przewidziała,  
 whether / when Ola predicted.PFV  
 że Marek boi się duchów? 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘Did Ola predict / when did Ola predict that Marek was afraid of ghosts?’ 
 ≫ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
 
As expected, the inference is absent with the imperfective przewidywać: 
82 
 
(230)  Czy / kiedy Ola przewidywała,  
 whether / when Ola predicted.IPFV  
 że Marek boi się duchów? 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘Was Ola predicting / when was Ola predicting that Marek was afraid of 
ghosts?’ 
 ≫̸ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
It needs to be pointed out that (230) would also be compatible with the factive 
interpretation of a subordinate clause. The imperfective simply does not enforce the 
truth of the complement sentence. This observation applies to the majority of 
imperfective clause-embedding verbs; they do not block factivity, but are neutral with 
respect to it. 
The above-mentioned patterns also hold for the (im)perfective zgadnąć.PFV – 
zgadywać.IPFV ‘guess’, przeczuć.PFV – przeczuwać.IPFV ‘sense’, wyczuć.PFV – 
wyczuwać.IPFV ‘sense’ or ‘rozgryźć.PFV – rozgryzać.IPFV ‘crack’. (231) illustrates the 
truth-presupposition of the perfective. 
(231)  Ola nie / prawdopodobnie zgadła / przeczuła / 
 Ola NEG / probably guessed.PFV / sensed.PFV / 
 wyczuła / rozgryzła  
 sensed.PFV / worked.out.PFV  
 że Marek boi się duchów. 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘Ola did not guess / sense / work out / probably guessed / sensed / worked 
out that Marek was afraid of ghosts.’ 
 ≫ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
In contrast, embedded propositions are neutral with respect to truthfulness when a 
matrix verb is marked with the imperfective aspect, as illustrated in (232). 
(232)  Ola nie / prawdopodobnie zgadywała / przeczuwała / 
 Ola NEG / probably guessed.IPFV / sensed.IPFV / 
 wyczuwała / rozgryzała  
 sensed.IPFV / worked.out.IPFV  
 że Marek boi się duchów. 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘Ola was not guessing / sensing / working out / was probably guessing / 
sensing / working out that Marek was afraid of ghosts.’ 
 ≫̸ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
See also the expected complementary distribution in question constructions. Compare 
(233) for the perfective ‘guess’ / ‘sense’ / ‘crack’ and (234) for their imperfective 
counterparts. 
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(233)  Czy / kiedy Ola zgadła / przeczuła / 
 whether / when Ola guessed.PFV / sensed.PFV / 
 wyczuła / rozgryzła,  
 sensed.PFV / worked.out.PFV  
 że Marek boi się duchów? 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘Did Ola guess / sense / work out / when did Ola guess / sense / work out 
that Marek was afraid of ghosts?’ 
 ≫ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
 
(234)  Czy / kiedy Ola zgadywała / przeczuwała / 
 whether / when Ola guessed.IPFV / sensed.IPFV / 
 wyczuwała / rozgryzała,  
 sensed.IPFV / worked.out.IPFV  
 że Marek boi się duchów? 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘Was Ola guessing / sensing / working out / when was Ola guessing / 
sensing / working out that Marek was afraid of ghosts?’ 
 ≫̸ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
Crucially, the above pattern is not restricted to Polish. See (235) for the truth-
presupposition of the perfective ‘guess’ in Czech, and (236) for the absence of that 
inference with its imperfective counterpart, adapted from Zuchewicz & Šimík (2018). 
 
(235)  Marie asi uhodla / neuhodla, 
 Marie probably guessed.PFV / NEG.guessed.PFV 
 že Karel je doma. 
 that Karel is at.home 
 ‘Marie probably guessed / did not guess (right) that Karel was at home.’ 
 ≫ Karel was at home. 
 
(236)  Marie asi hádala / nehádala, 
 Marie probably guessed.IPFV / NEG.guessed.IPFV 
 že Karel je doma. 
 that Karel is at.home 
 ‘Marie probably took / did not take a guess that Karel was at home.’ 
 ≫̸ Karel was at home. 
 
Importantly, the aspect of the verb in a dependent clause does not affect the inference 
patterns observed so far. In the following examples, the subordinate sentence expresses 
an accomplishment (Vendler 1957)30. The matrix verbs are marked for the perfective, 
and the embedded verb appears once in the perfective (237) and once in the 
 
30 I would like to thank Carla Umbach for pointing this out. 
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imperfective aspect (238). In contrast to the previous examples, it occurs in the past 
tense. 
We can see that, regardless of the aspectual marking within the embedded clause, the 
truth-presupposition remains. However, (237) and (238) differ in the extent of the 
integration of the nominal argument ‘apple’ into the process of eating, which is 
influenced by the effect of the (im)perfective ‘eat’. In (237), the truth-presupposition 
triggered by the perfective matrix verbs (stating that there was an event of Marek eating 
an apple in the actual world) is enriched by the totality entailment of the apple, triggered 
locally by the perfective ‘eat’ (stating that the apple was eaten completely, i.e. that the 
apple is not there in the end). In contrast, there is no totality entailment of the apple in 
(238), due to the imperfective aspect of ‘eat’ (cf. Krifka 1989b, Krifka 1989c, Krifka 
1992). 
(237)  Ola nie / prawdopodobnie zgadła / przeczuła / 
 Ola NEG / probably guessed.PFV / sensed.PFV / 
 wyczuła / rozgryzła / przewidziała,  
 sensed.PFV / worked.out.PFV / predicted.PFV  
 że Marek zjadł jabłko.  
 that Marek ate.PFV apple  
 ‘Ola did not guess / sense / work out / predict / probably guessed / sensed / 
worked out / predicted that Marek ate the apple.’ 
 ≫ Marek ate the whole apple (there is nothing left of the apple). Dividable 
into: 
≫ (from the matrix verb): There was an event of Marek eating an apple in 
the actual world. 
≫ (from the embedded verb): The apple was eaten completely. 
 
(238)  Ola nie / prawdopodobnie zgadła / przeczuła / 
 Ola NEG / probably guessed.PFV / sensed.PFV / 
 wyczuła / rozgryzła / przewidziała,  
 sensed.PFV / worked.out.PFV / predicted.PFV  
 że Marek jadł jabłko.  
 that Marek ate.IPFV apple  
 ‘Ola did not guess / sense / work out / predict / probably guessed / sensed / 
worked out / predicted that Marek was eating an apple.’ 
 ≫ Marek was eating an apple (it is left open whether the apple was eaten 
completely). 
Dividable into: 
≫ (from the matrix verb): There was an event of Marek eating an apple in 
the actual world. 
≫̸ (from the embedded verb): The apple was eaten completely. 
Compare (239) and (240) with the imperfective matrix verbs. 
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(239)  Ola nie / prawdopodobnie zgadywała / przeczuwała / 
 Ola NEG / probably guessed.IPFV / sensed.IPFV / 
 wyczuwała / rozgryzała / przewidywała,  
 sensed.IPFV / worked.out.IPFV / predicted.IPFV  
 że Marek zjadł jabłko.  
 that Marek ate.PFV apple  
 ‘Ola was not guessing / sensing / working out / predicting / was probably 
guessing / sensing / cracking / predicting that Marek ate the apple.’ 
 ≫̸ Marek ate the whole apple. 
≫̸ Marek was eating an apple. 
 
(240)  Ola nie / prawdopodobnie zgadywała / przeczuwała / 
 Ola NEG / probably guessed.IPFV / sensed.IPFV / 
 wyczuwała / rozgryzała / przewidywała,  
 sensed.IPFV / worked.out.IPFV / predicted.IPFV  
 że Marek jadł jabłko.  
 that Marek ate.IPFV apple  
 ‘Ola was not guessing / sensing / working out / predicting / was probably 
guessing / sensing / working out / predicting that Marek was eating an 
apple.’ 
 ≫̸ Marek was eating an apple. 
The lack of truth-presupposition of the matrix verb has an influence on the totality 
entailment of the nominal argument within a subordinate clause. This is why I did not 
subdivide the general inference as was done in the case of (237) and (238). 
(239) could be followed by: because he used to eat her food in the past. But look, her 
apple is in the fridge. / But he only took one bite of it. This corresponds to our intuitive 
interpretation of the sentence; since the existence of the whole event is not presupposed, 
the parts of it cannot be presupposed either. 
The exact differences between the particular verb forms (especially between the two 
perfective variants of ‘sense’ and their imperfective twins) will be discussed in the 
experimental part of this dissertation. 
5.2.1.2 The perfective as an entailment trigger 
According to Zuchewicz (2018: 486), many perfective matrix verbs show implicative 
(but not a presuppositional) behavior with respect to the truth-inference of the 
embedded proposition. For instance, verbs of proving (or incremental theme verbs in 
general) entail that their sentential argument is true, which can be seen in the examples 
(241) and (242). Udowodnić, dowieść and wykazać seem to be much stronger in their 
veridicality than pokazać though. 
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(241)  Ola udowodniła / dowiodła / wykazała / pokazała, 
 Ola proved.PFV / proved.PFV / revealed.PFV / showed.PFV 
 że Marek boi się duchów, 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘Ola proved / revealed / showed that Marek was afraid of ghosts.’ 
 → Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
 
(242)  # Ola udowodniła / dowiodła / wykazała /  
 Ola proved.PFV / proved.PFV / revealed.PFV /  
 pokazała, że Marek boi się duchów, 
 showed.PFV that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ale ostatecznie nie miała racji. 
 but finally NEG had.IPFV right  
 ‘Ola proved / revealed / showed that Marek was afraid of ghosts, but she 
was not right in the end.’ 
The inference vanishes under negation, after the insertion of a modal adverbial (243) 
and in question constructions (244), which excludes it from being a presupposition. 
(243)  Ola nie / prawdopodobnie udowodniła / dowiodła 
 Ola NEG / probably proved.PFV / proved.PFV 
 wykazała / pokazała,   
 revealed.PFV / showed.PFV   
 że Marek boi się duchów. 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘Ola did not prove / reveal / show / probably proved / revealed / showed 
that Marek was afraid of ghosts.’ 
 ↛ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
 
(244)  Czy / kiedy Ola udowodniła / dowiodła 
 whether / when Ola proved.PFV / proved.PFV 
 wykazała / pokazała,   
 revealed.PFV / showed.PFV   
 że Marek boi się duchów? 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘Did Ola prove / reveal / show / when did Ola prove / reveal / show that 
Marek was afraid of ghosts?’ 
 ↛ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
The imperfective counterparts do not enforce the truth of their complements. (245) 
shows that there is no entailment in an affirmative sentence. 
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(245)  Ola udowadniała / dowodziła / wykazywała / pokazywała, 
 Ola proved.IPFV / proved.IPFV / revealed.IPFV / showed.IPFV 
 że Marek boi się duchów, 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ale ostatecznie nie miała racji. 
 but finally NEG had.IPFV right. 
 ‘Ola was proving / revealing / showing that Marek was afraid of ghosts, but 
she was not right in the end.’ 
 ↛ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
As expected, the truth-inference is also absent under negation, after the insertion of a 
modal adverbial (246) and in question constructions (247). 
(246)  Ola nie / prawdopodobnie udowadniała / dowodziła 
 Ola NEG / probably proved.IPFV / proved.IPFV 
 wykazywała / pokazywała, 
 revealed.IPFV / showed.IPFV 
 że Marek boi się duchów. 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘Ola was not proving / revealing / showing / was probably proving / 
revealing / showing that Marek was afraid of ghosts.’ 
 ↛ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
 
(247)  Czy / kiedy Ola udowadniała / dowodziła 
 whether / when Ola proved.IPFV / proved.IPFV 
 wykazywała / pokazywała, 
 revealed.IPFV / showed.IPFV 
 że Marek boi się duchów? 
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 ‘Was Ola proving / revealing / showing / when was Ola proving / revealing 
/ showing that Marek was afraid of ghosts?’ 
 ↛ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
An interesting observation concerns ‘confirm’. The perfective potwierdzić tends to 
trigger a weak truth-entailment, which is why I assigned it to the entailment group. In 
contrast to the other members of this class, however, it lacks an incremental character, 
i.e. the perfective does not build on the action/process denoted by its imperfective twin. 
In the further part of the paper, I will give experimental evidence in favor of treating 
‘confirm’ as a communication verb instead. By now, an entailment pattern is distributed 
as follows. 
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(248)  Policjant potwierdził, że Marek boi się  
 policeman confirmed.PFV that Marek fears.IPFV REFL  
 duchów. 
 ghost.PL 
 ‘The policeman confirmed that Marek was afraid of ghosts.’ 
 → Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
 Adapted from: Zuchewicz (2018: 481) 
 
(249)  Policjant potwierdzał, że Marek boi się  
 policeman confirmed.IPFV that Marek fears.IPFV REFL  
 duchów. 
 ghost.PL 
 ‘The policeman was confirming that Marek was afraid of ghosts.’ 
 ↛ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
 Adapted from ibid. 
In line with Zuchewicz (2018: 481), the truth entailment can be found in potwierdzić 
and it is absent in potwierdzać; whereas (248) seems to entail that Marek is afraid of 
ghosts, (249) states that this is a possible, but not an obligatory interpretation. The 
inference presented in (248) does not project – either under negation / after the insertion 
of a modal adverbial (250) or in question constructions (251) – which confirms that it is 
not a presupposition. 
(250)  Policjant nie / prawdopodobnie potwierdził, 
 policeman NEG / probably confirmed.PFV 
 że Marek boi się duchów.  
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL  
 ‘The policeman did not confirm / probably confirmed that Marek was 
afraid of ghosts.’ 
 ↛ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
 Adapted from ibid. 
 
(251)  Czy / kiedy policjant potwierdził, 
 whether / when policeman confirmed.PFV 
 że Marek boi się duchów?  
 that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL  
 ‘Did the policeman confirm / when did the policeman confirm that Marek 
was afraid of ghosts?’ 
 ↛ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
 Adapted from ibid. 
However, emphasizing potwierdził by prosody in (251) presupposes the existence of the 
event described by the dependent clause, which means that the embedded proposition 
receives a factive interpretation. The effect seems to be stronger if the agent represents 
an instance known for her reliability, like policeman, inspector or judge. The fact that 
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the nature of the subject can influence the entailment pattern also suggests a difference 
between ‘confirm’ and the other verbs from the entailment group. 
The entailment pattern remains when the embedded proposition is an accomplishment. 
Consider the following examples, with the perfective matrix verbs and the perfective 
(252) and the imperfective embedded verb (253). 
(252)  Ola udowodniła / dowiodła / wykazała / pokazała, 
 Ola proved.PFV / proved.PFV / revealed.PFV / showed.PFV 
 że Marek przeszedł przez ulicę. 
 that Marek crossed.PFV through street 
 ‘Ola proved / revealed / showed that Marek had crossed the street.’ 
 → Marek had crossed the street (he is on the other side of the street). 
Dividable into: 
→ (from the matrix verb): There was an event of Marek crossing the street 
in the actual world. 
→ (from the embedded verb): Marek is on the other side of the street. 
 
(253)  Ola udowodniła 
/ dowiodła / wykazała / pokazała, 
 Ola proved.PFV / proved.PFV / revealed.PFV / showed.PFV 
 że Marek przechodził przez ulicę. 
 that Marek crossed.IPFV through street 
 ‘Ola proved / revealed / showed that Marek was crossing the street.’ 
 → Marek was crossing the street. Dividable into: 
→ (from the matrix verb): There was an event of Marek crossing the street 
in the actual world. 
↛ (from the embedded verb): Marek is on the other side of the street. 
Compare the imperfective matrix verbs with the perfective (254) and the imperfective 
(255) embedded verb. 
(254)  Ola udowadniała / dowodziła / wykazywała / pokazywała, 
 Ola proved.IPFV / proved.IPFV / revealed.IPFV / showed.IPFV 
 że Marek przeszedł przez ulicę. 
 that Marek crossed.PFV through street 
 ‘Ola was proving / revealing / showing that Marek had crossed the 
street.’ 
 ↛ Marek had crossed the street. 
↛ Marek was crossing the street. 
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(255)  Ola udowadniała / dowodziła / wykazywała / pokazywała, 
 Ola proved.IPFV / proved.IPFV / revealed.IPFV / showed.IPFV 
 że Marek przechodził przez ulicę. 
 that Marek crossed.IPFV through street 
 ‘Ola was proving / revealing / showing that Marek was crossing the 
street.’ 
 ↛ Marek was crossing the street. 
Both (254) and (255) could be followed by: but it turned out that he did not even try to 
cross it / but he turned back after walking a few steps. 
5.2.1.3 The apparent cancelability of the truth-entailment 
At first sight, the inference patterns discussed in the previous subsection seem to be 
influenceable by the argument structural properties of embedding verbs. According to 
Zuchewicz (2018: 487), aspect-dependent truth-entailment in Polish is apparently 
cancelable after the addition of an experiencer; cf. Anand & Hacquard (2014) for this 
aspect-independent correlation. All verb pairs from the entailment group allow an 
experiencer as their optional argument. 
Anand & Hacquard (2014: 73) refer to verbs like demonstrate, guarantee, imply, prove 
or show as ‘predicates of demonstration’. The authors point out that these verbs can take 
subjects that do not need to be animate, and thus are incapable of holding beliefs, 
compare (256). 
 
(256)  The bloody gloves demonstrate / imply / prove / show that Mary is the 
murderer. (Adapted from ibid.) 
 
(256) seems to entail that Mary is the murderer. Example (257) illustrates that there is 
no projection pattern, which means that (256) does not presuppose that p. 
 
(257)  Do the bloody gloves demonstrate / imply / prove / show that Mary is the 
murderer? (Adapted from ibid., 74.) 
 
Furthermore, veridicality vanishes after the insertion of an overt experiencer: 
 
(258)  The bloody gloves demonstrate / imply / prove / show to John that Mary is 
the murderer. (Adapted from ibid.) 
 
Following Jackendoff (2007), predicates of demonstration probably lack an experiencer 
argument in their semantic representation, and they gain it for cases like (258) via a 
lexical rule. Alternatively, these verbs do include a covert experiencer / judge, which, 
according to Stephenson 2007, may be replaced with overt pronominal counterparts; cf. 
Anand & Hacquard (2014: 74). 
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In line with ibid., if these predicates lack an experiencer argument when bare, we need 
to assume an additional case of veridicality without a private (doxastic) state. In 
contrast, adopting the view of the presence of a covert experiencer results in the 
occurrence of a private state without an entailment. Importantly, in both cases, we lack a 
(doxastic) private state and veridicality simultaneously, which is one of the main points 
of Anand & Hacquard's investigations. 
It is worth mentioning that the animacy of the subject influences the semantic relation 
between the that-clause and the matrix predicate; in the above examples, the bloody 
gloves are the instrument that proves p. In the case of animate subjects, the subject is a 
verifier/controller and not the instrument; here, we do not know what the crucial proof 
is; we only know who delivered it and what was proven. The non-veridicality of 
incremental theme verbs demonstrated in (258) seems to be due to the fact that the 
bloody gloves have not been acknowledged/accepted as a proof by the highest/an 
appropriate instance, and not to the fact that ‘prove’ itself allows for a non-veridical 
interpretation (cf. Moulton 2009 for the discussion about prove and proof). 
In Polish, incremental theme verbs seem to combine with inanimate subjects too (it is a 
very marked construction though), as shown in (259). However, only animate subjects 
allow for the addition of an experiencer, consider (260). 
(259)  ?? Zakrwawione rękawiczki udowodniły / dowiodły 
  bloody gloves proved.PFV / proved.PFV 
  wykazały / pokazały # Oli, że Marek jest 
  revealed.PFV / showed.PFV  Ola.DAT that Marek is 
  winny. 
  guilty.        
  ‘The bloody gloves proved / revealed / showed to Ola that Marek was 
guilty.’ 
  → Marek is guilty. 
→ The proof for Marek’s guilt were the bloody gloves. 
 
(260)  Jan udowodnił / dowiódł / wykazał / pokazał 
 Jan proved.PFV / proved.PFV / revealed.PFV / showed.PFV 
 Ani, że Marek boi się duchów, 
 Ania.DAT that Marek fears.IPFV REFL ghost.PL 
 jednak Krzysiek w to wątpi. 
 but Krzysiek in this doubts 
 ‘Jan proved / revealed / showed to Basia that Marek was afraid of ghosts, 
but Krzysiek doubts that.’ 
 ↛ Marek is afraid of ghosts. 
(260) truly means that Jan managed to convince Ania that Marek is afraid of ghosts, but 
he did not succeed in convincing Krzysiek. Adding an overt experiencer clearly leads to 
changing the lexical entry of perfective incremental theme verbs in Polish. As a result, 
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their meaning corresponds more to ‘convince’ than to ‘prove’. If we convinced someone 
that p (by using the perfective przekonać), it means that the recipient took the truth of p 
for granted, but it does not entail that p is true. This is why I assume that there is no 
experiencer argument in the semantic representation of incremental theme verbs, and 
that the truth-entailment of the perfective cannot be canceled. 
Anand & Hacquard (2014: 70) discuss the distribution of factivity and veridicality 
across English attitude verbs that take declarative complements. They realize the 
absence of factive assertives. However, cross-linguistically, we can easily find 
counterexamples. For instance, certain perfective communication verbs in Hungarian 
can only have a factive meaning (cf. chapter 7.1.1). More precisely, meg-mond ‘to say’ 
and meg-ír ‘to write’ are presupposition-triggers. They are incompatible with clausal 
complements that express wrong states of affairs (for example with ‘that the earth is 
flat’ or ‘that there is no life on earth’). Only their imperfective counterparts can combine 
with unverified / incorrect statements. 
In the next subsection, I will discuss cases where the perfective aspect might trigger a 
weak truth-implicature. 
5.2.1.4 The perfective as an implicature trigger 
According to Zuchewicz (2018: 481), a weak truth-implicature might arise with 
perfective verbs of communication. Its availability depends on many factors however. 
Consider the following examples. ‘⇒’ marks implicature. 
(261)  Policjant powiedział, że Marek jest winny. 
 policeman said.PFV that Marek is guilty 
 ‘The policeman said that Marek was guilty.’ 
 ⇒ Marek is guilty. 
 Adapted from: Zuchewicz (2018: 481) 
 
(262)  Policjant mówił, że Marek jest winny. 
 policeman said.IPFV that Marek is guilty 
 ‘The policeman was saying that Marek was guilty.’ 
 ⇒ Marek is guilty. 
 Adapted from: Zuchewicz ibid. 
Examples (261) and (262) demonstrate that, if the subject is an instance generally held 
in high esteem, both perfective and imperfective ‘say’ suggest that p is true. 
Nevertheless, the inference remains stronger with the perfective. This claim is based on 
the observation that it seems to be more likely to combine the imperfective variant with 
the adverb niby ‘apparently’ than the perfective one. Consider (263). 
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(263)  Policjant niby mówił, że Marek jest winny. 
 policeman apparently said.IPFV that Marek is guilty 
 ‘The policeman apparently said hat Marek was guilty.’ 
 ⇏ Marek is guilty. 
It needs to be pointed out that the perfective could also be used in (263), resulting in the 
same inference. The imperfective sounds more natural though, especially in the case of 
reported speech.31 
5.2.1.5 Factors relevant for the existence of the truth-implicature: Reliability condition, 
speech acts and lexical-semantic properties of the complex expression 
Based on Zuchewicz (2018: 481), the presence of the truth-implicature might correlate 
with the so-called reliability condition (cf. Schlenker 2010 for the factivity of 
announcements). This states that the speaker takes the truth of what the sentence subject 
said for granted if she (the speaker) uses a perfective communication verb. In the 
imperfective variant, however, the speaker does not want to commit herself to the truth 
of the proposition. In this case it remains open whether the speaker considers the 
sentence subject reliable or whether she believes that what the sentence subject said was 
true. As a result, there is no truth-implicature on p. The reliability effect seems to 
correlate with fulfilling all the parts of the speech act, which is necessarily the case 
when using the perfective, and which does not have to be the case when using the 
imperfective; Zuchewicz (2018: 488), see also Cohen & Krifka (2014), Krifka (2015) 
for commitment space semantics. 
According to Austin (1962) (see also Searle 1969), a speech act consists of three partial 
acts. The first one, a locutionary act, refers to uttering itself (act of uttering). The second 
one, an illocutionary act, captures the area of the speaker’s intention. Finally, the notion 
of perlocutionary act concerns the actual effect the particular speech act had on the 
hearer. A speech act is presumed to be completely realized only if all three parts have 
been fulfilled. In Polish, perfective communication verbs, in contrast to imperfective 
ones, entail the complete fulfillment of all parts of the speech act, as example (264) 
illustrates; Zuchewicz (2018: 488).32 
 
31 In the NKJP, cf. Pęzik (2012), we can find 26 instances of the collocation ‘niby mówić.PST’: 
niby___mówił*|mówil*, and 28 instances of the collocation ‘niby powiedzieć.PST’: 
niby___powiedział*|powiedzieli* (19.02.2019), which means that the corpus data do not reveal 
any difference between the two aspectual partners with respect to their well-formedness with 
niby. The search queries identified all conjugation forms in the past tense. Again, using the past 
tense was due to the fact that it is the only tense available for both the perfective and the 
imperfective, so it ensured a quantitatively fair comparison between the two forms. These 
results suggest that more detailed research, especially based on analyzing contexts in which the 
particular constructions occur, needs to be conducted. 
32 I would like to thank Manfred Krifka for inspiring this idea. 
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(264)  Iza właśnie go o tym # zawiadomiła / 
 Iza just him about that  notified.PFV / 
 zawiadamiała, ale przerwał jej w pół słowa. 
 notified.IPFV but interrupted her in middle word 
 ‘Iza has just notified / was just notifying him about that, but he interrupted 
her in the middle of the sentence.’ 
 Adapted from: Zuchewicz (2018: 489) 
Only zawiadomiła entails that the hearer received all the information. 
In general, the perfectivity-dependent truth-implicature tends to arise with non-
suppletive aspectual pairs: 
(265)  Policjant zawiadomił nas, że Marek jest winny. 
 policeman notified.PFV us that Marek is guilty 
 ‘The policeman notified us that Marek was guilty.’ 
 ⇒ Marek is guilty. 
 
(266)  Policjant zawiadamiał nas, że Marek jest winny. 
 policeman notified.IPFV us that Marek is guilty 
 ‘The policeman was notifying us that Marek was guilty.’ 
 ?⇏ Marek was guilty. 
Crucially (and as has already been shown), when there is an additional inference trigger, 
the aspect-dependent truth-implicature seems to be systematically available. 
(267)  Policjant powiedział nam / poinformował nas,  
 policeman said.PFV we.DAT / informed.PFV we.GEN  
 że Marek jest winny,  
 that Marek is guilty  
 ? ale jakoś bez przekonania / 
  but somehow without confidence / 
 ? ale ja mu nie wierzę. 
  but I him NEG believe 
 ‘The policeman told us / informed us that Marek was guilty, but he seemed 
not to be sure somehow / but I do not believe him.’ 
 ⇒ Marek is guilty. 
 
95 
 
(268)  Policjant mówił nam / informował nas,  
 policeman said.IPFV we.DAT / informed.IPFV we.GEN  
 że Marek jest winny,  
 that Marek is guilty  
 ale jakoś bez przekonania / 
 but somehow without confidence / 
 ale ja mu nie wierzę. 
 but I him NEG believe 
 ‘The policeman was telling us / was informing us that Marek was guilty, 
but he seemed not to be sure somehow / but I do not believe him.’ 
 ⇏ Marek is guilty. 
Compared to (267), (268) seems to be more likely to be followed by but he seemed not 
to be sure somehow / but I do not believe him. This shows that an additional inference 
trigger reveals the truth-related contrast even in the case of the (im)perfective verbs of 
communication. 
In the following examples, the subject within the matrix clause is a proper name, so we 
cannot verify her reliability. It seems that the truth-implicature is absent with the 
imperfective ‘say’; the sentence only reports Jan’s utterance, without making any 
statements about whether it is true. 
(269)  Jan powiedział, że Marek jest winny. 
 Jan said.PFV that Marek is guilty 
 ‘Jan said that Marek was guilty.’ 
 ⇒ Marek is guilty. 
 
(270)  Jan mówił, że Marek jest winny. 
 Jan said.IPFV that Marek is guilty 
 ‘Jan was saying that Marek was guilty.’ 
 ⇏ Marek is guilty. 
Examples (271) and (272) contain an additional modification of the content of the 
embedded clause. In contrast to (269) and (270), it denotes a subjective state of mind 
(something which cannot be objectively proven). In this case, and especially if the 
sentences are read out of context, the truth-implicature of the perfective vanishes. 
(271)  Jan powiedział, że Marek jest śmieszny. 
 Jan said.PFV that Marek is funny 
 ‘Jan said that Marek was funny.’ 
 ⇏ Marek is funny. 
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(272)  Jan mówił, że Marek jest śmieszny. 
 Jan said.IPFV that Marek is funny 
 ‘Jan was saying that Marek was funny.’ 
 ⇏ Marek is funny. 
In this subsection, we saw that the truth-implicature of the perfective verbs of 
communication is restricted to certain contexts, and that its availability may vary among 
speakers. Necessary conditions for the occurrence of the truth-implicature include 
reliability of the sentence subject and the verifiable character of the proposition from the 
that-clause. Also the morphological structure of the aspectual pairs needs to be taken 
into consideration. A more detailed explanation of the last-mentioned factor will be 
proposed in the experimental part of this dissertation. 
5.2.2 Establishing a new test for the perfectivity-factivity dependency 
Zuchewicz & Šimík proposed an additional test that yields further evidence of the 
perfectivity-dependent truthfulness in Polish and Czech. Consider the following 
examples. 
(273)  Zgadł / przewidział / wyczuł / przeczuł, że 
 guessed.PFV / predicted.PFV / sensed.PFV / sensed.PFV that 
 Ada kłamie, co nas zdziwiło. 
 Ada lies, what us surprised. 
 ‘He guessed / predicted / sensed that Ada was lying, which surprised us.’ 
 i. The fact that Ada was lying surprised us. 
 ii. The fact that he got it right that Ada was lying surprised us. 
 
(274)  Zgadywał / przewidywał / wyczuwał / przeczuwał, 
 guessed.IPFV / predicted.IPFV / sensed.IPFV / sensed.IPFV 
 że Ada kłamie, co nas zdziwiło. 
 that Ada lies, what us surprised. 
 ‘He took a guess / was predicting / sensing that Ada was lying, which 
surprised us.’ 
 i. #The fact that Ada was lying surprised us. 
 ii. The fact that he took a guess / was predicting / sensing that Ada was 
lying surprised us. 
 
(275)  Udowodnił / dowiódł / wykazał / pokazał, że 
 proved.PFV / proved.PFV / revealed.PFV / showed.PFV that 
 Ada kłamie, co nas zdziwiło. 
 Ada lies, what us surprised. 
 ‘He proved / revealed / showed that Ada was lying, which surprised us.’ 
 i. The fact that Ada was lying surprised us. 
 ii. The fact that he proved / revealed / showed that Ada was lying surprised 
us. 
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(276)  Udowadniał / dowodził / wykazywał / pokazywał, 
 proved.IPFV / proved.IPFV / revealed.IPFV / showed.IPFV 
 że Ada kłamie, co nas zdziwiło. 
 that Ada lies, what us surprised. 
 ‘He took a guess / was predicting / sensing that Ada was lying, which 
surprised us.’ 
 i. #The fact that Ada was lying surprised us. 
 ii. The fact that he was collecting evidence / revealing / showing that Ada 
was lying surprised us. 
 
First, because (z)dziwić ‘surprise’ is inherently factive, its complement needs to denote 
a true proposition. Second, that-clauses embedded under zgadnąć ‘guess.PFV’, 
przewidzieć ‘predict.PFV’, wyczuć ‘sense.PFV’, przeczuć ‘sense.PFV’ in (273), and under 
udowodnić ‘prove.PFV’, dowieść ‘prove.PFV’, wykazać ‘reveal.PFV’, pokazać ‘show.PFV’ 
in (275), must denote true propositions too, due to truth-presupposition and truth-
entailment requirements of the perfective. For that reason, co ‘what’ (or, similarly, its 
demonstrative counterpart to ‘that’) can refer to the that-clause in these cases. Naturally, 
one can also refer to the fact expressed by the matrix attitude; in this case, the 
proposition expressed by the that-clause is established / known in the discourse. In 
contrast, co ‘what’ cannot directly refer back to the proposition embedded under the 
imperfective counterparts in (274) and (276). Sentences embedded under these 
imperfective attitude predicates are neutral with respect to truthfulness, therefore only 
the guessing / predicting / sensing / proving / revealing / showing process itself is 
accessible as a discourse referent of the object of ‘surprise’ (cf. Zuchewicz & Šimík). 
5.2.3 Semantically-driven realizations of perfectivity-dependent truthfulness in Polish 
Based on Zuchewicz (2018: 489), I assume that the aspectual operator PFV introduces a 
nearly unspecified truthfulness feature that is parametrized by factivity, veridicality or 
truth-implicature via the dependency between the truth of an embedded proposition p 
and an event e denoted by the matrix verb. See (277) for a factive, (278) for a veridical, 
and (279) for an implicature-like interpretation of clause-embedding predicates in Polish 
(adapted from Zuchewicz 2018: 489-490). 
 
(277)  For a VP with a propositional complement p 
 PFV(λe〚VP〛(e) such that the truth of p is independent of e) 
→ e exists in the world of evaluation (factivity) 
 
(278)  For a VP with a propositional complement p 
 PFV(λe〚VP〛(e) such that the truth of p is dependent on e) 
→ e is verifiable in the world of evaluation (veridicality) 
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(279)  For a VP with a propositional complement p 
 PFV(λe〚VP〛(e) such that the truth of p is communicated by e) 
→ e is likely to exist in the world of evaluation (truth-implicature) 
 
If the truth of p holds regardless of the truth of e, e exists in the world of evaluation, i.e. 
an embedding verb is factive. In this case, there is no incremental creation of belief. For 
instance, the truth of propositions embedded under perfective zgadnąć ‘guess’, 
przewidzieć ‘predict’ or przeczuć ‘sense’ holds independently of the processes of 
guessing / predicting / sensing. In contrast, if the truth of p does depend on the truth of 
e, e becomes verifiable in the world of evaluation, and a matrix verb receives a veridical 
interpretation. Here, the truth of p is being incrementally created, and is a final 
consequence of the completion of a process denoted by e – the process of proving, 
revealing, showing, etc. Finally, if the truth of p is communicated by e, e is ‘only’ likely 
to exist in the world of evaluation. Zuchewicz (2018: 490) points out that it is unclear 
whether the realization of the truthfulness feature by an optional truth-implicature 
should count as realization at all. Alternatively, we could assume that, in the case of 
verbs of communication, the truthfulness introduced by PFV remains unspecified. In 
order to decide how to treat implicature, more empirical research needs to be done. 
5.2.4 Additional evidence: Nominalization constructions 
In the following, I will show that nominalization constructions provide further evidence 
for the correlation between perfectivity and truthfulness. 
The relationship between the perfective aspect of clause-embedding verbs and a truth-
related interpretation of complement sentences in Polish can also be seen in 
nominalization constructions, cf. Zuchewicz & Šimík (2018). First, I will consider 
nominals derived from presupposition verbs. (280) illustrates an eventuality nominal 
built from the imperfective guess, and (281) an eventuality nominal built from the 
perfective counterpart. 
(280)  Zgadywanie, że JAN ukradł klucze, było błędne. 
 guessing.IPFV that Jan stole keys was wrong 
 Okazało się, że to Marka sprawka. 
 turned.out REFL that this Marek.GEN doing 
 ‘Guessing that it was Jan who stole the keys was wrong. It turned out that 
it was Marek’s doing.’ 
 ↛ Jan is guilty. 
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(281)  #Zgadnięcie, że JAN ukradł klucze, było błędne. 
 guessing.PFV that Jan stole keys was wrong 
 Okazało się, że to Marka sprawka. 
 turned.out REFL that this Marek.GEN doing 
 ‘Successfully guessing that it was Jan who stole the keys was wrong. It 
turned out that it was Marek’s doing.’ 
 → Jan is guilty. 
 
Nominals built from incremental theme verbs that yield a veridical meaning of an 
embedded proposition pattern with those built from presupposition verbs. Consider 
(282) for an object nominal ‘proof’, (283) for eventuality nominals derived from 
imperfective incremental theme verbs, and (284) for eventuality nominals derived from 
the perfective twins. 
(282)  Potencjalny dowód (na to), że Jan jest winny, 
 potential proof for that that Jan is guilty 
 okazał się nieprawdziwy.  
 turned.out REFL false  
 ‘The potential proof of Jan’s guilt turned out to be false.’ 
 ↛ Jan is guilty. 
 
(283)  Udowadnianie / dowodzenie / wykazywanie / pokazywanie 
 proving.IPFV / proving.IPFV / revealing.IPFV / showing.IPFV 
 że Jan jest winny, zakończyło się fiaskiem. 
 that Jan is guilty finished REFL failure.INS 
 ‘Proving / revealing / showing that Jan is guilty failed.’ 
 ↛ Jan was guilty. 
 
(284)  #Udowodnienie / #dowiedzenie, / #wykazanie / #pokazanie, 
 proving.PFV / proving.PFV / revealing.PFV / showing.PFV 
 że Jan jest winny, zakończyło się fiaskiem. 
 that Jan is guilty finished REFL failure.INS 
 ‘Successfully proving / revealing / showing that Jan is guilty failed.’ 
 → Jan was guilty. 
By analogy to the behavior of the respective matrix verbs, only the nominals built from 
the perfective entail that p is true.   
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6 Factivity of the imperfective 
This dissertation aims to explain the relationship between the perfective aspect of 
clause-embedding verbs in Polish and a factive interpretation of embedded propositions. 
However, it does not intend to claim that the imperfective aspect necessarily blocks the 
factive meaning of a complement sentence; on the contrary, the imperfective is often 
compatible with factivity of the complement. Crucially, the truth-inference that goes 
along with the imperfective is never realized as presupposition or entailment; it is a 
context-bound cancellable implicature. 
6.1 (Non)factive imperfective verb pairs according to Danielewiczowa (2002) 
Danielewiczowa (2002) investigates how knowledge is encoded in the case of 
(non)factive imperfective epistemic verbs in Polish. She differentiates between the state 
of knowledge of the kontroler-nadawca (‘a controlling addresser’, ‘speaker’: an entity 
that is using a particular verb in her utterance), and the state of knowledge of the 
podmiot epistemiczny (‘the epistemic subject’: an entity whose characteristic is given / 
described by the imperfective verb). Danielewiczowa introduces the semantic 
representations of epistemic verbs in Polish by proposing two different entries for 
imperfective verbs that receive a factive interpretation if the main stress is put on the 
embedding-verb and not on the propositional complement, e.g. CZUĆ vs. czuć ‘feel’. 
6.1.1 The role of prosody in making imperfective verbs factive 
Danielewiczowa (2002: 52) identifies three different prosody-based situation types that 
Polish epistemic state verbs can be assigned to. 
Within the first group, the main accent can be placed either on the complement 
proposition or on the embedding verb. Different positions of stress do not influence the 
meaning of the respective epistemic verb; they only modify the thematic-rhematic 
structure of an utterance, for instance in the case of wiedzieć ‘know’. We can identify 
three subgroups here: first, factive verbs that presuppose the truthfulness of a 
complement sentence, more precisely, that presuppose both the epistemic subject’s and 
the speaker’s knowledge about the fact that a particular state of affairs holds (ibid., 54). 
For this group of verbs, the epistemic predicate is most likely to be stressed and not the 
complement proposition. The members of this subclass are for example: uprzytamniać 
sobie / uświadamiać sobie ‘realize’, orientować się ‘know about’, domyślać się 
‘suspect’, pamiętać ‘remember’, przypominać sobie ‘recall’, etc. 
The second subgroup consists of verbs that imply the speaker’s knowledge about the 
fact that the particular state of affairs does not hold or that there are some doubts 
regarding its holding (ibid., 55). Here, it is most likely / less marked for the proposition 
to be accented and not the epistemic predicate. The members of this subgroup are for 
instance: mylić się ‘be wrong’, okłamywać się ‘deceive oneself’, mamić się ‘beguile 
oneself’, zwodzić się ‘delude oneself’. 
102 
 
Finally, there are verbs which do not presuppose anyone’s knowledge about the 
factivity of the embedded proposition, for instance: być pewnym ‘be certain’, być 
przekonanym ‘be positive about’, mieć nadzieję ‘hope’, liczyć się z ‘reckon with’. 
Within the second prosody-based group, the main accent is always placed on the 
propositional argument. While the sentence Ewa myśli, że pięknie ŚPIEwa ‘Ewa thinks 
that she sings beautifully’ is correct, * Ewa MYŚli, że pięknie śpiewa is not. However, 
(and also noticed by Danielewiczowa), after the introduction of an explicit contrast, we 
can put the main stress on the epistemic verb without changing the verb’s meaning. 
Consider the following example: 
 
(285)  Ewa wcale nie MYŚli, że pięknie śpiewa, ona 
 Ewa at.all NEG thinks.IPFV that beautifully sings, she 
 jest o tym święcie przekoNAna / tak ci się 
 is about that firmly confirmed / so you.DAT REFL 
 tylko wyDAje.       
 only seems       
 ‘Ewa1 does not THINK that she1 sings beautifully, she1 firmly beLIEVes 
so / that is only your impREssion.’ 
 
Other members of this class are: przypuszczać ‘suppose’, obawiać się ‘be afraid’, 
odnosić wrażenie ‘have an impression’, przewidywać ‘predict’, sądzić, być zdania, 
‘think’ zakładać ‘assume’, etc. Verbs belonging to this group do not imply anyone’s 
knowledge of whether the embedded proposition is true. 
In the third group, the main accent can be placed either on the epistemic predicate or on 
the propositional argument. The crucial observation here is that different positions of 
stress give rise to different interpretations of the matrix verb with respect to factivity. 
This is why this group is the most relevant one for the purpose of this chapter and this 
dissertation in general: it reveals cases where factivity goes along with the imperfective 
aspect. According to Danielewiczowa, epistemic verbs that belong to this class consist 
of a factive and a non-factive variant, each having a distinct semantic representation. 
Consider (286) for the factive version of ‘suspect’. 
 
(286)  Jan podejRZEwa, że ma raka. 
 Jan suspects.IPFV that has cancer 
 ‘Jan suspects that he has cancer.’ 
 Adapted from ibid., 57 
 
With an accent on the matrix verb, (286) presupposes that Jan has cancer. More 
precisely, what is presupposed here is the speaker’s knowledge about this fact (ibid., 
58). The truth-inference does not vanish under negation or after the insertion of a modal 
adverbial, which confirms that it is a presupposition. From both 
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(287)  Jan nie podejRZEwa, że ma raka. 
 Jan NEG suspects.IPFV that has cancer 
 ‘Jan does not suspect that he has cancer.’ 
 
and 
 
(288)  Jan prawdopodobnie podejRZEwa, że ma raka. 
 Jan probably suspects.IPFV that has cancer 
 ‘Jan probably suspects that he has cancer.’ 
 
it still follows that Jan has cancer. However, the truth-inference vanishes after the 
introduction of an explicit contrast to the embedding proposition: 
 
(289)  Jan wcale nie podejRZEwa, że ma raka, on tylko 
 Jan at.all NEG suspects.IPFV that has cancer he only 
 uDAje. 
 pretends. 
 ‘Jan does not suspect that he has cancer, he is only pretending.’ 
 ⇏ Jan has cancer. 
 
In contrast, after putting stress on the complement sentence, neither the knowledge of 
the speaker (controller) nor the knowledge of Jan are presupposed. Consider (290), the 
non-factive counterpart to (286). 
 
(290)  Jan podejrzewa, że ma RAka. 
 Jan suspects.IPFV that has cancer 
 ‘Jan suspects that he has cancer.’ 
 Adapted from ibid., 57 
 
(290) leaves open the question of whether Jan has cancer. As Danielewiczowa (2002: 
58) puts it, we can easily test for this contrast. While we cannot say: 
 
(291)  # Jan podejRZEwa, że ma raka, ale ja sądzę, że 
  Jan suspects.IPFV that has cancer but I think that 
  to jest coś innego. 
  it is something else. 
  ‘Jan suspects that he has cancer, but I think that it is something else.’ 
 
uttering 
 
(292)  Jan podejrzewa, że ma RAka, ale ja sądzę, że to jest 
 coś innego. 
 ‘Jan suspects that he has cancer, but I think that it is something else.’ 
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does not lead to a contradiction. Danielewiczowa assumes that differences in meaning 
caused by prosodic features are semantic in nature because of the presence of nonequal 
components of content in the two variants (= the presence or absence of the 
presupposition of the kontroler-nadawca’s knowledge that the particular state of affairs 
holds). She further claims that the factivity-based opposition cannot be explained via the 
thematic-rhematic information ordering or via any pragmatic rule (ibid., 61). Therefore, 
she assumes the presence of two distinct units; e.g. for ‘suspect’: podejrzewać and 
podejRZEwać. The same pattern applies to wydawać się ‘seem’ (adapted from ibid., 
189): 
 
(293)  Janowi wydaje się, że ktoś za nim idzie. 
 Jan.DAT seems.IPFV REFL that somebody behind him walks 
 To może być prawda. 
 It can be truth 
 ‘It seems to Jan that somebody is following him. It may be true.’ 
 
(294)  Janowi wyDAje się tylko, że ktoś za nim 
 Jan.DAT seems.IPFV REFL only that somebody behind him 
 idzie. On jest taki nerwowy. 
 walks He is so nervous 
 ‘It only seems to Jan that somebody is following him. He is so nervous.’ 
 
(295)  Janowi wyDAje się, że ktoś za nim idzie. 
 Jan.DAT seems.IPFV REFL that somebody behind him walks 
 # To może być prawda. 
  it can be truth 
 ‘It seems to Jan that somebody is following him. It may be true.’ 
 
Based on the above observations, Danielewiczowa considers two realizations of ‘it 
seems [to somebody] that’: wydaje się [komuś], że i wyDAje się [komuś], że. See also 
the following contradiction: 
 
(296)  # WyDAje się, że mógł się pomylić. 
  seems.IPFV REFL that could REFL be.wrong 
  ‘It seems that he could be wrong.’ 
 
To sum up, we can observe systematic prosody-based oppositions within some 
imperfective epistemic verbs. Different prosodic patterns give rise to different semantic 
representations. 
However, Danielewiczowa also points out that the relationship between the factivity of 
imperfective epistemic matrix verbs and the two distinct prosodic realizations 
(accenting an embedding predicate vs. accenting a propositional complement) needs to 
be considered a tendency and not an obligatory correlation; as we have already seen 
above, accenting an embedding predicate does not always result in its factive 
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interpretation (it does not for instance with być pewnym, być przekonanym ‘be certain’, 
wierzyć ‘believe’, etc.). In the case of wierzyć, the epistemic subject does not know if p 
holds (her knowledge is not enough to say whether it does). Its accented imperfective 
twin WIErzyć remains neutral with respect to factivity; by stressing the embedding verb, 
the subject emphasizes the fact of giving credence to the truth of someone’s utterance, 
as in: 
 
(297)  WIErzę, że tego nie zrobiłeś. 
 believe.1SG.IPFV that it.GEN NEG did.2SG 
 ‘I believe that you did not do this.’ 
 Adapted from ibid., 242 
 
In the following, I will discuss Danielewiczowa’s view of the semantic structure of 
imperfective (non)factive verb pairs in Polish. 
6.1.2 Semantic representations of imperfective (non)factive twins 
Danielewiczowa proposes the following semantic representations of the non-factive 
podejrzewać (298) and the factive podejRZEwać ‘suspect’ (299): 
 
(298) a podejrzewa, że p [akcent na propozycji] 33 Danielewiczowa (2002: 284) 
[T] a, 
[TD] który (i) o p z {p, ¬p} wie, że jeśli p˘34, to pod pewnym względem źle, że  
p˘, 
(ii) nie wie, czy p˘ zachodzi, 
[R] jest gotów (r.i) ze względu na to, co wie, powiedzieć, że p˘, 
(r.ii) powiedzieć że jeśli p˘, to ktoś nie chce, żeby a wiedział, 
że p˘. 
a suspects that p [accent on a propositional complement]35 
[T] a, 
[TD] who (i) about p from {p, ¬p} knows that if p˘, than it is under certain  
circumstances bad that p˘, 
    (ii) does not know if p˘ holds, 
[R] is ready (r.i), on account of what she knows, to say that p˘, 
(r.ii) to say that if p˘, then someone does not want a to know that  
p˘. 
 
Starting from the top, [T] stands for ‘theme’ (as a part of the theme-rheme opposition), 
and a represents an epistemic subject. [TD] is the so-called dictum tematyczne 
 
33 I slightly modified the notational conventions. 
34 P˘ represents an element from the pair {p, ¬p}, which undergoes a negative evaluation, cf. 
Danielewiczowa (2002: 284). 
35 The English translations are my own. 
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‘thematic dictum’ that describes the presupposed components of meaning, i.e. the parts 
of an utterance that remain true under negation. (298) includes two presuppositions: (i) 
a’s readiness to negatively judge p˘ (and the lack of such readiness in the case of ¬ p˘), 
and (ii) a’s lack of knowledge of whether p˘ holds. The lack of readiness to negatively 
evaluate ¬p˘ is bound to the readiness to evaluate p˘ and ¬p˘ contrary to each other. In 
particular, if we suspect that p˘, then we do not suspect that ¬p˘ (one can only suspect 
bad things). The speaker is also evaluating p˘ negatively, which is covered by a knows 
that … 
[R] builds the last component of the semantic representation. It refers to the rhematic 
part of an utterance, i.e.the part that does not survive under negation. The rheme in 
(298) consists of a’s readiness to say two things: a is ready, on account what she knows, 
to say (r.i) that p˘, and to say (r.ii) that if p˘ holds, then there is someone who does not 
want a to know that it does.36 
 
Now consider (299) – the factive counterpart to the imperfective suspect: 
 
(299) a podejRZEwa, że p [akcent na predykacie] (ibid., 285) 
[T] a, 
[TD] (i)  który o p˘ z {p, ¬p} wie, że jeśli p˘, to źle, że p˘, 
(ii) o którym, ktoś, kto nie chce, żeby a wiedział, że p˘ zachodzi, wie,  
że a nie wie, czy p˘ zachodzi, 
[R] jest gotów ze względu na to, co wie, powiedzieć, że p˘. 
a susPECTS that p [accent on a predicate] 
[T] a, 
  [TD] (i)  who about p˘ from {p, ¬p} knows that if p˘, than it is bad that p˘, 
  (ii) about whom someone, who does not want a to know that p˘  
holds, knows that a does not know whether p˘ holds, 
[R] is ready, on account of what she knows, to say that p˘. 
As mentioned above and based on Danielewiczowa (2002: 285), in the case of the 
factive ‘suspect’, the accent is obligatorily placed on the embedding verb. The main 
difference between the factive and the non-factive variant is that the former, but not the 
latter, presupposes someone’s (but not the epistemic subject’s) knowledge about the fact 
that p˘ holds. Because this inference is a presupposition, it needs to be placed within 
[TD]. Furthermore, in the factive variant, it is presupposed that the controller wishes to 
keep p˘ secret from the epistemic subject. 
 
36 In my opinion, the last-mentioned point is not a necessary component of the rhematic 
representation. For instance, the sentence Ida podejrzewa, że oblała egzamin ‘Ida suspects that 
she failed the test’ can be uttered in a situation where the teacher has just begun to tell students 
their grades. Let’s say that Liwia, Ida’s friend, says the above sentence to Marek after Ida told 
her that she thinks she failed the test. In this case, there is no one who does not want Ida to 
know that p˘ (if p˘ holds). Similarly this applies to statements like Sandra podejrzewa, że będzie 
padać ‘Sandra suspects that it is going to rain.’ 
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A similar pattern can be found with czuć ‘feel’. Compare the following examples, 
adapted from ibid., 203: 
 
(300)  Marysia czuje, że Janek ją lekceWAży, ale ona jest 
 Marysia feels.IPFV that Janek her disregards but she is 
 przewrażliwiona. Myślę, że się myli. 
 oversensitive think.1SG that REFL be.wrong 
 ‘Marysia feels that Janek disregards her, but she is oversensitive. I think 
that she is wrong.’ 
 
(301)  Marysia CZUje (to), że Janek ją lekceWAży, # ale 
 Marysia feels.IPFV it.ACC that Janek her disregards  but 
 myślę, że się myli. 
 think.1SG that REFL be.wrong 
 ‘Marysia feels the fact that Janek disregards her, but I think that she is 
wrong.’ 
 
(302)  Marysia nie czuje, żeby Janek ją lekceWAżył. 
 Marysia NEG feels.IPFV that.BY Janek her disregarded 
 Może i ma rację. 
 Maybe and has right 
 ‘Marysia does not feel that Janek disregards her {subjunctive mood}. 
Maybe she is right.’ 
 
(303)  Tylko Marysia nie CZUje tego, że Janek ją 
 only Marysia NEG feels.IPFV it.GEN that Janek her 
 lekceWAży. 
 disregards 
 ‘Marysia is the only one who does not realize the fact that Janek disregards 
her.’ 
 
The above-mentioned correlation between factive accented and non-factive non-
accented ‘feel’ applies to the majority of cases. However, truth-presupposition can be 
canceled if an appropriate context is provided. This raises the question as to whether the 
inference is a presupposition at all. It might be givenness, which can, but does not have 
to correlate with factivity. Consider (304). 
 
(304)  Przez lata naprawdę CZUłam, że Krzysiek mnie 
 through years really felt.1SG.IPFV that Krzysiek me 
 zostawi i w końcu popadłam w paranoję. Sama 
 leaves and in the.end felt into paranoia myself 
 od niego odeszłam. 
 from him left 
 ‘I was really feeling for years that Krzysiek was going to leave me, and I 
finally became paranoid about that. It was me who left.’ 
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Two open issues remain. First, the assumption that two different semantic 
representations for verbs with prosody-based truth-related differences in meaning is 
only reasonable if the non-accented non-factive variant is considered a basis from which 
the factive twin is derived. Since we need an additional mechanism in order to receive 
the factive interpretation of the imperfective (putting stress on the matrix verb), and 
since the inference itself, limited to a small number of verbs anyway, vanishes under 
contrast, treating (non)factive twins as completely independent units seems exaggerated. 
Second, in cases like (297), there seems to be a weak truth-implicature. The speaker has 
a certain opinion about the epistemic subject and takes for granted the truth of what she 
has said (also if there is no proof, that means there is no veridicality in the proper 
sense). The combination of the above-mentioned factors suggests the presence of the 
prosody-based truth-implicature of the imperfective; putting stress on the matrix verb 
can give rise to the verb’s factive or reliability- / commitment-based interpretation 
(Cohen & Krifka 2014, Krifka 2015). More precisely, factivity and reliability are 
possible realizations of the truth-implicature of the imperfective. 
In the next subsection, I will discuss the notion of the so called factual imperfective. 
6.2 The factual imperfective 
Grønn (2003) investigates the usages of the imperfective aspect in Russian, where the 
imperfective past refers to complete events. This so called factual imperfective fulfills 
the function that is usually reserved for the perfective. Consider examples (305) and 
(306), adapted from Grønn (2003: 10): 
 
(305)  Vanja čital.IPFV ‘Vojnu i mir.’ 
 Vanja was reading ‘War and Peace’. (Processual Ipfv) 
 Or 
 Vanja has read ‘War and Peace’. (Factual Ipfv) 
 
(306)  Vanja pročital.PFV ‘Vojnu i mir.’ 
 Vanja (has) read ‘War and Peace’. 
 
The same observation holds for Polish: 
 
(307)  Janek czytał.IPFV ‘Wojnę i pokój.’ 
 Janek was reading ‘War and Peace’. (Processual Ipfv) 
 Or 
 Janek has read ‘War and Peace’. (Factual Ipfv) 
 
(308)  Janek przeczytał.PFV ‘Wojnę i pokój.’ 
 Janek (has) read ‘War and Peace’. 
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Grønn proposes that the factual imperfective refers to complete events while either 
asserting or presupposing the actual existence of the state of affairs denoted by the 
verbal predicate (existential vs. presuppositional imperfective). 
The presuppositional imperfective is restricted to past tense. Consider the Russian 
example (309), adapted from Grønn (2003: 153): 
 
(309)  A deti kric̄ali.IPFV: papa, papa! … Za c̄to on umer.PFV? Tovaris̄c̄i, no 
poc̄emu z̄e ko mne? Pri c̄em tut ja? Ja, c̄to li, ubival.IPFV? (Uppsala 
Corpus) 
 ‘And the children cried out: Dad, dad … Why did he die? Well, my friends, 
why do you ask me? I have nothing to do with it. Did I kill him?’ 
 
The imperfective ubival ‘killed’ is licensed in (309), because the event of killing is 
presupposed based on / easily inferable from the perfective-marked complete event of 
dying described in the previous utterance. The location in the past also belongs to the 
presupposed material; the existence of a killing event is given, therefore killing itself is 
not the focus of attention. Grønn assumes that presupposing the existence of an event 
means knowing of its existence. 
However, using the imperfective with the perfective meaning is much more restricted in 
Polish than in Russian. Consider (310) – the Polish counterpart of (309)37: 
 
(310)  A dzieci krzyczały.IPFV: tato, tato! … Dlaczego on umarł.PFV? Kochani, 
dlaczego mnie pytacie? Ja nie mam z tym nic wspólnego. Czy to ja go 
zabiłem.PFV / *zabijałem.IPFV? 
 
Only the perfective ‘kill’ can be used in (310), despite the presence of the 
presupposition of the dying event. 
Another interesting case is illustrated in the Russian example (311). It is an instance of 
the existential imperfective of the so-called experiential sort (adapted from Padučeva 
1996: 39, cf. also Grønn 2003, Mueller-Reichau 2018). 
 
(311)  Sergej vešal.IPFV ėtu kartu. On znaet kak ėto delaetsja. 
 ‘Sergej (once) put up this map. He knows how to do it.’ 
 
According to Mueller-Reichau (2018: 217), the following processing path is involved in 
understanding (311). There is an utterance situation where the hearer has problems with 
putting up a certain map. The speaker is not able to help, but she knows of someone – 
Sergej – who might be able to. The speaker believes that Sergej is an appropriate 
choice, because she knows that he has already put up this particular map. The speaker’s 
 
37 The translation is my own. 
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conclusion is driven by the trivial rule of common sense reasoning illustrated in (312); 
Mueller-Reichau ibid. 
 
(312)  i. Background rule: If someone does something, she will then know how to 
do it. 
 ii. Event: Sergej put up this map. 
 iii. Conclusion: Sergej knows how to put up this map. 
 
In line with Mueller-Reichau, the existential imperfective is immediately followed by a 
sentence explicating the proposition that is implicitly asserted by the imperfective 
aspect. In (311), that proposition states that Sergej is the one who knows how to put up 
the map. 
(311) works also for Polish, but only after providing an explicit temporal indication: 
 
(313)  Sergej wieszał.IPFV już kiedyś / ostatnio ten obraz. On wie jak to zrobić. 
 ‘Sergej put up this map (some time) in the past / recently. He knows how to 
do it.’ 
 
In general, using the imperfective in the perfective domain in Polish is possible in the 
following two scenarios: first, if the utterance focuses on the duration of an event, as in 
(314): 
 
(314)  Rastrelli budował.IPFV Pałac Zimowy aż osiem lat, ... 
 ‘Rastrelli was building the Winter Palace for eight years, …’ 
 
(314) could be followed by both (315) and (316): 
 
(315)  ale nigdy go nie skończył. 
 ‘but he never finished it.’ 
 
(316)  ale jak Państwo widzicie, opłacało się. 
 ‘but as you can see, it was worth it.’ 
 
(315) illustrates the typical use of the imperfective, i.e. the expression of the non-
completion of the building event. Judging (314) as non-compatible with (315) is based 
on our world knowledge, and not on any aspectual/semantic conflicts within an 
utterance. We know that Rastrelli built the Winter Palace in 1762, so we also know that 
the building process was completed. Using the imperfective makes it possible to focus 
on the duration (meaning that it took a long time to build the Palace), and not on the 
completion itself; for that reason, (316) is a perfect continuation of (314). 
Alternatively, the meaning of (314) could also be expressed with the perfective ‘build’: 
 
111 
 
(317)  Rastrelli zbudował.PFV Pałac Zimowy w osiem lat. 
 ‘Rastrelli built the Winter Palace within eight years.’ 
 
In (317), there is no emphasis on the long duration of the building process (in contrast to 
(314), so the sentence could mean that it was built quickly). 
Second, the imperfective can occur in the perfective domain in Polish if the speaker 
aims at indicating a particular modal or causal interpretation of a (complete) event: 
 
(318)  Matejko malował.IPFV te obrazy ku pokrzepieniu serc. 
 ‘Matejko was painting those {finished} paintings to raise people’s spirits.’ 
 
Without a specific indication (temporal, modal, causal), the imperfective form would 
appear unnatural in all the abovementioned examples. 
In the following chapter, I will present cross-linguistic evidence for the relationship 
between perfectivity and factivity.   
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7 Cross-linguistic evidence for the interaction between perfectivity 
and truthfulness 
7.1 Hungarian 
7.1.1 Factivity of perfective verbs of communication 
Hungarian is a Uralic SVO language with an agglutinative morphology (cf. Eberhard et 
al. 2019). In this language, aspect is not grammaticalized; verbal stems are neither 
systematically nor obligatorily marked as (im)perfective. However, some ‘semantically 
imperfective verbs’ (i.e. verbs that have an on-going, unlimited interpretation) can be 
perfectivized by means of the perfective particles meg- and be-. 
It was pointed out by Kiefer (1986) that, in Hungarian, certain verbs of communication 
have a factive and a non-factive variant. Consider the following examples, adapted from 
Kiefer (1986: 202). 
(319)  Péter mondta / írta, hogy Anna beteg. 
 ‘Peter said.IPFV / wrote.IPFV that Anna was sick.’ 
 i. The speaker does not commit herself to the truth of the 
proposition ‘Anna is sick.’ 
 ii. ↛ Anna is sick. 
 
(320)  Péter megmondta / megírta, hogy Anna beteg. 
 ‘Peter said.PFV / wrote.PFV that Anna was sick.’ 
 i. The speaker takes the proposition ‘Anna is sick’ for granted. 
 ii. → Anna is sick. 
 
As examples (319) and (320) illustrate, we can build (im)perfective minimal pairs mond 
– meg-mond ‘say’ and ír – meg-ír ‘write’. The respective embedded that-clauses differ 
only in factivity. Whereas the first member of each pair mentioned above embeds 
propositions that are neutral with respect to truthfulness, the second member embeds 
only true propositions. As has already been mentioned, Kiefer calls the (im)perfective 
variants (non)factive, on the basis of inference patterns presented in (319) and (320). In 
line with the terminology adapted in my dissertation, the perfective derivates in (320), 
in contrast to the imperfective underlying forms in (319), exhibit the veridical meaning 
of the subordinate clause. Only the observation that the truth-inference survives under 
negation confirms the factivity status of the perfective. See (322), compared to the 
imperfective (321).38 
 
38 I would like to thank Kata Wohlmuth for her judgements on Hungarian and for fruitful 
discussions. All remaining errors are my own. 
114 
 
(321)  Péter nem mondta / nem írta, hogy Anna beteg. 
 ‘Peter was not saying / writing that Anna was sick.’ 
 ↛ Anna is sick. 
 
(322)  Péter nem mondta meg / nem írta meg, 
 hogy Anna beteg. 
 ‘Peter did not say / write that Anna was sick.’ 
 → Anna is sick. 
 
Kiefer can be seen as a pioneer of the observation on perfectivity-dependent factivity 
realized on propositional complements: 
“It is generally known that perfective verbs are often used to report on facts whereas 
imperfective verbs are used to describe ongoing processes or activities. This may explain why 
megmond ‘say (perfective)’ and megír ‘write (perfective)’ are factive whereas mond ‘say 
(imperfective)’ and ír ‘write (imperfective)’ are not. This does not mean, however, that all 
perfective verbs are automatically factive (of course, they are not). The majority of factives 
seem to be statives, they describe states and are consequently neither perfective nor 
imperfective. This may mean, however, that whenever we have an imperfective-
perfective pair such as mond-megmond, ír-megír which may take an embedded that-
clause, in addition to the difference concerning perfectivity there might also be a 
difference concerning factivity between the two verbs, the perfective verb being factive 
and the imperfective one nonfactive.” (Kiefer 1986: 203–204). 
By means of the (at first sight unusual) factive meaning of propositions embedded under 
perfective verbs of communication, Hungarian seems to make a systematic distinction 
between reported facts and reported utterances/statements. 
To conclude, the perfective meg- functions as a factivity-trigger when applied to verbs 
of communication cf. (323). 
 
(323)  [[meg- VCOMM] [that …]] → p is true, also under negation; V is factive 
 
Another observation that confirms the factivity of perfective communication verbs in 
Hungarian comes from embedding of propositions that are known to be false. Consider 
the following example. 
(324)  Many people have claimed that the earth was flat. 
 i. Homer azt #megmondta / mondta that the earth was flat. 
 ii. Thales azt #megmondta / mondta that the earth was flat. 
 iii. Leucippus azt #megmondta / mondta that the earth was flat. 
 ‘Homer / Thales / Leucippus said.PFV / said.IPFV that the 
earth was flat.’ 
 
Since it is part of common knowledge that the earth is round, i.e. that the proposition 
from the subordinate clauses in (324) does not hold in the actual world, it can only be 
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embedded by the imperfective ‘say’. This means that, as presented in (324), discourse-
givenness does not influence the projection pattern. In the above example, p is 
introduced in the beginning (in the sense that p has been claimed before), and the 
utterances i.–iii. focus on the subjects (who were the people that said that p). If 
factivity was a side-effect of givenness, one would expect the sentences i.–iii. to be 
well-formed under the perfective ‘say’. The fact that they are not suggests that factivity 
originates from / is bound to actualization. 
7.1.2 Veridicality of perfective incremental theme verbs 
A very interesting phenomenon can be observed in incremental theme verbs / reveal-
type predicates in Hungarian. In the case of ‘to prove’, the perfective particle be- needs 
to be used in order to get truth-entailment. 
(325)  Péter bebizonyította, hogy Anna beteg. 
 ‘Peter proved.PFV (it right) that Anna was sick.’ 
 → Anna is sick. 
 
Crucially, there is no imperfective version of (325), i.e. it is not possible to remove the 
particle and, as a result, to get rid of the entailment. The only way to use the verb ‘to 
prove’ is with be-, and with a veridical meaning of a complement sentence. This fact 
might arise from the lexical content of ‘proof’; if something is a proof, it cannot be 
wrong. There can be a potential proof that has not been accepted in the course of 
verification or some piece of evidence that is not sufficient to establish a proof, but 
everything that is acknowledged as a proof causes a veridical interpretation of a 
proposition. 
If we want to express the meaning ‘to be proving’, we have to use a conative 
construction based on ‘to try to prove’. Consider (326) for the imperfective, and (327) 
for the perfective version of that construction. 
(326)  Péter próbálta bebizonyítani, hogy Anna beteg, 
 de végül nem bizonyította be. 
 ‘Peter tried.IPFV to prove.PFV that Ann was sick, but he did not prove 
it in the end PFV.’ 
 ↛ Anna is sick. 
 
(327)  Péter megpróbálta bebizonyítani, hogy Anna beteg, 
 de végül nem bizonyította be. 
 ‘Peter tried.PFV to prove.PFV that Ann was sick, but he did not prove it 
in the end PFV.’ 
 ↛ Anna is sick. 
 
There is an implicature-based difference between (326) and (327). With the 
imperfective variant (326), it seems improbable that Anna is sick. After using the 
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perfective, however, the proposition expressed by the that-clause is more likely to be 
interpreted as true. Since both (326) and (327) can be followed by but he did not prove 
it in the end, there is no entailment in the case of the perfective. A weak truth-inference 
might be an implicature. 
Based on this subsection, we can assume the following. 
 
(328)  [[be- VPROVE] [that …]] → p is true, but not under negation; V is veridical 
 
(329)  [[meg- VTRY] [that …]] → p is likely to be interpreted as true 
 
To sum up, the perfective tends to trigger truthfulness in Hungarian. Truthfulness can be 
realized as factivity (verbs of communication), veridicality (an incremental ‘to prove’) 
or a weak truth-implicature (‘to try’). General aspect-related differences in truthfulness 
are presented in (330) and (331). 
 
(330)  [[V.PFV] [that …]] → p is true 
 
(331)  [[V.IPFV] [that …]] → p is neutral with respect to truthfulness 
 
Specific parametrizations of the perfective within each analyzed verb group are 
illustrated in (332), (333) and (334). 
 
(332)  [[VCOMM.PFV] [that …]] → truth-presupposition on p (p is true, also under 
negation) 
 
(333)  [[VPROVE.PFV] [that …]] → truth-entailment on p 
 
(334)  [[VTRY.PFV] [that …]] → truth-implicature on p 
 
Crucially, the three types of truth-inference observed in Hungarian correspond to the 
inference types described for Polish. The only difference between the two languages lies 
in the distribution of the inference types over diverse semantic groups of verbs. There 
is, however, one case of a 1:1 relationship between verb class and inference type. In 
both languages, perfective verbs of proving (incremental theme verbs) yield truth-
entailment. This suggests the cross-linguistic (or universal) role of incrementality in 
triggering veridicality. Furthermore, it speaks in favor of the development of an account 
that would explain the correlation: [+ perfective] + [+ incremental] = [+ veridical]. 
In the next subsection, I will discuss perfectivity-dependent truthfulness arising from 
ability modals in Hindi and French. 
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7.2 Modal constructions in Hindi, Greek and French 
7.2.1 Actuality entailment 
In this section, I will investigate cases where aspect is marked on modals, and where the 
perfectivity-truthfulness dependency remains. 
7.2.1.1 Hindi 
Hindi is an SOV Indo-Aryan language that marks both tense and aspect (cf. for instance 
Eberhard et al. 2019). In line with Koul (2008: 105), there are three grammatical aspect 
types in Hindi: habitual, progressive and perfective (recall also the concept of the ‘two 
perfectives’ described by Singh 1998 and Arunachalam & Kothari 2011 that was 
mentioned in section 4.1). 
The influence of perfective ability modals on a factive interpretation of complement 
clauses was discovered by Bhatt (1999). Bhatt discusses the presence of the so-called 
actuality entailment in languages like Hindi or Greek. 
Actuality entailment refers to the non-cancelable inference stating that the proposition 
expressed by the complement clause holds in the actual world. I will use the term 
actuality entailment only with regard to the truth-inference triggered by modal verbs 
or modal constructions. The phenomenon itself seems to be equivalent to the truth-
entailment (veridicality) described in this dissertation. As a result of the actuality / truth-
entailment, an embedded proposition is to be taken for granted if the matrix verb 
appears in the affirmative form. I am using the terms ‘truth-entailment’ and 
‘veridicality’ (instead of ‘actuality’), because they do not base on actualization. I prefer 
to define truth-inferences via the verification in the world of evaluation. 
Example (336) illustrates that the perfective variant of the Hindi sentence Yusuf could 
fly the airplane entails that Yusuf did in fact fly the airplane. The continuation with but 
he did not fly the airplane causes a contradiction. The respective imperfective form 
lacks this inference, which can be seen in (335).39 
 
39 Examples (335) and (336) indicate a correlation between perfectivity and definiteness on the 
nominal level, and between perfectivity and truthfulness on the sentential one (i.e. the 
relationship between definiteness and factivity in a broader sense); cf. also Bhatt (1999: 174) for 
the existential interpretation of indefinite subjects embedded under the ‘manage to’-reading (the 
perfective reading) of ability modals, and the generic interpretation of indefinite subjects 
embedded under the ‘had the ability to’-reading (the imperfective reading) of these modals. 
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(335)  Yusuf havaii-jahaaz uṛaa sak-taa hai/thaa 
 Yusuf air-ship fly can-IPFV be.PRS/be.PST 
 (lekin vo havaii-jahaaz nahĩĩ uṛaa-taa hai/thaa). 
 but he air-ship NEG fly-IPFV be.PRS/be.PST 
 ‘Yusuf is/was able to fly airplanes but he doesn’t/didn’t fly airplanes.’ 
 Adapted from: Bhatt (1999: 176) 
 
(336)  Yusuf havaii-jahaaz uṛaa sak-aa 
 Yusuf air-ship fly can-PFV 
 (# lekin us-ne havaii-jahaaz nahĩĩ uṛaa-yaa). 
  but he-ERG air-ship NEG fly-PFV 
 ‘Yusuf could fly the airplane, but he didn’t fly the airplane.’ 
 Adapted from: Bhatt (1999: 176) 
 
As further evidence, consider contradictions present in the following examples. 
(337)  # Yunus Yakub-kaa tiin baar khoon kar sak-aa. 
  Yunus Yakub-GEN 3 times murder do can-PFV 
 ‘Yunus could murder Yakub three times/on three occasions.’ 
 Adapted from: Bhatt (1999: 176) 
 
(338)  # mE apne-aap-ko maar sak-aa. 
  I self-ACC kill can-PFV 
 ‘I could kill myself.’ 
 Adapted from: Bhatt (1999: 176) 
 
Since the perfective ‘can’ enforces a clausal argument to hold, we cannot have multiple 
instantiations of a perfective murdering-event. Furthermore, if the subject could.PFV kill 
herself, she cannot be the sentence speaker anymore. 
In this subsection we saw that, perfective ability modals in Hindi, in contrast to their 
imperfective counterparts, trigger truthfulness of the complement sentences. 
7.2.1.2 Greek 
A similar pattern holds for Greek. Greek is an Indo-European SVO language that has 
the so-called aorist (perfective past) and a rich aspectual system in general, cf. Smyth 
(1984), Eberhard et al. (2019). Consider examples (339) and (340). 
 
(339)  Borusa na sikoso afto to trapezi 
 can.IPFV.1SG na lift.NON-PST-PFV.1SG this the table 
 ala δen to sikosa. 
 but NEG it lift.IPFV 
 ‘(In those days), I could lift this table, but I didn’t lift it.’ 
 Adapted from: Bhatt (1999: 175) 
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(340)  Boresa na tu miliso 
 can.PST-PFV.1SG na him talk.NON-PST-PFV.1SG 
 (# ala δen tu milisa). 
  but NEG him talk.PST-PFV 
 ‘I was able to talk to John (but I did not talk to him).’ 
 Adapted from: Bhatt (1999: 175) 
 
As examples (339) and (340) demonstrate, only embedding by the imperfective ability 
modal allows for the complement sentence not to hold in the actual world (or to be 
neutral with respect to truthfulness). Following Bhatt (1999: 175), the presence of the 
perfectivity-bound actuality entailment in Greek can further be confirmed via the 
contradiction of (341) and (342). 
 
(341)  # O Yanis borese na skotosi ton 
  the Yanis can.PST-PFV na kill.NON-PST-PFV the 
  Petro 3 fores. 
  Petro 3 times 
  ‘Yanis managed to kill Petro three times.’ 
  Adapted from: Bhatt (1999: 175) 
 
(342)  # Boresa na aftoktoniso. 
  can.PST-PFV na kill-self 
  ‘I managed to kill myself.’ 
  Adapted from: Bhatt (1999: 176) 
 
Crucially, the contradiction vanishes if ‘kill’ is marked for the imperfective aspect. The 
imperfective variants of (341) and (342) would mean something like ‘On three 
occasions, John could have killed Peter’ and ‘I could have killed myself’, respectively 
(Bhatt 1999: 175). 
7.2.1.3 Generalization for languages that mark aspect on ability modals 
In line with Bhatt (1999: 177), the following pattern holds for languages that mark 
aspect on ability modals: 
 
(343)  a. PST (PFV(can) [VP]) = managed-to 
 b. PST (IPFV(can) [VP]) = had-ability-to 
 Adapted from: Bhatt (1999: 177) 
 
The derivation of the actuality entailment is presented in (344). 
 
(344)  ABLESTATIVE (P)(x) + [+ bounded] ↔ P(x) (Actuality Entailment) 
 Adapted from: Bhatt (1999: 183) 
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Following Bhatt (1999: 183), the absence of the [+ bounded] feature gives rise to the 
standard ability attribution. As a consequence, if a language parametrizes the 
[+ bounded] feature by the perfective aspect, the resulting perfective ability modal 
yields actuality entailment. In contrast, since the imperfective lacks the [+ bounded] 
feature by default, imperfective ability modals do not yield actuality entailment. This 
shows that it is in fact the standard semantics of perfectivity that is responsible for the 
truth-entailment of perfective ability modals. 
However, assuming that ‘able’ is a stative is not unproblematic. For instance in Greek, 
perfectivizing imperfective states gives rise to an inchoative interpretation of a derivate 
(Bhatt 1999: 184). Consider the following example. 
(345)  O Jannis agapise tin Maria to 1981. 
 the Jannis love-PST-PFV-3SG the Maria in 1981 
 ‘John started loving/fell in love with Mary in 1981.’ 
 Adapted from: Anagnostopoulou et al. (1998) 
 
For that reason, Bhatt (1999: 184) proposes treating ‘able to’ as a non-stative 
implicative verb that has a conventional implicature similar to ‘manage to’. Under this 
assumption, actuality entailment of perfective ability verbs used in the past tense in 
Hindi, Greek, Bulgarian or Catalan, and of the past episodic readings of the English to 
manage to results from the implicative character of these verbs. The evaluation of the 
proposition embedded under an implicative verb happens via realization of the matrix 
tense feature: 
(346)  John managed to eat the pizza. → John ate the pizza. 
 Bhatt (1999: 184) 
 
In this proposal, the standard ability attribution reading of ‘to be able to ‘is derived by 
means of the GEN operator: 
 
(347)  a. (In those days,) A fireman was able to eat five apples. 
  LF: PST (GEN (able(eat-5-apples)) (fireman)) 
 b. A fireman is able to eat five apples. 
  GEN ((able(eat-5-apples)) (fireman)) 
  Adapted from: Bhatt (1999: 185) 
 
The problem with Bhatt’s account lies in the fact that, in some languages (for instance 
in French), the same lexeme is a basic for both an ability and an epistemic interpretation 
of a given modal. As will be shown later, in French, epistemic perfective modals do not 
yield an entailment though. This is why assuming an implicative meaning as a default 
would require some additional assumptions. 
In the next subsection, I will briefly discuss French data that further confirm the truth-
related potential of (some) perfective modal constructions. 
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7.2.1.4 French 
In line with Smith (1991: 253) among others, the aspectual viewpoint in French is 
expressed via tense. We can have a perfective, an imperfective, and a neutral 
perspective on events. However, the choice between perfective and imperfective (i.e. 
the building of aspectual minimal pairs) is only available in the past tense. In other 
tenses, the particular forms encode either the neutral or the perfective perspective. 
Hacquard (2006) investigated possible truth-inferences of some French modal verbs 
marked for the perfective aspect. Consider the following examples, where actuality 
entailment is present with the perfective ability modal, and absent with its imperfective 
counterpart. 
 
(348)  Pour aller au zoo, Jane pouvait prendre le train 
 (but she went there by bike / but she did not go to the zoo at all). 
 ‘To go to the zoo, Jane can-PST-IPFV take the train.’ 
 Adapted from: Hacquard (2006: 13) 
 
(349)  Pour aller au zoo, Jane a pu prendre le train 
 (# but she did not take the train / # but she went there by bike). 
 ‘To go to the zoo, Jane can-PST-PFV take the train.’ 
 Adapted from: Hacquard (2006: 13) 
 
The interpretation of (348) is such that, within all accessible worlds, there is a world in 
which Jane 1): goes to the zoo, and 2): arrived there by train. Crucially, this is not 
contradictory to a scenario where Jane neither took a train in the actual world nor went 
to the zoo at all. In contrast, in (349), Jane did necessarily take the train in reality. The 
sentence cannot be followed by any utterance stating that she did not take the train in 
the end (Hacquard 2006: 13). 
Interestingly, actuality entailment is not restricted to perfective ability modals; it also 
occurs with the perfective ‘must’: 
(350)  Pour aller au zoo, Jane devait prendre le train 
 (but she did not take the train). 
 ‘To go to the zoo, Jane must-PST-IPFV take the train.’ 
 Adapted from: Hacquard (2006: 14) 
 
(351)  Pour aller au zoo, Jane a dû prendre le train 
 (# but she did not take the train). 
 ‘To go to the zoo, Jane must-PST-PFV take the train.’ 
 Adapted from: Hacquard (2006: 14) 
 
By analogy to the previous examples, the imperfective ‘must’ in (350) does not require 
its complement to hold in the actual world, whereas the perfective one in (351) enforces 
the truth of an embedded proposition. The only difference between (349) and (351) lies 
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in the modal-bound component of meaning: While (349) denotes an actualized 
possibility, (351) expresses an actualized necessity. In the former case, there might have 
been several options for getting to the zoo, and it was Jane’s preference to take the train. 
In the latter case, however, taking the train was the only option available (Hacquard 
2006: 14). 
7.2.2 Actuality implicature 
Hacquard (2006: 16) shows that the perfectivity-dependent truth-inference in French is 
not always an entailment. (352) and (353) constitute a minimal pair that consists of the 
imperfective (in the former case) and the perfective (in the latter case) version of the 
(modal) construction ‘to have the possibility’. Although the perfective variant strongly 
suggests that Darcy did meet Lizzie in the actual world (especially in direct comparison 
with the imperfective alternative), we can negate that state of affairs without giving rise 
to a contradiction. 
(352)  Darcy avait la possibilité de rencontrer Lizzie 
 (but he did not meet her in the end). 
 ‘Darcy had-IPFV the possibility to meet Lizzie.’ 
 Adapted from: Hacquard (2006: 16) 
 
(353)  Darcy a eu la possibilité de rencontrer Lizzie 
 (but he did not meet her in the end). 
 ‘Darcy had-PFV the possibility to meet Lizzie.’ 
 Adapted from: Hacquard (2006: 16) 
 
Hacquard further notices that, since the meaning of the French ‘have the possibility’ is 
very similar to the meaning of the ability modal, one would expect the same inference 
pattern in (349) and (353) if the differences in interpretation between the (im)perfective 
forms were due to some pragmatic aspects of ‘possibility’. Instead, the presence of a 
clearly semantic inference in (349) and ‘only’ a pragmatic enrichment in (353) suggest 
that it is rather the syntax / semantics of the modal that triggers the entailment. 
Anyhow, what is crucial for the purpose of this dissertation is that data from French 
provide further cross-linguistic evidence for the relationship between perfectivity and 
truthfulness. 
In the next subsection, I will briefly discuss Hacquard’s explanation of the perfectivity-
veridicality dependency in French modal constructions. 
7.2.3 Hacquard’s explanation 
The background for the proposal is based on the observation that not all perfective 
modals in French require actuality of their complements. For instance, epistemic 
interpretations of the above-described ‘can’/‘must’ do not yield actuality entailment 
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independently of aspect. Consider the following examples, adapted from Hacquard 
(2006: 24). 
 
(354)  Darcy a pu aimer Lizzie. 
 Darcy could-PFV love Lizzie 
 ‘Darcy could have loved Lizzie.’ 
 
(355)  Darcy pouvait aimer Lizzie. 
 Darcy could-IPFV love Lizzie 
 ‘Darcy could have been in love with Lizzie’. 
 
(356)  Darcy a dû aimer Lizzie. 
 Darcy must-PFV love Lizzie 
 ‘Darcy must have loved Lizzie.’ 
 
(357)  Darcy devait aimer Lizzie. 
 Darcy must-IPFV love Lizzie 
 ‘Darcy must have been in love with Lizzie’. 
 
Following Hacquard (2006: 24), examples (354)–(357) do not differ with respect to the 
truth-related meaning of their complement sentences. This results from the fact that, in 
these cases, aspect is interpreted below the modal. In both the perfective and the 
imperfective variants, the speaker makes an assertion as to what could or must have 
been the case at the reference past time; the speaker’s assumptions are based on the state 
of her knowledge at the time of utterance. In the perfective (354) and (356), the 
proposition (Darcy(love(Lizzie))) held at some point in the past, but it no longer holds 
at the speech time. In contrast, in the imperfective (355) and (357), it is left open 
whether the proposition still holds at the time of utterance. 
This shows that ability modals pattern differently from epistemic modals regarding the 
presence or absence of actuality entailment. Interestingly, deontic modals that express 
permission or obligation belong either to the first or to the second group. If the 
obligation lies with the addressee, there is no actuality entailment, and the modal can 
only be marked for the imperfective aspect. If the obligation lies with the subject, 
however, actuality entailment appears with the perfective. 
According to Hacquard (2006: 147), actuality entailment is obligatory in cases where 
the perfective aspect scopes over a modal; if ASPECT is parametrized by [+ PERFECTIVE] 
and occurs in a matrix environment by scoping over a modal, its world argument is 
realized by the actual world, and, as a consequence, provides an actual event, cf. 
Hacquard (2006: 200). In this line of reasoning, perfective subject-related deontic modal 
verbs like the one in (358) (the so-called goal-oriented modals, cf. Fintel & Iatridou 
2005) that likewise yield actuality entailment would also allow aspect raising. In (358), 
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modality is relativized to the subject (the obligation lies with Kitty), and a 
circumstantial accessibility relation arises. 
 
(358)  Kitty a dû faire ses devoirs 
 ‘Kitty must-PFV do her homework.’40 
 (so that she would be allowed to go out at night). 
 (#but she didn’t do it/and she did it). 
 Adapted from: Hacquard (2006: 122). 
 
However, if (358) had an addressee-oriented interpretation (if one addressed the 
babysitter that is supposed to make sure that Kitty gets her homework done), the 
perfective aspect could not be used regardless of whether the proposition from the 
embedded clause holds in the actual world or not. 
In line with Hacquard, this suggests that epistemics and addressee-oriented deontics, in 
contrast to subject-oriented deontics and ability modals, are evaluated at the utterance 
time and can only be interpreted above tense. 
Consider also the English sentence (359), where (the only possible) epistemic 
interpretation of must comes about via the modal’s evaluation at the speech time. The 
fact that the addressee-deontic reading is ruled out suggests that the deontic must can 
only be interpreted at the time of utterance. 
(359)  Lydia must have gone to confession. 
 Adapted from: Hacquard (2006: 122) 
 
Following Ninan (2005) and Hacquard (2006: 123), example (359) triggers an epistemic 
interpretation, because it is conceptually well-formed to report about current epistemic 
knowledge that concerns a past state of affairs. In contrast, it is not well-formed to bring 
about a past state of affairs. 
Hacquard’s account nicely explains the complementary distribution between subject-
oriented deontic and ability modal verbs on the one hand (subsumed under the term 
root modals, cf. Kratzer 1981) and addressee-oriented deontic and epistemic modal 
verbs on the other with respect to enforcing the actual meaning of their complement 
sentences. 
 
40 It needs to be pointed out that, in (358), the modal devoir occurs in its past participle form 
(with a representing the ‘have’-auxiliary). The inferences described above remain the same 
when the modal is marked for the simple past and agrees with the third person, as in: Kitty dût 
faire ses devoirs ‘Kitty must-PST-PFV do her homework.’ (Paul Marty, p.c.). Furthermore, the 
continuation with ‘and she did it’ does not have to result in a contradiction; it gives rise to the 
interpretation ‘Kitty was obliged to do her homework, and she fulfilled the duty by doing her 
homework’ (Paul Marty, p.c.). 
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However, in order to explain the truth-entailment of perfective incremental theme verbs 
in Polish, it seems more promising to build on an account that focuses on propositional 
content and its nature rather than on distinctions in scope relations. Furthermore, the 
relationship between aspect and modality is beyond the scope of this dissertation; Polish 
modal verbs are not marked for aspect anyway. 
Since the truth-entailment in Polish systematically occurs with perfective reveal-type 
predicates that represent different instances of verbs of proving, an incremental, 
complete vs. non-complete creation of proof should function as a basis for the 
derivation of the aspect-dependent veridicality. More precisely, I need a definition of 
‘proof’ that assumes part structure of proof (cf. Schroeder-Heister 1991 for proof in 
logical systems). I will demonstrate that, if single pieces of evidence are sufficient to 
establish a proof, a truth-conditional object is revealed. The distinction between non-
sufficient and sufficient amount of evidence provides a reasonable solution to the 
phenomenon in question. 
Furthermore, the fact that one needs various ways of accounting for the relationship 
between aspect and truthfulness in different languages is not a problematic issue. We 
have already seen that the correlation itself is a cross-linguistic phenomenon. Variegated 
realizations of aspect-dependent truthfulness and its regularity depend for instance on 
the aspectual system in a language (grammaticalized as in Slavic languages, partly 
grammaticalized as in Hungarian, marked on modals as in French, etc.) and on the need 
for fulfillment of possible gaps. In general, it seems that, if a matrix verb is marked for 
the perfective aspect and embeds a propositional complement, one should expect the 
complement to be interpreted as true (no matter how ‘strong’ the inference emerges). 
This assumption holds especially for languages that enable embedding by both the 
perfective and the imperfective, i.e. the building of aspectual minimal pairs within the 
main clause. 
In the next subsection, I will provide the last piece of evidence for the perfectivity-
factivity dependency. 
7.3 Imperfective aspect as a non-factivity trigger in Austronesian languages 
I will concentrate on two languages spoken in Vanuatu: Daakaka and Mavea. In 
Daakaka and Mavea, one of the noncanonical functions of the imperfective markers is 
the expression of false beliefs and/or counterfactuality. This indicates the correlation 
between imperfectivity and non-factivity (and supports the binary distribution between 
the two aspects with respect to factivity); Prince (p.c.), see also Prince et al. (2018). 
In the next two subsections, I will present data from the above-mentioned languages. 
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7.3.1 Daakaka 
(360)  Nye na bwe dimyane kyun ka ebya 
 1s 1s REAL.CONT want just MOD1 wing 
 -ur ka we pwer 
 -1P.IN.POSS MOD2 POT stay 
 ‘I just wish I had wings.’ 
 ref 4207 
(https://korpling.org/annis3/?id=f891e226-b0a7-4a10-9070-011ed9a6e036, 
04.02.19) 
 MOD1=complementizer, CONT=continuous (marks imperfectivity), 
MOD2=assertive marker; otherwise the clause would be a directive, 
POT=potential 
According to Prince (p.c.), the verb dimyane ‘want’ is inherently imperfective and 
usually occurs without aspectual marking. In (360), however, it appears that the 
continuous marker bwe indicates the counterfactuality of the embedded clause, or marks 
the difference between ‘want’ and ‘wish’. In the closely-related neighboring language 
Dalkalaen, continuous markers appear consistently in past counterfactual clauses 
(Prince et al. 2018). While both languages have other ways to express counterfactuality, 
the imperfective seems to contribute to the counterfactual interpretation. 
7.3.2 Mavea 
Similar observation holds for Mavea, where the imperfective marker lo- combines with 
duseia ‘think’ only in case of false beliefs. Otherwise (and by default), duseia appears 
without lo-. There seem to be parallels to the English think vs. thought, with duseia 
representing the former, and duseia + lo- the latter (von Prince, p.c.). 
(361)  na- lo- duseia na- -v or m̋atan ma 
 1SG- IPFV- think 1SG- -say maybe because COMP 
 mo- sisi mo- evuia 
 3SG- dark 3SG- finish 
 ‘I thought maybe because it is dark that’s it (I thought a fish had 
accidentally bumped into my leg, but it turned out to be a shark that 
attacked me.).’ 
 ref 06015.087 
(https://korpling.org/annis3/?id=740f51f5-a020-4dbd-b974-3e4083d55e4e, 
04.02.19) 
 
In the following, I will present experimental evidence for the relationship between 
perfectivity and factivity in Polish.   
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8 Background for the empirical investigation on the interaction 
between perfectivity and factivity in Polish 
In order to empirically verify the above-mentioned theoretical assumptions about the 
interaction between perfectivity and factivity in Polish, an acceptability judgement 
study was conducted. 
8.1 Motivation for the acceptability judgement study 
Using an acceptability judgement task turned out to be the most reasonable solution for 
detecting interpretative differences between perfective and imperfective aspect in 
Polish. Constructing two types of scenarios – a factive and a non-factive one (I will 
explain the difference between them in a further part of this chapter) provides an 
opportunity to directly address and investigate the interplay between (non)factivity and 
(im)perfectivity. The way of building experimental material ensured that the differences 
in acceptability could only be attributed to the factivity of the scenarios; the actual 
(im)perfective test sentences were minimal pairs differing only in aspect. 
Another way to examine the factivity of the perfective would be to undertake a corpus-
based investigation. In particular, one could analyze contexts that license the occurrence 
of the (im)perfective verb forms. If an embedded proposition is a fact or a statement that 
is considered to be true (which can be stated either on the basis of world knowledge, 
e.g.: know / discover that the earth is round, or on the basis of an explicit language 
context, e.g.: know / discover that Anna stole the cookie), and if an embedding verb is 
an attitude predicate, then we would expect the matrix verb to be marked for the 
perfective aspect. The problem with approaching my research question by means of a 
corpus-based analysis lies in the subjectivity of interpretation of the contexts and in the 
lack of clarity when it comes to comparability of results. We would need to specify as to 
when a context counts as factive. Furthermore, is it necessary to differentiate between 
instances that acknowledge something as a fact? For example, with respect to the act of 
proving, there could be a professor, a judge, a policeman, a friend, etc., who might 
fulfill the function of a verifier. Should we treat them all alike and assume that the entire 
responsibility for the factivity of the complement sentence lies with prove itself? 
Another problem with a corpus-based investigation concerns receiving enough data in 
order to draw any statistically significant conclusions. Every context needs to be 
analyzed manually, which makes it almost impossible to run a meaningful quantitative 
analysis. Moreover, we do not always know what people were thinking while using 
certain expressions. 
A more suitable research question for a corpus-based analysis would, for instance, be an 
investigation of collocations: (im)perfective verb form vs. an occurrence of an 
anaphoric expression (he guessed.PFV / guessed.IPFV it that Stefan is the culprit). 
Anaphoric expressions make the propositions being interpreted discourse-given, and 
128 
 
discourse-given propositions tend to be taken for granted. For that reason, we would 
expect the relationship between perfectivity and anaphoricity (rather than between 
imperfectivity and anaphoricity). A quantitative corpus-based analysis could be 
conducted in order to verify this hypothesis. 
In contrast to what was said about corpus-based investigations, an acceptability 
judgment experiment allows comparable contexts to be created for the particular 
semantic classes of verbs (by keeping a verifier/controller constant for example), and to 
control for many external factors (distractors) that could potentially have an influence 
on the speakers’ judgements. In addition, a corpus does not provide negative evidence; 
the lack of data in a corpus does not mean that the phenomenon in question does not 
exist. 
In the following, I will discuss four different acceptability judgement tasks and make a 
decision as to which task should be used in my own experiment. 
8.2 Four types of acceptability judgement tasks 
8.2.1 Forced-Choice task 
There are four main types of design one could use to conduct an acceptability 
judgement experiment (Sprouse & Almeida 2017, Marty et al. 2018 among others). The 
first possibility is the Forced-Choice task. Here, participants analyze pairs of test 
sentences and choose the more acceptable / better alternative. Test sentences tend to 
appear as vertically arranged pairs. Each variant is followed by a single radio button. 
For every pair, participants select the radio button next to the sentence they consider 
more acceptable. The crucial point is that each pair of a particular sentence type / with a 
specific semantic feature is meant to be as similar as possible (both structurally and 
lexically) in order to constitute a syntactic / semantic minimal pair differing only in the 
phenomenon of interest. In a given scenario (for instance where the proposition Marek 
is in England holds), the following test sentences could be used in order to determine 
the aspect-related differences in factivity (adapted from Marty et al. 2018): 
(362) Forced-Choice, test item: 
     Ania zgadła, że Marek jest w Anglii.    ○ 
     ‘Ania guessed.PFV that Marek is in England.’41 
     Ania zgadywała, że Marek jest w Anglii.   ○ 
     ‘Ania guessed.IPFV that Marek is in England.’ 
Since I was interested in both qualitative and quantitative differences in the acceptance 
of (im)perfective forms across (non)factive scenarios, and in consideration of their 
 
41 English translations of test items are more literal than translations of examples in the 
theoretical part, which is due to staying as close to the original as possible. 
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belonging to different semantic classes, I did not employ the Forced-Choice task in my 
experiment. It would report on the presence or absence of the effect, but not on 
distinctions in effect sizes. Furthermore, the Forced-Choice task does not tell us how 
good the better alternative, and how bad the worse one actually are (is the better variant 
just a little better or is the worse one completely unacceptable?). 
8.2.2 Magnitude Estimation task 
The second possibility is the magnitude estimation task, which aims at presenting a 
single test sentence to the participants. A test sentence is accompanied by a reference 
sentence, the so-called standard, with a pre-assigned acceptability rating – the modulus. 
The reference sentence should be in the middle range of acceptability and unrelated to 
the test sentence. Participants are told to estimate the acceptability of the test sentence 
as a numerical score being a multiple of the modulus. For example, if the participant 
considers the test sentence third as acceptable as the given standard (set up as 50 in 
(363)), the test sentence will be rated as 150 (based on Marty et al. 2018, see also 
Stevens 1957, Bard et al. 1996): 
(363) Magnitude Estimation, item: 
     Ania nie udowadniała, od kiedy Marek jest w Anglii.    50 
     ‘Ania did not prove.IPFV since when Marek is in England.’ 
(test item:) Ania zgadywała, że Marek jest w Anglii.        □ 
     ‘Ania guessed.IPFV that Marek is in England.’ 
Magnitude estimation tasks seem to be most suitable for syntactic or lexical contrasts. 
Since I am investigating context-bound differences in interpretation, I did not apply this 
method either. 
8.2.3 Yes-No task 
The Yes-No task provides the third option for collecting data via an acceptability 
judgement experiment. Here, each experimental item consists of a single test sentence 
accompanied by a pair of response options (‘yes’ and ‘no’). Participants choose one of 
these options to estimate whether the test sentence is acceptable / good or not. Consider 
example (364): 
(364) Yes-No task, test item: 
     Ania zgadywała, że Marek jest w Anglii.    Yes○ No○ 
     ‘Ania guessed.IPFV that Marek is in England.’ 
Both the Forced-choice and the Yes-No task could have been used in order to capture 
qualitative differences in the acceptance of (im)perfective forms across (non)factive 
scenarios; in (364), a specific context would be needed to make a judgement (for 
instance a proposition stating that it is a fact that Marek is in Italy). One of the aspectual 
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alternatives (one member of a respective pair, cf. (364) for an illustration) would be 
shown in a factive and / or a non-factive environment. In this case, because participants 
can in principle accept or reject both aspectual variants of a particular verb lexeme, a 
quantitative comparison of the effect across different verb groups is possible. In this 
kind of design, filler items complete experimental material, resulting in the creation of 
lists for many groups of participants in order to reduce processing efforts (a 
questionnaire would become very long if it contained all items). Due to the fact that the 
Yes-No task is primarily meant to detect qualitative differences between experimental 
conditions, I did not implement it in my experiment. 
Luckily, there is another option left that makes it possible to conduct a direct 
quantitative analysis of the results. A modified version of its standard implementation 
was used in my experiment. 
8.2.4 Likert Scale task 
In the standard version of the Likert scale task, an experimental item consists of a single 
test sentence, which occurs together with a series of usually 5 or 7 response 
possibilities. As a result, a graded response scale arises. Participants are asked to 
estimate the acceptability of each test sentence (and usually also of the filler items) by 
marking a particular number on a scale. See example (365), which, presented in a 
specified context, could build a test item in my experiment. 
(365) Likert Scale, test item: 
    Ania zgadywała, że Marek jest w Anglii.    
    ‘Ania guessed.IPFV that Marek is in England.’ 
 
        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
    very good ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ very bad 
As mentioned above, the Likert scale task served as a basis for the design of my 
experiment. I will go into the details of the procedure in the next section. 
8.3 Motivation for the choice of the design 
The choice of the design plays a fundamental role in detecting contrasts between 
(syntactic or semantic) minimal pairs. It has been observed that acceptability judgement 
experiments differ with respect to how sensitive they are at detecting such contrasts (cf. 
Sprouse & Almeida 2017, 2011, Marty et al. 2018 among others). 
Sprouse & Almeida (2017) investigated which of the above-mentioned methods could 
be applied to the widest range of experimental scenarios in theoretical syntax. It was 
shown that the Forced-Choice task is the most sensitive one when it comes to reporting 
differences between two experimental conditions. However, it needs to be pointed out 
that it is also the only task which explicitly aims at contrasting two conditions. Likert 
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Scale and Magnitude Estimation reached almost the same sensitivity across effect and 
sample sizes, which suggests that participants treated Magnitude Estimation as a kind of 
a Likert Scale. The Yes-No task appeared to be the least sensitive method. 
If the research question aims at detecting the better / more preferred variant of a 
particular linguistic phenomenon (sentence type, word order, semantic or pragmatic 
alternative, etc.), the Forced-Choice task seems to be the most suitable method; it will 
report on qualitative differences between experimental conditions. It will not provide 
any information on effect sizes though, which is why other tasks should be taken into 
consideration when planning quantitative research. 
Marty et al. (2018) investigated the influence of both the mode of presentation of 
contrasting conditions (individual vs. joint presentation) and the features of the response 
scale (binary scales vs. Likert scales vs. continuous sliders) on the accuracy of speakers’ 
judgements. Ten experiments differing with respect to one or two of the above-
mentioned criteria have shown that, independently of the response scale used, there is 
always an advantage in presenting contrastive conditions jointly. Additionally, it is 
more beneficial to use graded than binary response scales or more precisely graded 
scales with no predefined labels. 
According to Marty et al. (2018), if our research aims at finding quantitative differences 
between experimental conditions while testing minimal pairs, Likert Scale combined 
with joint presentation is one of the most promising types of design. Based on Marty et 
al.'s (2018) and Sprouse & Almeida's (2017) findings, I decided to integrate joint 
presentation into the Likert Scale in my own experiment. 
As already mentioned, there are two crucial factors which need to be taken into 
consideration before deciding on which kind of acceptability judgement study should be 
conducted in order to give the most precise evidence for/against the initial hypothesis 
(cf. Marty et al. 2018). 
First, one has to consider whether contrasting conditions (in the case of my 
investigation the (im)perfective verb forms) should be presented individually (Figure 1) 
or jointly (Figure 2). The advantage of choosing pairwise presentation lies in making 
participants aware of what matters for judging sentences as more or less acceptable. In 
my experiment, where pairwise presentation was used, the participants got an indirect 
hint that they should pay attention to the verb form. I decided to present contrasting 
conditions jointly in order to avoid the problem of what the acceptance of (one of) the 
aspectual variants is to be traced to. There may be many aspect-independent reasons for 
considering a sentence suitable in a given scenario; for instance, the choice of a lexeme 
in a matrix verb position, the speakers’ attitudes towards the described state of affairs, 
etc. Furthermore, since the factivity-based contrast between perfective and imperfective 
verbs of communication seems to be at least an implicature, the presence of another 
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aspectual form for priming is the only way to identify potential differences in 
interpretation. 
To sum up, in the case of presenting only one aspectual alternative of a given pair, it 
might not be clear if its acceptance in a particular context is due to aspect; there may be 
multiple reasons for judging a sentence as more or less acceptable. 
 
Individual presentation 
(Non)factive scenario: ..... 
Sentence to be judged: 
{Marek udowodnił, że Basia kłamie. 
 
 
very good ------- very bad} 
‘Marek proved.PFV that Basia is lying.’  
Figure 1: Presenting contrasting conditions individually (based on Marty et al. 2018). 
Joint presentation 
(Non)factive scenario: ..... 
Sentences to be judged: 
{Marek udowodnił, że Basia kłamie. 
 
 
very good ------- very bad} 
‘Marek proved.PFV that Basia is lying.’  
{Marek udowadniał, że Basia kłamie. very good ------- very bad} 
‘Marek proved.IPFV that Basia is lying.’  
Figure 2: Presenting contrasting conditions jointly (based on Marty et al. 2018). 
Second, one needs to decide on features of the response scale. There is a choice between 
binary scales (2 options), discrete 5-/7-point scales (many options) and continuous 
scales (infinite scales). For the reasons sketched above, a non-binary scale is the most 
suitable solution for detecting the pairwise contrast I am interested in. Since I cannot see 
any concrete advantage of using an infinite scale, I decided to employ a standard 7-point 
scale.42 
In the next chapter, I will present the acceptability judgement study on the relationship 
between perfectivity and truthfulness in Polish. 
  
 
42 There have also been problems reported for this response option. For instance, in spite of the 
possibility of using a non-limited scale, it has been observed that participants use a small set of 
numbers again and again, cf. Featherston (2008), Weskott & Fanselow (2011), Marty et al. 
(2018) among others. Furthermore, it even happens that participants do not manage to make a 
ratio comparison of the acceptability of two sequences at all, cf. Sprouse (2011), Marty et al. 
(2018). 
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9 Acceptability judgement study on the relationship between 
perfectivity and truthfulness in Polish43 
9.1 Tool: Lime survey 
Both constructing the items and conducting the experiment were carried out using 
LimeSurvey – the online open source survey tool (cf. LimeSurvey Project Team & 
Schmitz 2012). Every speaker received a unique access key, which enabled her to 
participate in the experiment. The keys were distributed among family, friends, and 
friends of friends (they were printed out and given directly to the contributors). The 
survey could be completed from any place. The only requirements were computer and 
internet access. 
9.2 Participants 
55 Polish native speakers participated in the survey. Four participants had to be 
excluded because they submitted incomplete results. In the end, I analyzed judgements 
made by 31 female and 20 male speakers between 19 and 60 years old. The participants’ 
educational background is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
43 Ethical approval was not needed for the research conducted in this dissertation. The study was 
an online-survey that could be carried out anywhere, so no physical contact with participants 
was required. The whole procedure was anonymized, so it was not possible to assign results to 
physical persons. Participants were not asked for any personal data at any stage of the 
experiment (IP addresses were not stored either). No vulnerable groups were investigated; legal 
age was the participation requirement. The content of the questionnaire involved only neutral 
language judgements, so the participation did not involve any risk or physical / emotional 
discomfort. Naturally, every subject who explicitly agreed to participate was informed about the 
possibility of interrupting her participation at anytime and without any consequences, and 
explicitly agreed to the results being used for scientific purposes. See again below. 
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Figure 3: Participants’ educational background. 
9.3 Investigated verb lexemes 
I investigated 15 (im)perfective verb pairs that were assigned to three different semantic 
groups (30 verbs altogether), see Figure 4. None of them allows for a neutral 
interpretation regarding aspect, i.e. every twin has either perfective or imperfective 
meaning. The assignment to a particular group took place on the basis of the expected 
type of truth-inference triggered by the matrix verb. The first group is the 
presupposition group. Here, the truth-inference survives in question constructions, 
under negation, and after the insertion of a modal adverbial. The second group is the 
entailment group, with a truth-inference occurring in a positive sentence, but without 
there being any projection pattern. The third group is the implicature group. In this 
case, the truth-inference was expected to be at least a weak implicature. All lexemes that 
belong to this group are verbs of communication. 
 
0 10 20 30
Participants’ educational background
without higher education (5) studies in philology / linguistics (6)
studies in natural sciences (25) studies in humanities (15)
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presupposition group entailment group implicature group 
zgadnąć.PFV – 
zgadywać.IPFV 
‘guess’ 
udowodnić.PFV – 
udowadniać.IPFV 
‘prove’ 
obwieścić.PFV – 
obwieszczać.IPFV 
‘announce’ 
przeczuć.PFV – 
przeczuwać.IPFV 
‘sense’ 
dowieść.PFV – 
dowodzić.IPFV 
‘prove’ 
poinformować.PFV – 
informować.IPFV 
‘inform’ 
wyczuć.PFV – 
wyczuwać.IPFV 
‘sense’ 
wykazać.PFV – 
wykazywać.IPFV 
‘reveal’ 
powiedzieć.PFV – 
mówić.IPFV 
‘say’ 
rozgryźć.PFV – 
rozgryzać.IPFV 
‘work out’ 
pokazać.PFV – 
pokazywać.IPFV 
‘show’ 
zakomunikować.PFV – 
komunikować.IPFV 
‘announce’ 
przewidzieć.PFV – 
przewidywać.IPFV 
‘predict’ 
potwierdzić.PFV – 
potwierdzać.IPFV 
‘confirm’ 
zawiadomić.PFV – 
zawiadamiać.IPFV 
‘notify’ 
Figure 4: List of (im)perfective verb pairs investigated in my experiment. 
The choice of verb lexemes was motivated by three factors. First, I aimed at analyzing 
verbs that fulfilled the requirements of belonging to one of the above-mentioned groups. 
In the case of presupposition verbs, there is only a small number of possible candidates 
in general, which is why considering frequency, for instance, as a factor was not a 
reasonable solution. Second, both the perfective and the imperfective variants of a 
particular verb lexeme were expected to form a syntactically well-formed unit after 
being combined with a that-clause, which also limited the number of suitable 
candidates. Third, the three inference-based groups were meant to constitute more or 
less semantic-lexically unique classes, which worked perfectly for the entailment group 
(incremental theme verbs; reveal-type-verbs) and for the implicature group (verbs of 
communication). The final choice of the experimental material was made on the basis of 
the Polish dictionary of synonyms “Gdy Ci słowa zabraknie”, Broniarek (2005). 
In order to improve the accuracy of the analysis, I also investigated the frequency of 
occurrence of the (im)perfective verb pairs in NKJP. The results are summarized in 
Figure 5. 
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verb pair number of examples in NKJP 
 zgadnąć.PFV 1439 
guess   
 zgadywać.IPFV 586 
 przeczuć.PFV 180 
sense   
 przeczuwać.IPFV 1320 
 wyczuć.PFV 2208 
sense   
 wyczuwać.IPFV 2308 
 rozgryźć.PFV 275 
work out   
 rozgryzać.IPFV 81 
 przewidzieć.PFV 10285 
predict   
 przewidywać.IPFV 21423 
 udowodnić.PFV 9284 
prove   
 udowadniać.IPFV 1858 
 dowieść.PFV 2459 
prove   
 dowodzić.IPFV 8059 
 wykazać.PFV 16609 
reveal   
 wykazywać.IPFV 7912 
 pokazać.PFV 36529 
show   
 pokazywać.IPFV 24824 
 potwierdzić.PFV 16485 
confirm   
 potwierdzać.IPFV 14245 
 obwieścić.PFV 690 
announce   
 obwieszczać.IPFV 393 
 poinformować.PFV 24513 
inform   
 informować.IPFV 28593 
 powiedzieć.PFV 282514 
say   
 mówić.IPFV 436927 
 zakomunikować.PFV 36529 
announce   
 komunikować.IPFV 24824 
 zawiadomić.PFV 4393 
notify   
 zawiadamiać.IPFV 1696 
Figure 5: Frequency of occurrence of the (im)perfective verb pairs in NKJP (26.04.2019). 
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The following query was used to identify the lexemes in question: 
[base=verb & !pos=pcon & !pos=pant & !pos=ger & !pos=pact & !pos=ppas]. Base was 
parametrized by the particular aspectual form in infinitive (for example zgadnąć, 
zgadywać, etc.). The function of base is to find all forms of a certain lexeme. The value 
of base is a basic form (verbs in infinitive, nouns in first person singular nominative). 
However, for instance the base zgadywać would also return gerunds like zgadywanie or 
participles (imiesłowy) like zgadujący, which is why I restricted the query by 
commands excluding such non-verbal derivates from the analysis; negation is marked 
by an exclamation mark. As a result, the following constructions were omitted: 
imiesłów przysłówkowy współczesny (PCON), e.g. zgadywając, imiesłów przysłówkowy 
uprzedni (PANT), e.g. zgadnąwszy, odsłownik: gerund (GER), e.g. zgadywanie, imiesłów 
przymiotnikowy czynny (PACT), e.g. zgadujący, and imiesłów przymiotnikowy bierny 
(PPAS), e.g. zgadywany. For the corpus description and especially for the IPI PAN 
search tool that was used in the above study see Przepiórkowski (2004). The aim of 
analyzing the frequency of the aspectual pairs was to find out which of the two 
competitors of a respective verbal concept is ‘more stable’ in the mental lexicon of 
Polish native speakers. Frequency may have an aspect-independent influence on the 
acceptance, so its consideration may be useful in explaining experimental results. 
I used the balanced NKJP subcorpus with three hundred million segments. 
It should be pointed out that there is a slight difference in meaning between przeczuć 
and wyczuć ‘sense’, udowodnić and dowieść ‘prove’ and obwieścić and zakomunikować 
‘announce’. In the former case, przeczuć seems to be more specified, since it requires an 
intuition-based source of evidence. Wyczuć, on the other hand, refers to objective hints 
that made it possible to sense something (right). This explains why przeczuć is less 
frequent than wyczuć, and why one can say: Moje przeczucie się nie sprawdziło ‘My 
hunch was not right’, but not: Moje #wyczucie się nie sprawdziło. In the case of the 
second-mentioned verb pair, dowieść is more archaic than udowodnić (and preferred in 
the literary language), which is why it is less frequent. Udowodnić seems to stress 
incrementality of the underlying process of proving more strongly. It is further the 
standard form used in legal contexts. In the case of the last-mentioned verb pair, 
obwieścić is more archaic – it occurs for instance in Biblical contexts – hence it is less 
frequent in the corpus. It also has a negative component of meaning (Dzisiaj obwieściła, 
że nie przyjdzie ‘Today she announced that she is not going to come’ → The speaker 
does not like the decision of the sentence subject). 
In the following, I will move on to the structure of the survey. 
9.4 The structure of the survey 
The survey consisted of four parts. First, participants were asked some general 
questions. They had to agree that they have been sufficiently informed about the 
experiment in order to proceed (cf. Figure 6 and Figure 7). 
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Oświadczam, iż została/-em wystarczająco poinformowana/-y o badaniu oraz jego 
przebiegu. Zapoznała/-em się z treścią informacji na temat badania i nie zgłaszam w 
tej sprawie żadnych obiekcji. Dobrowolnie wyrażam zgodę na udział w badaniu oraz 
na wykorzystywanie zanonimizowanych wyników w celach naukowych, jak i na ich 
dalsze przetwarzanie w formie elektronicznej. 
I declare that I have been sufficiently informed about the experiment and its procedure. I am 
familiar with the information about the experiment, and I do not raise any objections to it. I 
voluntarily agree to participate, and I am giving my permission to use my anonymized 
responses for research purposes, and for them to be electronically processed. 
Jestem świadoma/-y, iż w każdej chwili mogę przerwać mój udział w badaniu. 
I am aware of the fact that I can stop anytime before completing. 
Jestem osobą pełnoletnią. 
I am of legal age. 
○ Potwierdzam. 
 I confirm. 
Figure 6: Agree-item 1. 
Zgadzam się na prezentowanie wyników w formie anonimowej na 
konferencjach/workshopach naukowych oraz podczas seminariów i wykładów. 
I am giving my permission to present the anonymous results during conferences/scientific 
workshops and during seminars and talks. 
○ Zgadzam się. 
 I agree. 
Figure 7: Agree-item 2. 
Afterwards, the participants were asked about their mother tongue (Polish was a 
requirement). No bilingual speakers participated. Further questions concerned foreign 
languages spoken, age, gender, and educational background (the options were: studies 
in philology/linguistics, studies in humanities, studies in natural sciences, no higher 
education). 
Second, the warm-up items appeared (see the next subsection). 
Afterwards, participants were presented with two groups of test items (constant 
randomization groups called random2 and random3). Dividing test items into two 
groups was aimed at preventing the same verb pair from being presented in a factive 
and a non-factive scenario one after the other. For instance, if guess belongs to the 
random2 group in a factive context, it is placed in the random3 group in a non-factive 
context. Some verbs were assigned to the random2 group when presented in a factive 
scenario, and others when presented in a non-factive scenario (there was no 1:1 
relationship between randomization group and the type of the scenario, but the ordering 
itself was determined by the (non)factivity of the scenarios in relation to the particular 
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verb). Furthermore, the order of presenting items within the two randomization groups 
was individually randomized for every participant. 
9.5 Two types of items 
9.5.1 Warm-up items 
Before starting with the actual test items, the participants were presented with two 
warm-up questions. The warm-up questions were introduced in order to make 
respondents familiar with the task itself, consider Figure 8 and Figure 9. Figure 8 was 
also intended to indicate that it is fine to consider both variants equally fine. 
W tej części ankiety znajdują się dwa przykłady, które nie należą do eksperymentu 
głównego. Celem ich wprowadzenia jest zapoznanie Państwa z zadaniem 
stosowanym w eksperymencie głównym. 
In this part of the questionnaire, you will find two item examples, which do not belong to the main 
experiment. They aim at making you familiar with the task used in the main experiment. 
Proszę zaznaczyć w skali między idealnie a bardzo źle, jak dobrze wyrażenia (a) i 
(b) odpowiadają treści kontekstu, w jakim są prezentowane. Proszę kierować się 
jedynie zgodnością w treści. Nie ma limitu czasowego. 
Mark on a scale between ideal and very bad, how well the expressions (a) and (b) correspond to the 
context. Consider compatibility in content only. There is no time limit. 
Dwóch chłopców zjadło w sumie pięć batonów, a dwie dziewczynki zjadły ich w 
sumie cztery. 
Two boys ate five bars of chocolate altogether, and two girls ate four bars of chocolate altogether. 
(a) Chłopcy zjedli w sumie więcej batonów niż dziewczynki. The boys ate more bars of 
chocolate altogether than the girls did. 
idealnie ideal ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ bardzo źle very bad 
(b) Dziewczynki zjadły w sumie mniej batonów niż chłopcy. The girls ate less bars of 
chocolate altogether than the boys did. 
idealnie ideal ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ bardzo źle very bad 
Figure 8: Warm-up item 1. 
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W tej części ankiety znajdują się dwa przykłady, które nie należą do eksperymentu 
głównego. Celem ich wprowadzenia jest zapoznanie Państwa z zadaniem 
stosowanym w eksperymencie głównym. 
In this part of a questionnaire, you will find two item examples, which do not belong to the main 
experiment. They aim at making you familiar with the task used in the main experiment. 
Proszę zaznaczyć w skali między idealnie a bardzo źle, jak dobrze wyrażenia (a) i 
(b) odpowiadają treści kontekstu, w jakim są prezentowane. Proszę kierować się 
jedynie zgodnością w treści. Nie ma limitu czasowego. 
Mark on a scale between ideal and very bad, how well do the expressions (a) and (b) correspond to 
the context. Consider compatibility in content only. There is no time limit. 
Ania zauważyła, że z kuchni zniknęły wszystkie pączki. Wkrótce stało się jasne, kto 
za tym stoi. Marek przyznał, że to on je 
Ania realized that all donuts disappeared from the kitchen. Soon it became clear who was 
responsible for that. Marek confessed that it was him who 
(a) jadł. ate.IPFV (them). 
idealnie ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ bardzo źle 
(b) zjadł. ate.PFV (them). 
idealnie ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ bardzo źle 
Figure 9: Warm-up item 2. 
9.5.2 Test items 
Regarding the test items, every proper name and every surname (the name of every 
character) was used only once in the survey. Furthermore, the order of displaying the 
(im)perfective minimal pairs was pseudo-randomized. The reason for this was to 
exclude (or at least to minimize) possible habituation effects. 
9.6 Two types of scenarios 
As mentioned above, every (im)perfective verb pair was presented in a factive and a 
non-factive scenario. However, the same pair never appeared in the two scenarios one 
after the other. 
The description of the context always started with introducing a proposition that was to 
be considered a fact (participants were given direct instructions to take its truth for 
granted). Afterwards, a short story was told. The structure of the story was kept as 
simple as possible, mostly on the following style: X did something, and Y did 
something. In a factive scenario, the character that did the right thing – something which 
was in line with the proposition introduced in the beginning – was picked out. In 
contrast, the character that did the wrong thing – something that did not correspond to 
the fact described at the top of the page – was selected in the non-factive scenario. 
In a nutshell, the perfective was expected to score higher in the factive scenario, while 
the imperfective was expected to score higher in the non-factive scenario. 
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9.7 Item examples44 
9.7.1 guess from the presupposition group 
Factive scenario 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Marek ukradł nasz 
służbowy komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that Marek stole our company computer. 
Księgowa Majewska i programista Adamczyk niezależnie od siebie wytypowali 
sprawców. 
Tylko programista Adamczyk wskazał właściwą osobę – 
Accountant Majewska and programmer Adamczyk independently of each other bet on who the thief 
was. Only programmer Adamczyk picked out the right person – 
(a) zgadł, że Marek jest winny. He guessed.PFV that Marek was guilty. 
idealnie ideal ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ bardzo źle very bad 
(b) zgadywał, że Marek jest winny. He guessed.IPFV that Marek was guilty. 
idealnie ideal ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ bardzo źle very bad 
Figure 10: Experimental item for ‘guess’ in a factive scenario. 
 
Non-factive scenario 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Krzysztof ukradł nasz 
służbowy komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that Krzysztof stole our company computer. 
W czasie trwania śledztwa programista Król wytypował Izę, a księgowa Zabłocka 
wytypowała Krzysztofa. 
Programista Król był wyraźnie rozczarowany – 
During the investigation programmer Król picked out Iza, and accountant Zabłocka Krzysztof. 
Programmer Król was clearly disappointed – 
(a) zgadł, że Iza jest winna. He guessed.PFV that Iza was guilty. 
idealnie ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ bardzo źle 
(b) zgadywał, że Iza jest winna. He guessed.IPFV that Iza was guilty. 
idealnie ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ bardzo źle 
Figure 11: Experimental item for ‘guess’ in a non-factive scenario. 
 
44 See appendix for the full list. 
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9.7.2 prove from the entailment group 
Factive scenario 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Alicja ukradła nasz 
służbowy komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that Alicja stole our company computer. 
Komisarz Jankowski oraz komisarz Nowak niezależnie od siebie prowadzili 
śledztwo w tej sprawie. 
Komisarz Nowak jako jedyny w sposób niepodważalny udokumentował winę Alicji 
– 
Commissioner Jankowski and commissioner Nowak independently of each other investigated the 
case. Only commissioner Nowak irrefutably documented that Alicja was to blame – 
(c) udowodnił, że to jej sprawka. (He) proved.PFV that she was guilty. 
idealnie ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ bardzo źle 
(d) udowadniał, że to jej sprawka. (He) proved.IPFV that she was guilty. 
idealnie ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ bardzo źle 
Figure 12: Experimental item for ‘prove’ in a factive scenario. 
 
Non-factive scenario 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Fryderyk ukradł nasz 
służbowy komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that Fryderyk stole our company computer. 
W czasie dochodzenia komisarz Malinowski wskazywał na Józefa, a komisarz 
Stępień na Fryderyka. 
Komisarz Malinowski z trudem przyjął swoją porażkę – 
During the investigation commissioner Malinowski picked out Józef, and commissioner Stępień 
Fryderyk. Commissioner Malinowski could hardly accept that he was wrong – 
(a) udowodnił, że Józef jest winny. (He) proved.PFV that Józef was guilty. 
idealnie ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ bardzo źle 
(b) udowadniał, że Józef jest winny. (He) proved.IPFV that Józef was guilty. 
idealnie ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ bardzo źle 
Figure 13: Experimental item for ‘prove’ in a non-factive scenario. 
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9.7.3 say from the implicature group 
Factive scenario 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: To pewne, że to Teodor ukradł pieniądze z kasy. 
Consider what follows a fact: It's a certainty that Teodor stole the money from the safe. 
Dyrektor Karpiński i księgowa Gajda opowiadali każde co innego w sprawie 
potencjalnego sprawcy, ale jedynie dyrektor Karpiński przekazuje dalej dokładnie 
sprawdzone informacje. 
Director Karpiński and accountant Gajda each said different things about who the potential culprit 
was, but only director Karpiński is passing on the exactly proved information. 
To on 
It was him who 
(a) powiedział nam, że Teodor jest winny. (He) told.PFV us that Teodor was guilty. 
idealnie ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ bardzo źle 
(b) mówił nam, że Teodor jest winny. (He) told.IPFV us that Teodor was guilty. 
idealnie ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ bardzo źle 
Figure 14: Experimental item for ‘say’ in a factive scenario. 
 
Non-factive scenario 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: To nie Brygida ukradła pieniądze z kasy. 
Consider what follows a fact: It was not Brygida who stole the money from the safe. 
(a) Grafik Klimek niby powiedział nam, że Brygida jest winna, wszyscy jednak 
wiemy, że on ma tendencję do zmyślania. Graphic designer Klimek kind of told.PFV us 
that it was Brygida’s fault, but we all know that he has a tendency to make things up. 
idealnie ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ bardzo źle 
(b) Grafik Klimek niby mówił nam, że Brygida jest winna, wszyscy jednak wiemy, że 
on ma tendencję do zmyślania. Graphic designer Klimek kind of told.IPFV us that it was 
Brygida’s fault, but we all know that he has a tendency to make things up. 
idealnie ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ bardzo źle 
Figure 15: Experimental item for ‘say’ in a non-factive scenario. 
I would like to discuss one crucial point that concerns the way of formulating both the 
context sentences and the (im)perfective interpretation alternatives. As the above item 
examples illustrate, there are different types of scenarios for the presupposition and the 
entailment verbs on the one hand, and for the communication verbs on the other. In the 
case of verbs of communication, the inference is weak and pragmatic in nature, which 
means that there is no easy way to empirically test for its existence. Anyhow, the way of 
testing for it must differ from the way implemented for the two other aforementioned 
groups of verbs, where the inference is semantically definable. In this experiment, I 
aimed at detecting the (non)factive meanings of the (im)perfective verbs of 
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communication based on the reliability-condition. In order to achieve that, I had to 
modify the experimental material. In the case of perfective communication verbs, the 
proposition from the embedded clause is expected to be taken for granted due to the 
reliability of the sentence subject (expressed within the interpretation alternatives). 
More precisely, the participants should rank the perfective higher than the imperfective 
in the factive scenario, because the reporting subject is described as reliable (so that we 
can assume that p is true). In contrast, in the non-factive context, the perfective should 
be ranked lower than the imperfective, because the subject does not count as reliable, 
and as a result, she is not expected to tell the truth. Due to the deviation in the structure 
of the test material, the implicature-based part of the study can be treated as a separate 
(sub-)experiment. 
9.8 Experimental hypotheses 
In a factive scenario, the perfective should receive a higher acceptance than the 
imperfective. However, we do not expect the imperfective to be completely rejected 
there. The reason for ranking the imperfective lower results from the speaker following 
Grice’s Maxim of Quantity. According to Grice (1975: 45), the category of Quantity 
relates to the quantity of information that is provided by an utterance, and it is specified 
by two submaxims. First, one should make one’s contribution as informative as 
necessary for the purpose of the conversation, and second (or at the same time), one 
should not make her contribution more informative than is required. The imperfective 
appears less informative than the perfective in a factive scenario, because it does not say 
anything about the final result of the process described by the proposition from the 
embedded clause. In other words, it does not provide as much information as is 
necessary for the fulfillment of the current goal of communication. 
In a non-factive scenario, the imperfective should score higher than the perfective. We 
expect the perfective to be clearly rejected within the presupposition and the entailment 
verb groups. The question remains as to whether there are any quantitative differences 
in acceptability between these groups. Furthermore, we do not expect the perfective to 
be completely ruled out in the case of verbs of communication, because the truth-
inference they might trigger is at least a weak implicature.   
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10 Results 
10.1 General findings 
Figure 16 demonstrates general results for each verb group. 
 
Figure 16: The mean acceptance range of the (im)perfective verb pairs in a factive and a non-
factive scenario in the presupposition, entailment and communication group. The numbers 
represent two aspectual variants of the respective lexemes. 
The following verb lexemes are encoded by the respective numbers: 
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presupposition group entailment group implicature group 
1 zgadnąć.PFV – 
zgadywać.IPFV 
‘guess’ 
6 udowodnić.PFV – 
udowadniać.IPFV 
‘prove’ 
11 obwieścić.PFV – 
obwieszczać.IPFV 
‘announce’ 
2 przeczuć.PFV – 
przeczuwać.IPFV 
‘sense’ 
7 dowieść.PFV – 
dowodzić.IPFV 
‘prove’ 
12 poinformować.PFV – 
informować.IPFV 
‘inform’ 
3 wyczuć.PFV – 
wyczuwać.IPFV 
‘sense’ 
8 wykazać.PFV – 
wykazywać.IPFV 
‘reveal’ 
13 powiedzieć.PFV – 
mówić.IPFV 
‘say’ 
4 rozgryźć.PFV – 
rozgryzać.IPFV 
‘work out’ 
9 pokazać.PFV – 
pokazywać.IPFV 
‘show’ 
14 zakomunikować.PFV – 
komunikować.IPFV 
‘announce’ 
5 przewidzieć.PFV – 
przewidywać.IPFV 
‘predict’ 
10 potwierdzić.PFV – 
potwierdzać.IPFV 
‘confirm’ 
15 zawiadomić.PFV – 
zawiadamiać.IPFV 
‘notify’ 
Figure 17: Verb lexemes that are encoded by the particular numbers. 
Figure 16 reveals a clear correlation between perfectivity and factivity. The perfective 
scores higher in a factive than in a non-factive scenario within each verb group. 
Additionally, the strength of interaction between (im)perfectivity and (non)factivity 
varied across all groups. 
The strongest effect can be observed within the entailment group. Here, the perfective 
forms of all lexemes received the highest acceptance rates in the factive, and the lowest 
acceptance rates in the non-factive scenarios. This confirms that perfectivity not only 
goes along with factivity but also (and even more importantly) it is incompatible with 
non-factivity. Furthermore, there is a clear interaction between perfective and 
imperfective aspect across the two scenarios. The imperfective is strongly accepted in a 
non-factive context, and it tends to be rejected in a factive one. 
I would like to emphasize the deviant behavior of the verb pair encoded as 10: 
potwierdzać.IPFV – potwierdzić.PFV ‘confirm’. There is only a minimal interaction 
between the two aspectual forms in a non-factive scenario. The expectations for confirm 
were of an explorative character; it seems that this verb belongs in the communication 
rather than in the entailment group. As will become clear later, it lacks incremental 
character, which seems to be the main factor responsible for triggering entailment. 
Within the presupposition group, there is an interaction between perfectivity and 
(non)factivity as well (but it is more scattered compared to the entailment group). As 
expected, the perfective scores better in a factive environment, and it tends to be 
rejected in a non-factive one. There is also a cross-shaped interaction between the 
(im)perfective aspect and (non)factivity. The strongest differences in acceptability 
between the two aspectual forms were found in a non-factive context, where the 
imperfective was judged as close to ideal, and the perfective was mostly rejected. 
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Interestingly, the verb pair 4: rozszyfrowywać.IPFV – rozszyfrować.PFV ‘work out’ 
received a middle acceptance rate in a non-factive scenario independently of aspect. As 
will be discussed in a further part of this section, this might result from differences in 
accessibility to the metaphorical meaning of ‘work out’ (literal meaning is ‘crack’) 
among speakers. Crucially, the two aspectual forms are complementary distributed in a 
factive context (with the perfective scoring very high and the imperfective very low), 
which further confirms the perfectivity-factivity dependency. 
As expected, the weakest effect was found within verbs of communication. Here, the 
perfective is slightly (but systematically) better in a factive than in a non-factive 
scenario. Furthermore, there is an interaction between (im)perfectivity and factivity, 
with the perfective scoring better than the imperfective in a factive scenario. In the case 
of communication verbs, the aspect seems to have a limited access to the content of an 
embedded proposition. It rather marks the (non-)realization of all parts of the speech 
act, i.e. whether the hearer received the information or not. This is why, within this verb 
group, the truthfulness-effect was weaker than for other groups.45 
Figure 18 summarizes the interaction between (im)perfectivity and (non)factivity in 
each verb group at a cross-shaped vertex.46 
 
45 I would like to thank Manfred Krifka for pointing this out. 
46 It can be seen that communication verbs were ranked lower with complement clauses than 
other verb groups. This might be due to their complex argument structural properties and 
possible preferences in particular syntactic environments. 
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Figure 18: The interaction between (im)perfectivity and (non)factivity at a cross-shaped vertex 
in each verb group. I: presupposition verbs, II: entailment verbs, III: verbs of communication. 
For a more detailed discussion, see section 10.3. In the following, I will present a 
statistical analysis for each verb group. 
10.2 The paired-samples t-test 
A t-test is a statistical hypothesis test that compares two means in order to identify 
whether there is a significant difference between them (cf. Gries 2009, Urdan 2010 
amongst others). The two most commonly used t-tests are the independent-samples t-
test and the paired-samples t-test. 
The independent-samples t-test compares two independent samples on a given variable. 
For instance, if one wants to compare the average weight of a hundred randomly chosen 
boys to that of a hundred randomly chosen girls, the independent-samples t-test should 
be conducted. Because the two samples are unrelated and there is no intersection 
between them, we call the two groups independent. Boys and girls constitute an 
independent variable with two categories, and weight represents a dependent variable. 
An independent-samples t-test examines whether the average scores on the dependent 
variable (weight) differ depending on belonging to a particular group (boys vs. girls), cf. 
Urdan (2010: 93). 
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The paired-samples t-test also aims at comparing two means on a single dependent 
variable. In contrast to the independent-samples t-test, however, it compares the means 
of a single sample or of two paired / matched samples. For example, following Urdan 
(2010: 94), in order to compare a sample of boys’ Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) 
scores with their fathers’ SAT scores, each boy needs to be matched with his father. As 
a result, each score is matched / paired with a second one. Because of this pairing, the 
scores are dependent upon each other, and a dependent samples t-test needs to be 
applied. Similarly, in the study conducted in this dissertation, every perfective verb is 
matched with its imperfective twin. The goal is the detection of possible differences in 
interpretation between two aspectual forms of a given lexeme (and within certain groups 
of verbs) depending on the factivity of the scenarios. Crucially, due to the joint 
presentation procedure, the (im)perfective verb forms function as primers to each other. 
More precisely, I compared the differences in acceptability between the (im)perfective 
aspect ratings within each verb group (two samples: the imperfective and the perfective 
members of the respective minimal pairs) once in a factive, and once in a non-factive 
scenario (i.e. the acceptability of the two aspectual forms depend on the factivity of the 
scenarios). The statistical analysis was calculated in RStudio (cf. RStudio Team 2016), 
by using the following formulas: > WITH(SUBSET(PRS, SCENARIO == "F"), + 
T.TEST(MN~ASPECT, PAIRED=T)) and > WITH(SUBSET(PRS, SCENARIO == "NF"), + 
T.TEST(MN~ASPECT, PAIRED=T)) for presupposition verbs, > WITH(SUBSET(NTL, 
SCENARIO == "F"), + T.TEST(MN~ASPECT, PAIRED=T)) and > WITH(SUBSET(NTL, 
SCENARIO == "NF"), + T.TEST(MN~ASPECT, PAIRED=T)) for entailment verbs, as well as 
> WITH(SUBSET(CMN, SCENARIO == "F"), + T.TEST(MN~ASPECT, PAIRED=T)) and > 
WITH(SUBSET(CMN, SCENARIO == "NF"), + T.TEST(MN~ASPECT, PAIRED=T)) for verbs of 
communication.47 
In accordance with the standard assumptions, I consider the difference between two 
means significant if p < 0.05 (cf. Fisher 1925). If a result turns out to be significant, it 
provides strong evidence against the null hypothesis that assumes that there is no 
difference between the means or that any difference observed is due to chance. 
The only problem with applying the t-test to my data lies in the fact that acceptability 
judgements are not ‘dividable’, which is why comparing means can seem questionable 
at first sight. However, since the t-test is a standard procedure for analyzing pairwise 
contrast, I decided to employ it for my analysis. 
10.2.1 Presupposition group 
I will begin with the presupposition group. A paired-samples t-test revealed, for the 
factive scenario, a non-significant difference between the perfective and the 
 
47 PRS: presupposition group, NTL: entailment group, CMN: communication group. 
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imperfective aspect ratings (t = 2.434, df = 4, p > 0,05)48. In contrast, there is a 
significant difference between the two aspectual forms in the non-factive scenario, with 
the imperfective scoring higher than the perfective (t = -4.0665, df = 4, p < 0,05). These 
results provide evidence in favor of the initial hypothesis; there is a significant 
interaction between perfectivity and factivity in a non-factive context, and a clear 
tendency (even if not statistically significant) for such a correlation in a factive 
environment. 
10.2.2 Entailment group 
Within the entailment group, a highly significant difference between the perfective and 
the imperfective aspect ratings was detected in both scenarios. In a factive context, the 
imperfective scored lower than the perfective (t = 24.983, df = 4, p < 0.001). In the non-
factive scenario, we observed the reverse significant difference (t = -6.0464, df = 4, p < 
0.01), with the perfective scoring lower than the imperfective. These results strongly 
support the experimental hypothesis across all conditions. 
10.2.3 Implicature group 
For verbs of communication, a significant difference between the perfective and the 
imperfective aspect ratings was found in a factive scenario (t = 6.2017, df = 4, p < 
0,005). The difference between the two aspectual forms in a non-factive context is non-
significant (t = 0.64953, df = 4, p > 0,5). These findings also speak in favor of the 
perfectivity-factivity dependency. 
10.3 Detailed investigations within each group 
In this section, I will present a detailed analysis of the verb pairs within each group. 
10.3.1 Presupposition group 
10.3.1.1 The perfective in a factive scenario 
The perfective clearly functions as a truthfulness trigger in the case of presupposition 
verbs. A general overview of its acceptance in a factive scenario is presented in Figure 
19. 
 
48 T: the actual t-value; it indicates the size of a difference relative to the variation in a particular 
data sample. If t is close to 0, it suggests the lack of a significant result. The greater the t-value, 
the greater the evidence in favor of the experimental hypothesis (and against the null 
hypothesis). The p-value establishes, on the basis of the t-value, the statistical significance of 
the effect. 
Df: the degrees of freedom; the minimum amount of data needed to calculate a statistical 
analysis (numbers used to approximate the number of observations in the data set in order to 
determine a statistical significance), cf. Urdan (2010: 60). 
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Figure 19: The acceptance of perfective presupposition verbs in a factive scenario. 
Zgadnąć was perfectly accepted (by being judged as ‘ideal’ or A2) by 96% of the 
participants. The next highest scoring occurred with rozgryźć, with a 94% acceptance 
rate. Wyczuć was perfectly accepted by 86% of the participants, and przeczuć by 73%. 
Przewidzieć received a 67% acceptance rate. 
Interestingly, some speakers did not accept przeczuć and przewidzieć in a factive 
scenario (6% judged przeczuć as ‘very bad’ or A6, and 10% clearly rejected 
przewidzieć). The reason for this might lie in a surprisingly high acceptance for the 
respective imperfective twins. 
These observations correlate with the differences in frequency; both przeczuć and 
przewidzieć are clearly less frequent than their imperfective twins (przeczuć: 180 
occurrences, przeczuwać: 1320 occurrences; przewidzieć: 10285 occurrences, 
przewidywać: 21423 occurrences). In the case of the three remaining verb pairs, either 
the perfective is more frequent than the imperfective (zgadnąć and rozgryźć) or there is 
only a slight difference between the two forms (wyczuwać is slightly more frequent than 
wyczuć), cf. Figure 5. 
10.3.1.2 The imperfective in a factive scenario 
Figure 20 presents a general overview of the results for the imperfective members of the 
analyzed aspectual pairs in a factive scenario. 
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Figure 20: The acceptance of imperfective forms of presupposition verbs in a factive scenario. 
As mentioned above, the imperfective przeczuwać and przewidywać both received a 
very high acceptance rate in a factive scenario – 72% and 57%, respectively (ratings 
‘ideal’ or A2), which makes them serious competitors for their perfective partners in 
triggering factivity. Interestingly, these imperfective verbs are ambiguous between a 
factive and a non-factive interpretation, which, again, might be due to their high 
frequency (so that the imperfective takes over the function of the perfective). As will 
become clear later, przeczuwać and przewidywać are also perfectly acceptable in a non-
factive context. It is worth mentioning that even the presence of the perfective primer 
did not prevent participants from judging the imperfective as (non-)factive (depending 
on the scenario). 
In general and as expected, the imperfective forms received a middle acceptance rate in 
a factive scenario. Complete rejection rates (A6 or ‘very bad’) were as follows: 65% for 
rozgryzać, 40% for zgadywać, 20% for wyczuwać, 18% for przewidywać, and 4% for 
przeczuwać. 
A relatively high rejection rate for rozgryzać (by a correspondingly high acceptance rate 
for its perfective twin rozgryźć) might be determined by three factors. First, rozgryzać 
has the lowest frequency of all investigated verbs, and it is more than three times rarer 
than its perfective twin rozgryźć. Second, rozgryzać combined with a that-clause 
produces a syntactically marked structure49. Third and lastly, the metaphorical 
 
49 There is also an interesting tendency with respect to the occurrence of the imperfective 
zgadywać with a clausal complement. Zgadywać, że is rare (but still not really marked) in 
combination with a that-clause, but the construction seems to be especially productive when the 
matrix verb appears in the present tense. This confirms the neutrality of zgadywać in triggering 
factivity. We can find 49 instances of such usages in NKJP, cf. Pęzik (2012). The construction 
seems to be a spoken language phenomenon: 
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interpretation of rozgryzać (be working out/‘cracking’ who solved the mystery vs. be 
cracking a nut) is not accessible to every speaker. In contrast, rozgryźć seems to be 
lexicalized in its metaphorical meaning, and even if it also occurs rather with a nominal 
than with a propositional complement, its influence on the factive interpretation of the 
subordinate clause was clearly a basis for the speakers’ judgements. 
10.3.1.3 The perfective in a non-factive scenario 
In the following, I will present experimental results for the acceptance of the 
(im)perfective presupposition verbs in a non-factive scenario. Just as a quick reminder, 
the perfective was expected to be completely rejected here, whereas the imperfective 
was supposed to be the default. Figure 21 illustrates the results for the perfective. 
 
Figure 21: The acceptance of perfective forms of presupposition verbs in a non-factive scenario. 
At first, I will concentrate on the results for zgadnąć, przeczuć, wyczuć, and 
przewidzieć. All these forms tend to be rejected in a non-factive scenario. Zgadnąć 
received an 85% rejection rate (ratings A6 or ‘very bad’), and przeczuć 79%. Wyczuć 
and przewidzieć were clearly rejected by 69% of the participants, respectively. The 
results again reveal a special status of zgadnąć, which appears to be ‘unquestionably’ 
factive. We might consider treating the perfective and the imperfective realizations of 
‘guess’ in Polish as semantically independent lexemes. The perfective zgadnąć would 
be assigned the meaning ‘guess rightly’, and the imperfective zgadywać ‘take a guess’. 
Interestingly, the perfective and the imperfective forms are both achievements (Vendler 
1957), which means that they do not stand in a typical imperfective → activity, 
perfective → termination/accomplishment relation; the only difference between 
 
PELCRA_6203010001731 (23.01.2019/11:21): Ludzie gdzie żeście się wychowywali ( zgaduje 
że w chlewie )? ‘People, where have you been brought up (I am guessing that in a pigsty?) 
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zgadywać and zgadnąć lies in (non)factivity. This shows that, in the case of the latter 
form, the meaning of perfectivity boils down to factivity (cf. Zuchewicz & Šimík 2018 
for Polish and Czech). 
Interesting results were found with the perfective rozgryźć. This verb appeared to be a 
strong factivity trigger in a factive scenario, but did not score unambiguously in a non-
factive one. In a non-factive scenario, rozgryźć was completely rejected by 51% of the 
participants (ratings A6 and ‘very bad’), but it was also perfectly accepted by 28% 
(ratings ‘ideal’ and A2). The reason for this might be that the metaphorical meaning of 
the perfective ‘work out/crack’ allows for a factive: ‘crack something right/find a right 
answer’, and a non-factive (subjective) interpretation: ‘find an answer (for yourself)’. 
Depending on which meaning is accessible to the speaker, rozgryźć can be either factive 
or non-factive. This is why the judgments seem contradictory at first glance. 
10.3.1.4 The imperfective in a non-factive scenario 
Figure 22 demonstrates the acceptance of the imperfective counterparts of the analyzed 
presupposition verbs in a non-factive scenario. 
 
Figure 22: The acceptance of imperfective forms of presupposition verbs in a non-factive 
scenario. 
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Figure 22 clearly shows that the imperfective goes with a non-factive scenario (and that 
it is hardly ever rejected there). Because of anomalous results for rozgryzać, I will 
analyze this verb separately50. 
The highest acceptance rates (choosing ‘ideal’ or A2) are distributed as follows: 85% 
for zgadywać (compared to 2% for complete rejection by judging it as ‘very bad’ or 
A6), 84% for przeczuwać (4% for complete rejection), 83% for przewidywać (6% for 
complete rejection), and 81% for wyczuwać (4% for complete rejection). 
The imperfective rozgryzać received inconsistent judgements. 30% of the participants 
gave it the highest acceptance, whereas 45% completely rejected it. The high rejection 
rate might result from the marked syntactic frame (again, for many participants the form 
itself seemed to be the basis for assessment). In contrast, participants who concentrated 
on the semantic contrast with a perfective primer did accept its imperfective twin. 
Furthermore, the fact that rozgryzać was completely rejected by 65% of the participants 
in the factive scenario proves that, despite its oddness in combination with a that-clause 
and a low frequency, it is still less marked when used non-factively. 
To sum up, we saw that perfective presupposition verbs are indeed factive in that they 
received very high acceptance rates in a factive scenario. As expected, their 
imperfective counterparts received middle acceptance rates in a factive environment; 
however, przeczuwać ‘to sense’ and przewidywać ‘to predict’ turned out to be 
ambiguous between a factive and a non-factive interpretation. Furthermore, the 
perfective tended to be rejected in a non-factive context. Interestingly, although 
rozgryźć ‘to work out/crack’ turned out to be a strong factivity-trigger in a factive 
scenario, it was also compatible with a non-factive one. All imperfective variants of 
presupposition verbs except rozgryzać ‘to work out/crack’ clearly favor non-factive 
environments. 
10.3.2 Entailment group 
10.3.2.1 The perfective in a factive scenario 
In this section I will present the experimental results for entailment verbs. As in the case 
of the presupposition group, I will start with the comparison between the perfective and 
the imperfective aspect in a factive scenario. 
Figure 23 illustrates the results for the perfective. 
 
50 I would like to briefly justify the fact that I did not remove the verb pair rozgryzać – rozgryźć 
‘work out/crack’ from the main analysis. On the one hand, while planning my experiment, I still 
expected these lexemes to pattern with other presupposition verbs. On the other hand, I was 
aware of the syntactic oddness of rozgryzać, że, and of the non-systematic accessibility of the 
metaphorical interpretation of ‘crack’ in general. In the end, the results for this verb pair were 
intended to be explorative in character. A crucial observation concerns the fact that the 
perfective rozgryźć received a very high acceptance rate in a factive scenario, which confirms 
the correlation between perfectivity and factivity. 
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Figure 23: The acceptance of perfective forms of entailment verbs in a factive scenario. 
Figure 23 shows that there is an even stronger correlation between perfectivity and 
factivity (here realized as veridicality) in the case of entailment verbs than in the case of 
presupposition verbs. This suggests that it is not the type / ‘strength’ of the truth-
inference itself (presupposition, entailment or implicature), but rather some event-
structural properties of the matrix predicate that determine the exact direction of the 
perfectivity-factivity dependency. As already pointed out, it seems that incrementality 
(Dowty 1991, Krifka 1992) plays a crucial role here. I will come back to this issue in a 
further part of the paper. 
The acceptance rates (‘ideal’ or A2) for the perfective verbs of revealing/verbs of 
proving are as follows: 98% for udowodnić and potwierdzić, respectively (0% 
rejection), 96% for dowieść and wykazać, respectively (0% rejection), and 90% for 
pokazać (also 0% rejection). We can see that, independently of the verb lexeme used, 
the perfective is always an ideal candidate for the factive scenario. It is worth 
mentioning that even the clause-embedding pokazać ‘show’ was judged as factive. 
10.3.2.2 The imperfective in a factive scenario 
The imperfective counterparts of the analyzed reveal-type predicates also scored as 
expected, see Figure 24. 
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Figure 24: The acceptance of imperfective forms of entailment verbs in a factive scenario. 
All imperfective verbs tend to be rejected in a factive scenario (judgements A6 or ‘very 
bad’): potwierdzać by 67% of the participants, dowodzić by 57%, pokazywać by 51%, 
udowadniać by 49%, and wykazywać by 41%. However, there were also some 
participants who maximally accepted the imperfective (by choosing ‘ideal’ or A2): 16% 
for wykazywać, 14% for pokazywać, 12% for udowadniać, 8% for dowodzić, and 6% for 
potwierdzać. The remaining participants judged it as average (by choosing A3, A4 or 
A5). These findings suggest that the imperfective forms of verbs of revealing in Polish 
are neither ideal nor very bad in a factive scenario. As has already been pointed out, this 
might be due to the fact that they are less informative in this context than their 
perfective counterparts. The degree of rejection seems to be determined by the degree of 
sensitivity towards the effect of the Maxim of Quantity, which varies from person to 
person. 
10.3.2.3 The perfective in a non-factive scenario 
In this section I will demonstrate the results for entailment verbs in a non-factive 
scenario. Consider Figure 25 for the perfective. 
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Figure 25: The acceptance of perfective forms of entailment verbs in a non-factive scenario. 
As Figure 25 demonstrates, the participants clearly rejected the perfective forms of 
entailment verbs in a non-factive scenario. The ratings A6 and ‘very bad’ were 
distributed as follows: 81% for dowieść, 77% for udowodnić, 67% for wykazać and 
pokazać, respectively, and 41% for potwierdzić. 
There are interesting differences in acceptability between the standard verbs of proving 
(dowieść and udowodnić), other reveal-type predicates (wykazać and pokazać), and 
potwierdzić (a weakly veridical verb without the evidence-based character of the closure 
of the verbal process). Putting it more precisely, all these verbs seem to be incremental 
theme verbs at first sight, but they differ in the semantic nature of the result of the 
incremental process. If partial evidence that leads to the truth of p comes from the 
proving process (investigation), we can observe the highest rejection rate of the 
perfective in a non-factive context. For instance, the incrementality of to prove that Max 
is in Tokyo can be described as follows: we have four pieces of evidence which, taken 
together, count as a sufficient evidence to the effect that Max is in Tokyo: partial 
evidence 1: Max is not in Paris, partial evidence 2: Max switched off his French phone, 
partial evidence 3: Max switched on his Japanese phone, partial evidence 4: Max bought 
tickets to Tokyo last week. 
In contrast, in the case of other reveal-type predicates, the amount of evidence 
available is enough to take the truth of p for granted, but it is more likely for a 
counterexample to appear, since single events are weaker than proving events. This 
explains why, in a non-factive scenario, the rejection rate of wykazać and pokazać was 
lower than the rejection rate of dowieść and udowodnić, although all four lexemes 
received a comparable acceptance rate in a factive scenario. 
Finally, the lowest rejection rate, which was observed for potwierdzić, might result from 
the subjective (or non-verifiable) nature of evidence (or the lack of evidence). For 
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instance, to confirm that Max is in Tokyo does not have to involve any kind of 
investigation/logical reasoning. One can confirm something which is wrong, while 
being aware of the fact that it is wrong: 
 
(366)  Jan confirmed that Anna was in Spain, although she was in Austria, and he 
knew about that {about the fact that Anna was in Austria}. 
 
It is impossible to do that with prove though: 
 
(367)  #Jan proved that Anna was in Spain, although she was not there, and he 
knew about that {about the fact that she was not there}. 
 
It seems reasonable to introduce a more fine-grained factivity scale within perfective 
incremental theme verbs, based on the nature of the incremental process itself. 
The question arises as to what extent potwierdzić should be treated as an incremental 
theme verb at all. As example (368) demonstrates, it does not necessarily build on any 
partial actions, and it can refer to a punctual event: 
 
(368)  Jan just confirmed that Anna got fired, without having proved it at all. 
 
Furthermore, confirm (and the Polish aspectual pair potwierdzić – potwierdzać), in 
contrast to the reveal-type predicates, presuppose that p is/was part of the common 
ground. ‘Confirm’ neither presupposes nor entails that p is true though. Consider the 
following examples. 
 
(369)  #Jan just confirmed that Anna got fired, without having heard it before. 
 
(370)  Jan just proved that Anna got fired, without having heard it before. 
 
In other words, propositions embedded under confirm count as discourse-given. 
Discourse-givenness can, but need not give rise to factivity or veridicality (cf. the 
influence of correlates on the veridical interpretation of a complement sentence: 
Schwabe 2013, Schwabe & Fittler 2014 for German, Egré 2008 for English, but also the 
lack of that effect in Hungarian: Cuba & Ürögdi 2010). 
The givenness-presupposition of ‘confirm’ might also be the reason for the relatively 
low acceptance rate for the imperfective potwierdzać in a non-factive environment (see 
the next subsection). The verb might be preferred in an iterative scenario, which was 
excluded via the context description. 
To conclude, the fact that potwierdzić scores and behaves differently from all reveal-
type predicates speaks against its incremental character. For that reason, a post-hoc 
analysis of incremental theme verbs was conducted (see section 11). In particular, 
‘confirm’ was added to the communication group. This step can be motivated by the 
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fact that the basis for derivation of this aspectual pair is the simple verb twierdzić ‘to 
claim.IPFV’ / ‘to assert.IPFV’ (with its perfective counterpart s-twierdzić). This suggests 
that po-twierdzić / po-twierdzać are still instances of verbs of communication / inherited 
some features of these verbs. 
Since in every case except for the pair dowieść – dowodzić the perfective is more 
frequent than its imperfective counterpart, frequency seems not to have had an influence 
on the speakers’ judgements. 
In the following, I will present the results for the imperfective entailment verbs in a 
non-factive scenario. 
10.3.2.4 The imperfective in a non-factive scenario 
 
Figure 26: The acceptance of imperfective forms of entailment verbs in a non-factive scenario. 
All imperfective entailment verbs received very high acceptance rates in a non-factive 
scenario. The ratings ‘ideal’ or A2 were given to the respective verb lexemes by the 
following number of participants: 81% for dowodzić, 80% for udowadniać, 73% for 
pokazywać, 71% for wykazywać, and 60% for potwierdzać. As was observed for the 
perfective, also in the case of the imperfective we can see differences between verbs of 
proving, verbs of revealing, and confirm. As mentioned before, the relatively low 
acceptance rate for confirm might be due to the fact that its preferred interpretation is 
the iterative one (where the action described by a verbal predicate is being repeated, for 
instance: to be confirming a hundred times, to be confirming since yesterday). In order 
to avoid the possibility of using the imperfective in the domain of the perfective, the 
scenarios suggested the singular character of events. As a result, an iterative 
interpretation was excluded. 
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To sum up, perfective incremental theme matrix verbs, in contrast to their imperfective 
counterparts, are systematically veridical with respect to the meaning of propositions 
they embed. 
Perfective forms of incremental theme verbs are clearly accepted in factive scenarios, 
and clearly rejected in non-factive ones. Imperfective forms tend to be rejected in 
factive contexts (they are still not completely ruled out, though), and they are clearly 
accepted in non-factive contexts. 
Again, the fact that, in a non-factive environment, the perfective confirm scored 
differently than the prove-/reveal-type predicates, suggests that it is not perfectivity 
itself, but rather perfectivity combined with incrementality that yields an entailment 
pattern. Furthermore, the results of the experiment and the judgements presented in 
examples (366), (367) and (368) question the incremental character of confirm. 
10.3.3 Implicature group 
10.3.3.1 The perfective in a factive scenario 
In this chapter, I am going to discuss the results for the last group – the verbs of 
communication.  
Figure 27 presents the judgements for the perfective in a factive scenario. 
 
Figure 27: The acceptance of perfective forms of verbs of communication in a factive scenario. 
As expected, and as was observed for the previous two groups of verbs, the perfective 
forms of verbs of communication are perfectly acceptable in a factive scenario. The 
following number of participants rated them as ‘ideal’ or A2: 89% in the case of 
obwieścić and poinformować, respectively, 88% in the case of zawiadomić, 85% in the 
case of powiedzieć, and 77% in the case of zakomunikować. 
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10.3.3.2 The imperfective in a factive scenario 
Interestingly, many imperfective twins of the perfective verbs listed in Figure 27 also 
received high acceptance rates in a factive scenario. The results are summarized in 
Figure 28. 
 
Figure 28: The acceptance of imperfective forms of verbs of communication in a factive 
scenario. 
Figure 28 shows that the imperfective did not tend to be rejected in a factive scenario. 
The ratings for the complete rejection (A6 and ‘very bad’) were distributed as follows: 
38% for zawiadamiać, 34% for obwieszczać, 20% for komunikować, 16% for 
informować, and 10% for mówić. In contrast, many of the above-mentioned lexemes 
received a high acceptance rate. The following percentage of participants judged them 
as ‘ideal’ or A2: 51% in the case of informować, 48% in the case of mówić, 41% in the 
case of komunikować, 26% in the case of zawiadamiać, and 12% in the case of 
obwieszczać. 
Relatively high rejection rates for obwieszczać and zawiadamiać might also result from 
their low frequencies (393 occurrences of obwieszczać by 690 occurrences of obwieścić, 
and 1696 occurrences of zawiadamiać by 4393 occurrences of zawiadomić). These are 
the lowest numbers within the communication group; for comparison, there are 282514 
occurrences of powiedzieć and 436927 of its imperfective twin mówić. 
These results suggest that, although the perfective is still a better variant for the factive 
scenario, the imperfective can be its well-matched competitor. 
Crucially, even if the quantitative differences in acceptability between the two aspectual 
forms of communication verbs were lower than in the case of the entailment group, the 
perfective members of the respective pairs were always better than their imperfective 
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counterparts (the difference was significant too). This speaks in favor of the initial 
hypothesis. 
It is worth mentioning that the morphological structure of imperfective communication 
verbs clearly influences their acceptance in a factive scenario. If the imperfective verb is 
a basis for aspectual derivation (informować and komunikować; their perfective 
counterparts are being created via po- and za- prefixation, respectively) or a suppletive 
form (mówić), it fits well in the factive environment. However, if it is a derivate 
(zawiadamiać and obwieszczać; derived from zawiadomić and obwieścić via 
morphonological change, cf. Młynarczyk 2004 for the terminology), its acceptance in a 
factive context decreases. 
In the following, I will compare the results for the (im)perfective communication verbs 
in a non-factive scenario. 
10.3.3.3 The perfective in a non-factive scenario 
 
Figure 29: The acceptance of perfective forms of verbs of communication in a non-factive 
scenario. 
Interestingly (and unexpectedly), perfective forms of communication verbs are hardly 
ever rejected in a non-factive scenario. I will concentrate on their acceptance rates 
(‘ideal’ and A2) in order to directly compare them to those of the imperfective 
counterparts. Rejection rates (A6 and ‘very bad’) are given in brackets. 
In a non-factive scenario, 61% of the participants perfectly accepted obwieścić and 
powiedzieć, respectively (only 2% rejection each), 57% zakomunikować (8% rejection), 
51% zawiadomić (10% rejection), and 53% poinformować (10% rejection). 
0
5
10
15
20
25
obwieścić
'announce'
poinformować
'inform'
powiedzieć 'say' zakomunikować
'announce'
zawiadomić
'notify'
The acceptance of perfective verbs of communication in a non-
factive scenario
ideal A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 very bad
164 
 
10.3.3.4 The imperfective in a non-factive scenario 
Figure 30 summarizes the results for the imperfective communication verbs in a non-
factive scenario. 
 
Figure 30: The acceptance of imperfective forms of verbs of communication in a non-factive 
scenario. 
As expected, the imperfective verbs of communication tend to be associated with a non-
factive environment. The highest acceptance rates (‘ideal’ and A2) were distributed as 
follows: 80% for mówić, 59% for zawiadamiać, 56% for informować, 55% for 
komunikować, and 52% for obwieszczać. 
Surprisingly, the perfective obwieścić is better than the imperfective obwieszczać in a 
non-factive scenario. It seems that obwieszczać scored lower due to its archaic form and 
very low frequency. However, the rejection rate of obwieszczać was much higher in a 
factive than in a non-factive scenario. This shows that, despite the general tendency 
towards markedness, obwieszczać scores better when used in a non-factive context. 
Poinformować and zakomunikować behave on a par with their imperfective twins in a 
non-factive context. The imperfective mówić and zawiadamiać received a higher 
acceptance rate in a non-factive scenario than their perfective counterparts. Another 
reason for higher rejection rates of some imperfective verbs might lie in the speakers’ 
preference towards an iterative interpretation (especially in the case of zawiadamiać and 
informować). 
To sum up, the perfectivity-factivity dependency within verbs of communication can 
clearly be seen in a factive scenario. In contrast, the (im)perfective forms are not 
distributed in a complementary manner in a non-factive environment. This means that 
the relationship between perfectivity and factivity is weaker in the case of 
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communication verbs than in the case of the presupposition and the entailment group. 
Furthermore, the imperfective is more often rejected in a factive than in a non-factive 
scenario, which confirms its correlation with non-factivity, and the (im)perfectivity – 
(non)factivity-dependency in general. 
10.4 Summary of results 
The goal of the experiment was to verify whether there is a systematic relationship 
between perfectivity and truthfulness. I expected differences in effect sizes depending 
on the semantic class a matrix verb belongs to. The highest contrast between the 
perfective and the imperfective with respect to their well-formedness in factive 
scenarios was expected for the presupposition group, and the lowest for the 
communication group. However, it turned out that the clearest and strongest effect 
occurs for incremental theme verbs that are systematically veridical. This reveals the 
role of internal event-structure in triggering truthfulness. Furthermore, it becomes 
obvious that a quantized (definite) interpretation of nominal objects of perfective 
incremental theme verbs translates to their veridical interpretation if the argument is 
realized as a proposition. This, in turn, suggests a correlation between definiteness and 
veridicality. Importantly, all perfective incremental theme verbs are bases for aspectual 
derivation. 
Thus, the results indicate that the behaviour of the predicates regarding projection 
pattern (truth-inference’s survival in question constructions, under negation or after the 
insertion of a modal adverbial) that was the basis for the establishment of the three verb 
classes is not the primary source of the actual size of the effect; if this was the case, the 
most significant results should have arisen with presupposition verbs. 
In general, regardless of belonging to a particular verb group, the perfective clause-
embedding verbs investigated in this dissertation unquestionably favor factive 
environments. Even more importantly, they are clearly rejected in non-factive scenarios 
within the presupposition and the entailment groups. Perfective communication verbs 
are compatible with both a factive and a non-factive context (the judgements are more 
scattered in the latter case, however). Crucially, if the imperfective is a derivate, its 
acceptance in a factive scenario decreases. This, in turn, suggests the relationship 
between morphological formation patterns and factivity. If the perfective is a basis for 
aspectual derivation, the factivity-based contrast between (im)perfective forms becomes 
more obvious. 
Imperfective clause-embedding verbs in Polish are most compatible with non-factive 
scenarios. This does not mean, however, that they do not allow for factive readings; for 
instance, we saw that some imperfective presupposition verbs are ambiguous between a 
factive and a non-factive interpretation. 
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Due to the unambiguousness of results for incremental theme verbs and the parallel to 
the corresponding nominal arguments, I will provide an explanation for the veridicality 
of this verb class based on its event-structural properties. It seems that the truthfulness 
of the perfective cannot be explained in isolation (in the sense that there might be an 
independent motivation for it within each verb group) even if there is a general tendency 
for the perfective to denote true propositions. This tendency most probably results from 
completedness / any sort of temporal limitation that constitutes the basic meaning of 
perfectivity. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that CPs exhibit more complex structure than DPs. 
Whereas the meaning of nominal arguments of incremental theme verbs is easily 
accessible (it is the DP itself that undergoes an incremental change), we need additional 
‘invisible’ steps in order to access the meanings of CPs that constitute single pieces of 
evidence in a proof chain (it is more than ‘just’ a that-clause that gives rise to 
incrementality). In other words, composing proof seems more complex than composing 
a DP. A detailed investigation on this topic will be the subject of future research. 
In the next chapter, I will present a post-hoc analysis of slightly reorganized verb 
classes. 
10.5 Note on the role of the Aktionsarten in triggering truth-inference of the 
perfective 
As was shown for Polish (im)perfective ‘guess’, Aktionsarten may influence the 
realization of the truthfulness feature. Since both zgadnąć ‘guess.PFV’ and zgadywać 
‘guess.IPFV’ are achievements, there is no way for the perfective to access / build on the 
meaning of the imperfective (the perfective cannot mark the closure of an event that is 
inherently punctual). Thus, the perfective cannot fulfill its default function as 
completedness marker. It seems that, in this particular case, perfectivity is obligatorily 
parametrized by factivity. Clause-embedding achievements tend to be factive in general; 
both perfective factive ‘sensing’-verbs – wyczuć and przeczuć – are state-based 
achievements (cf. Zuchewicz & Šimík 2018). 
Furthermore, it can be observed that inchoativity systematically blocks factivity. As 
previously shown, wyczuć and przeczuć ‘sense’ are factive verbs. Both of them denote a 
resultative Aktionsart. Crucially, their imperfective stem czuć ‘feel’ can also combine 
with the prefix po-, giving rise to the inchoative meaning of a derivate (‘to start 
feeling’). In this case, the inference that is triggered by the perfective is at least a weak 
truth-implicature. Consider the following examples, adapted from Zuchewicz & Šimík 
(2018). 
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(371)  Przez chwilę #wyczułam / #przeczułam 
 through moment sensed.1SG.PFV.RES / sensed.1SG.PFV.RES 
 / poczułam, że to Jan wysyła mi kwiaty, ale 
 / felt.1SG.PFV.INCH that it Jan sends me flowers but 
 okazało się, że to Kuba. 
 turned.out REFL that it Kuba 
 ‘I started feeling that it was Jan who keeps sending me flowers (and the 
sense lasted a moment), but it turned out that it was Kuba.’ 
 ≫̸ Jan keeps sending me flowers. 
 
(372)  Ale miałam wyczucie! 
 but had sensing.PFV.RES 
 ‘I have totally sensed it right!’ 
 
(373)  Ale miałam przeczucie!51 
 but had sensing.PFV.RES 
 ‘I have totally sensed it (right)!’ 
 
(374)  # Ale miałam poczucie! 
  but had feeling.PFV.INCH 
 
(375)  Miałam #wyczucie / #przeczucie 
 had sensing.PFV.RES / sensing.PFV.RES 
 / poczucie winy / siły. 
 / feeling.PFV.INCH guilt.GEN / power.GEN 
 ‘I felt guilty / strong.’ 
 
Examples (371)–(374) illustrate that only poczuć (and its nominal variant poczucie) can 
refer to temporary events, which indicates their non-factivity. Example (375) further 
demonstrates that non-verifiable subjective states of mind can only be described by 
poczucie. 
According to Zuchewicz & Šimík (2018), the same pattern holds for Czech: 
 
(376)  Karel cítil, že Marie je doma. 
 Karel felt.IPFV that Marie is at.home 
 ‘Karel sensed that Marie was at home.’ 
 ≫̸ Marie was at home. 
 
 
51 However, as already mentioned, one can still say Dobrze, że moje przeczucie się nie 
sprawdziło. ‘Fortunately, my hunch was not right.’, but one cannot say #Dobrze, że moje 
wyczucie się nie sprawdziło. This suggests that, while the factivity of wyczucie is not affected by 
the process of nominalization, the noun przeczucie can have both a factive and a non-factive 
reading. 
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(377)  Karel ucítil na tři minuty, že Marie je 
 Karel felt.PFV.INCH for three minutes that Marie is 
 doma.        
 at.home.        
 ‘Karel started sensing that Marie was at home (and the sense lasted three 
minutes).’ 
 ≫̸ Marie was at home. 
 
(378)  Karel vycítil (#na tři minuty), že Marie je 
 Karel felt.PFV.RES for three minutes that Marie is 
 doma.        
 at.home.        
 ‘Karel sensed at once that Marie was at home.’ 
 ≫ Marie was at home. 
 
(379)  Karel nevycítil, že Marie je doma. 
 Karel NEG.felt.PFV.RES that Marie is at.home. 
 ‘Karel did not sense that Marie was at home.’ 
 ≫ Marie was at home. 
 
The most apparent relationship holds between incremental accomplishments and 
veridicality. This relationship is explained in greater detail in section 5.2.1.2.  
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11 Post-hoc analysis: Exchanging members of two verb groups 
Within the scope of the post-hoc analysis, the entailment group was restricted to 
incremental theme verbs; the pair potwierdzić – potwierdzać ‘confirm’ was removed 
from the data set. ‘Confirm’ was added to the communication group instead. 
11.1 Entailment group restricted to incremental theme verbs 
11.1.1 Perfective incremental theme verbs in a factive scenario 
Figure 31: The acceptance of perfective incremental theme verbs in a factive scenario. 
 
We can see, again, that incremental theme verbs pattern alike in that they are 
unquestionable veridicality-triggers. The average acceptance rate (ideal + A2) for the 
four perfective forms in a factive scenario was 95%. 
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11.1.2 Imperfective incremental theme verbs in a factive scenario 
Figure 32: The acceptance of imperfective incremental theme verbs in a factive scenario. 
 
Imperfective incremental theme verbs presented in a factive scenario also pattern alike. 
The average rejection rate (A6 + very bad) for all lexemes was 50%. In this and the 
above case, the results for ‘confirm’ do not differ much from the results for reveal-type 
predicates. 
11.1.3 Perfective incremental theme verbs in a non-factive scenario 
Figure 33: The acceptance of perfective incremental theme verbs in a non-factive scenario. 
 
All perfective variants of reveal-type predicates tend to be rejected in a non-factive 
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context. The average rejection rate was 73%. The rejection rate would have been lower 
if ‘confirm’ had been considered a member of this group. 
11.1.4 Imperfective incremental theme verbs in a non-factive scenario 
Figure 34: The acceptance of imperfective forms of incremental theme verbs in a non-factive 
scenario. 
 
The results for imperfective incremental theme verbs in a non-factive environment are 
very consistent too. 76% of the participants gave them maximal acceptance. The results 
for ‘confirm’ are below this average (60%). As was mentioned before, the reason for 
this might lie in the inherent iterativity of potwierdzać. 
In the following, I will reanalyze verbs of communication by extending this group to 
include ‘confirm’. 
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11.2 Communication group extended by confirm 
11.2.1 Perfective communication verbs in a factive scenario 
 
Figure 35: The acceptance of perfective forms of verbs of communication in a factive scenario. 
 
Like other investigated verb groups, perfective verbs of communication also received 
the highest acceptance rates in a factive scenario. The perfective ‘confirm’ matches this 
picture. 87% of the participants ranked perfective communication verbs as ideal. 
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11.2.2 Imperfective communication verbs in a factive scenario 
Figure 36: The acceptance of imperfective forms of verbs of communication in a factive 
scenario. 
 
As was shown before, imperfective communication verbs are not ruled out in a factive 
scenario. ‘Confirm’ patterns differently though; this would suggest the need for the 
creation a separate group for lexemes that enforce / favor an iterative interpretation of 
events. In any case, 30% of the participants rejected imperfective forms of verbs of 
communication in a factive environment. The results for ‘confirm’ are much above this 
average (67%). 
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11.2.3 Perfective communication verbs in a non-factive scenario 
Figure 37: The acceptance of perfective forms of verbs of communication in a non-factive 
scenario. 
 
The above diagram makes it clear, again, that ‘confirm’ should not be treated as a 
communication verb. All ‘typical’ perfective verbs of communication tend to be 
accepted in a non-factive context. In contrast, the perfective ‘confirm’ allows for both a 
factive and a non-factive interpretation (see the main experimental results). Due to this 
discrepancy, I have decided not to merge the results for this subgroup. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
obwieścić
'announce'
poinformować
'inform'
powiedzieć 'say' zakomunikować
'announce'
zawiadomić
'notify'
potwierdzić
'confirm'
The acceptance of perfective verbs of communication in a non-
factive scenario
ideal A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 very bad
175 
 
11.2.4 Imperfective communication verbs in a non-factive scenario 
Figure 38: The acceptance of imperfective forms of verbs of communication in a non-factive 
scenario. 
 
Generally, imperfective verbs of communication are compatible with a non-factive 
environment, but as was discussed above, lexical properties and frequency might affect 
the acceptance in particular cases. 
The post-hoc analysis revealed that ‘confirm’ does not behave like other / typical 
communication verbs in Polish. It seems that it would fit into a group where the 
difference between the perfective and the imperfective is based on iterativity. The 
results further show that truth-entailment is restricted to perfective incremental theme 
verbs, which clearly proves the presence of parallels between the nominal and sentential 
arguments of these verbs with respect to quantization / veridicality. 
In the next section, I will show how to compose a proof.   
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
obwieszczać
'announce'
informować
'inform'
mówić 'say' komunikować
'announce'
zawiadamiać
'notify'
potwierdzać
'confirm'
The acceptance of imperfective verbs of communication in a non-
factive scenario
ideal A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 very bad
176 
 
 
  
177 
 
12 Incrementality revisited 
In the following, I will argue that proof has parts. I will draw parallels between ‘typical’ 
incremental theme verbs like ‘eat (a sandwich)’ or ‘build (a house)’ and clause-
embedding reveal-type predicates like ‘prove’ or ‘show’. I will refer to both as 
incremental theme verbs. Before composing a proof (a justification for assuming 
incrementality for reveal-type predicates), I will briefly discuss the process of argument 
creation in natural language. Finally, I will present a unified analysis of incremental 
theme verbs that take either a nominal or a propositional complement. 
12.1 Part structures of proof 
12.1.1 Background: Argument creation in natural language 
Toulmin (1958) and Toulmin (2003) among others investigate the characteristics of 
legal argumentation processes and propose a scheme for informal argumentation. 
Toulmin provides a non-formal basis for the assumption that a proposition is interpreted 
as true if there is a proof for it. He uses the following components for the justification 
procedure: a datum (D), a warrant (W) and a conclusion (C). In the argumentation 
process, a datum supports a conclusion. An addressee accepts a datum as a justification 
/ proof for the conclusion if there is a warrant that confirms a valid relation between a 
datum and a conclusion. Consider the following example. 
 
(380)  (i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
Anna is a U.S. citizen. 
She was born in California. 
If a person was born in California, she becomes a U.S. citizen. 
A person that was born in the U.S. becomes a citizen at birth. 
California is a state in the U.S. 
 
In (380), (ii) is a datum for the conclusion (i). Being born in California results in 
becoming a U.S. citizen. This is due to the warrant (iii); if a person is born in California, 
she automatically gets U.S. citizenship. A warrant can be supported by further rules (the 
so-called backing (B) in Toulmin’s terminology), cf. (iv). In (380), these rules are 
specified by law. An argument pattern for (380) is presented in (381). 
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(381)  D: Anna was born in California → C: So, presumably, Anna is a U.S. citizen. 
 
                                             Since 
 
                           W: A person born in California will 
                            most likely become a U.S. citizen 
 
                                      On account of 
 
                                 B: Specific legal rules 
 
Adapted from: Toulmin (2003: 97) 
 
Whereas a datum is made explicit, a warrant usually remains implicit because it is 
presupposed as known. In the case of legal argumentation, backing is based on specific 
legal rules (factual statements). A different situation is illustrated in (383); here, a 
warrant is supported by a rule that is a non-mandatory social norm followed by some 
(but not all) members of a society. For that reason, the addressee can refuse its validity. 
This is not possible in (380). 
 
(382)  (i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
{If you want to recognize him,} Henry will not wear a pink jacket. 
He is a boy. 
If a child is a boy, it does not wear a pink jacket. 
It is more common for girls to wear clothes that are pink than for 
boys. 
 
Since the incremental creation of a proof is based on evidence, it represents a sort of a 
legal investigation – the addressee cannot refuse a proof. In the following, I will show 
how to compose a proof in order to access its parts. I will concentrate on the part-
structure of proof, because it is crucial for veridicality-based differences in meaning 
between (im)perfective reveal-type predicates in Polish. Any single piece of evidence 
that supports a (preliminary) conclusion corresponds to a datum in Toulmin’s sense. 
12.1.2 Composing a proof 
In this section, I will discuss the internal structure of a proof, based on the meaning of 
(im)perfective reveal-type predicates in Polish. The main contrast between the two 
aspectual forms lies in implying different amount of evidence for the validity of a that-
sentence. The progress of the proving process depends on increasing / strengthening the 
evidence, i.e. on the incremental creation of evidence. The gradual character of evidence 
creation justifies calling reveal-type predicates incremental theme verbs and treating 
them analogously to incremental theme verbs that combine with nouns or nominal 
arguments denoting entities. In the latter case, the subparts of the object correspond to 
the subparts of a verbal event. In the former case, single pieces of evidence are linked to 
particular stages of the proving process. 
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To begin with, I will clarify the notions of evidence and proof as well as the relationship 
between them. We can see proofs as sequences of single pieces of evidence. If evidence 
is sufficient in order to acknowledge a proposition (which in our case is expressed by 
the that-clause) as true, it is established as a proof. Partial evidence incrementally 
creates a proof, exactly as the single parts of a house incrementally create a house. 
Verbs that imply the existence of evidence / partial evidence are for instance ‘prove’, 
‘reveal’, ‘show’ (reveal-type predicates in this dissertation). Proof is the sufficient 
evidence that is available at the time of evaluation. Linking the validity of a proof to the 
evaluation time is necessary in order to allow for the insertion of a new piece of 
evidence into the proof-chain. This step is justified by trial scenarios where a person is 
proven guilty and goes to jail, but is found innocent after years due to the appearance of 
a new piece of evidence. In these cases, different pieces of evidence yield different 
proofs, depending on the time of evaluation. 
As was mentioned above, proof is an essential component of meaning of reveal-type 
predicates. A that-sentence embedded under a reveal-type verb denotes a proposition. 
This proposition is true if there is a proof for it. For instance, to prove that Anna was in 
Italy means to find a chain / sum of pieces of evidence that yield a proof for Anna’s stay 
in Italy. A proof is only present with the perfective, giving rise to its veridical 
interpretation. In other words, the perfective, in contrast to the imperfective, implies the 
existence of a proof (sufficient evidence) for the proposition expressed by the that-
clause. 
Consider scenario (383) and its illustration in (384). The presence of a proof in the case 
of the perfective blocks the accessibility of single pieces of evidence, exactly as a 
complete (built) house / an eaten apple do not allow for accessing parts of the objects. 
As a result, assertion A automatically reveals conclusion C. 
(383)  A: Jan proved.PFV that Anna was in Italy. 
 a: (evidence such that) Anna booked a flight to Italy. 
 b: (evidence such that) Anna was seen in Rome. 
 C: Anna was in Italy. 
 
(384)   
 
 
A: Jan proved.PFV that (Anna(inItaly)) 
a: 
Anna booked a 
flight to Italy. 
C: Anna(inItaly) 
bn52: 
Anna was seen in 
Rome. 
C: Anna(inItaly) 
   C: Anna(inItaly)53 
In (384), above the line, single pieces of evidence a and b individually suggest C 
(marked as ~ ). Both a and b hold for the assertion A. Under the line, C is the general 
conclusion for A; b is the final piece of evidence that converts evidence into a proof. 
 
52 I use n to indicate that the derivation is closed, i.e. that the crucial piece of evidence has been 
delivered. 
53 The form of expression is based on Schroeder-Heister (2018: 20). 
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The length of a proof-chain depends on the dynamics of the proving process and the 
premises available. 
In contrast, since the proving process is still ongoing with the imperfective, the assertion 
itself does not reveal the conclusion. We can only say what single pieces of evidence 
suggest – we do not have a proof yet. In other words, the evidence that is available at 
the evaluation time is not sufficient to establish a proof. Importantly, the quality of 
single pieces of evidence does not change in the course of the derivation. Only a new 
piece of evidence could bring a potential counterexample (something that reveals L and 
not C). It needs to be pointed out that the proof-chain presented here only contains 
essential evidence (non-eliminable components in a chain). Examples (385) and (386) 
demonstrate the internal structure of the imperfective ‘prove’. 
 
(385)  A: Jan proved.IPFV that Anna was in Italy. 
 a: (evidence such that) Anna booked a flight to Italy. 
 b: (evidence such that) Anna got an Italian SIM-card. 
 … 
 
(386)   
 
 
A: Jan proved.IPFV that (Anna(inItaly)) 
a: 
Anna booked a 
flight to Italy. 
C: 
Anna(inItaly) 
b: 
Anna got an 
Italian SIM-card. 
C: 
Anna(inItaly) 
c: 
 
 
? 
 
Since single pieces of evidence are not sufficient to establish a proof in the case of the 
imperfective, the assertion itself does not entail the conclusion in (386); one cannot say 
more than ‘a is evidence for C and b is evidence for C’. The imperfective leaves the 
conclusion open. 
To sum up, only perfective clause-embedding reveal-type predicates in Polish imply the 
existence of a proof, i.e. sufficient evidence for the validity of an embedded proposition. 
Consider the internal structure of the perfective (387), single steps in a proof-chain 
(388), omitting single steps (389) and elimination of single steps (390) that hold for the 
perfective. 
 
(387)    
C 
C 
 
← 
← 
 
a (partial evidence a) 
b2/n (partial / crucial evidence b) 
 EVIDENCE∈PROOF〚PROOF〛 
 
(388)   a 
〜
C 
 b 
〜
C 
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(389)   
A 
  a 
  C 
… 
… 
  bn 
  C 
   C  
 
(390)  A 
 C 
 
The imperfective, defined as in (391), only allows for establishing conclusions that 
might be drawn from single steps in a proof-chain (392). As was mentioned above, 
there could be a new piece of evidence c that does not lead to C, but to something else. 
 
(391)   C 
C 
? 
← 
← 
… 
a (partial evidence a) 
b (partial evidence b) 
c (partial evidence c) 
 EVIDENCE∉PROOF〚EVIDENCE〛 
  
 
(392)   a 
〜 
C 
 b 
〜 
C 
 c 
〜 
C 
… 
 
… 
△ 
〜 
? 
In the next section, I will propose a unified analysis for incremental theme verbs that 
combine with both nouns and clauses.  
The question arises whether there is any part structure in the case of the communication 
and the presupposition group. With the former, one could imagine two levels of 
partition: first, the mapping between what has been said and a particular time span that 
relates to the uttered part of information (i.e. a linearized order of the production of 
single pieces of an utterance with prosodic boundaries between these pieces) and 
second, speech-act-based partition that refers to the (non-)realization of all parts of the 
speech-act. Crucially, in both cases, it is not the content of an embedded proposition 
itself that has parts. With presupposition verbs, assuming partition seems more 
problematic, since the perfective and the imperfective tend to be achievements. One 
could think of a part structure for przeczuwać.IPFV – przeczuć.PFV and wyczuwać.IPFV – 
wyczuć.PFV ‘sense’, where a gradual process of collecting hints leads to sensing 
something right. However, we have seen that the imperfective variants can have a 
factive interpretation too, which means that the perfective does not necessarily build on 
the meaning of the imperfective. From that it follows that a systematic content-based 
partition can only be stated for reveal-type predicates. 
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12.2 My unified aspect-driven analysis of Polish incremental theme verbs that 
take both nominal and propositional complements 
The starting point for my analysis builds the core meaning of (im)perfective incremental 
theme verbs like (prze)czytać ‘read’ or (z)budować ‘build’ in combination with their 
incremental themes książka ‘book’ or dom ‘house’. Let us assume the part structure for 
objects and events as shown in (393). 
 
(393)   
x represents a house that could be built (but does not exist yet), and x’ stands for some 
already created parts of that house. According to (393), there is a part of the house x’ at 
the evaluation time i. The existence of an object at the evaluation time i* would imply 
the existence of a house. Parts of the object are mapped to parts of building events and 
vice versa. 
I will introduce the REAL-operator. In its scope, it contains (parts of) objects / events that 
are realized (built, read, eaten, proven, etc.) at the time of evaluation. Importantly, 
realization need not mean creation. It refers to any kind of affectedness of the object by 
the verbal process. Consider (394) – the representation of the situation described in 
(393). (394) says that a partial building event e’ was realized at the evaluation time i. It 
captures the meaning of the English sentence He was building a house (i), but he did not 
finish yet (i*) and its Polish equivalent Jan budował.IPFV dom (i), ale jeszcze nie 
skończył (i*). 
 
(394)  λe’λe[build(e) ∧ e’⊑e ∧ REAL(i)(e’)]54 
 
Mapping to objects and mapping to events ensure that the existence of partial events 
implies the existence of partial objects and vice versa. Since the analysis I propose 
 
54 The question arises whether the notion of saying that a partial event is real requires some form 
of branching time structure. In my opinion, branching time structure is not necessary in order to 
capture the basic semantics of (im)perfective incremental theme verbs. Imperfective incremental 
theme verbs imply the realization of partial events, whereas their perfective counterparts block 
partition / imply the realization of complete events. Branching time structure makes it possible 
to specify partition more precisely, for instance in cases like: Yesterday he built one part of the 
house, and today the other part, but the entire house is still not ready, he is still building it. This 
could be a possible extension of my analysis. 
the house: x 
  e'    i          i* 
 
x'   
build a house: e 
t 
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applies to incremental theme verbs, mapping to objects and mapping to events are 
implicit rules that govern the interpretation of the formulas. 
In line with Neo-Davidsonian event semantics (Castañeda 1967, Carlson 1984, Parsons 
1990, Krifka 1992, Champollion 2016 among others), I am only introducing variables 
for events; arguments of the verb (both nominal and propositional) are represented as 
relations to events (here via the PAT-relation). Neo-Davidsonian semantics treats all 
types of arguments alike, which makes it a perfect approach for analyzing incremental 
theme verbs that take both nominal and propositional complements. 
Starting with (im)perfective incremental theme verbs that take nominal complements, 
the perfective implies the realization of a complete event e in the world of evaluation 
w0, consider (395) for ‘read.PFV a book’. (395) is to be read as follows: Lambda e, e is 
an event of reading that is completely realized in w0 and a book is a patient of e in w0. 
Since the complete event is realized in the case of the perfective, and since a patient 
argument is linked to the complete event, the entire patient is necessarily realized too. 
Furthermore, the lack of accessibility of partial events implies the lack of accessibility 
of partial objects (here single parts of the book). 
 
(395)  in w0: 
λe[przeczytać(w0)55(e) ∧ REAL(w0)(e) ∧ PAT(w0)(e,książka)] 
 
with existential closure: 
∃e[przeczytać(w0)(e) ∧ REAL(w0)(e) ∧ PAT(w0)(e,książka)] 
 
(396) shows the single steps in the derivation. Step (5) is the final result before the 
application of the existential closure. The REAL-condition is introduced by aspectual 
operators that also require its boundedness to the world of evaluation. As was 
mentioned before, the perfective enforces the realization of a complete event (step 3). 
The derivation itself (from (1) to (5)) is simple and corresponds to the standard 
assumptions on aspectual composition: Both the perfective and the imperfective take a 
VP as an argument by building the aspect phrase (step 4). Aspectual composition does 
not show the single steps in the proof chain, which is why we have to distinguish 
between aspectual composition and composing a proof. 
 
(396)  AspP 
 
AspPFV 
VP 
V 
(5)= λe[przeczytać(w0)(e) ∧ REAL(w0)(e) ∧ PAT(w0)(e,książka)] 
(4)= λPλe[P(w0)(e) ∧ REAL(w0)(e)](λe[przeczytać(e) ∧ PAT(e,książka)]) 
(3)= λPλe[P(w0)(e) ∧ REAL(w0)(e)] 
(2)= λe[przeczytać(e) ∧ PAT(e,książka)] 
(1)= λPλe[P(e)](przeczytać) 
 
In contrast, the imperfective only implies the realization of some partial event(s) e’ in 
w0. (397) is to be read as follows: Lambda e’, lambda e, e is a reading event56 that has a 
 
55 I am treating w0 as a free variable. 
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partial event e’ that is realized in w0 and a book is a patient of e in w0. As was 
mentioned above, if there is a partial event, there needs to be a corresponding partial 
object too. Since the patient argument is in the relation to a complete event, and since 
only parts of that event are realized at the evaluation time, there have to be parts of the 
object that are affected by the realized parts of the event. Compare (397) and (398) for 
‘read.IPFV a book’. The realized parts of the object are the parts of the book that are 
read.57 
 
(397)  in w0: 
λe'λe[czytać(w0)(e) ∧ e'⊑e ∧ REAL(w0)(e’) ∧ PAT(w0)(e,książka)] 
 
with existential closure: 
∃e’∃e[czytać(w0)(e) ∧ e'⊑e ∧ REAL(w0)(e’) ∧ PAT(w0)(e,książka)] 
 
The only difference in the derivation compared to the perfective is the introduction of 
the realization of partial events and its boundedness to the world of evaluation (step (3) 
in (398)). 
 
(398)  AspP 
 
AspIPFV 
VP 
V 
(5)= λe'λe[czytać(w0)(e) ∧ e'⊑e ∧ REAL(w0)(e’) ∧ PAT(w0)(e,książka)] 
(4)= λPλe’λe[P(w0)(e) ∧ e'⊑e ∧ REAL(w0)(e’)](λe[czytać(e) ∧ PAT(e,książka)]) 
(3)= λPλe’λe[P(e) ∧ e'⊑e ∧ REAL(w0)(e’)]58 
(2)= λe[czytać(e) ∧ PAT(e,książka)] 
(1)= λPλe[P(e)](czytać) 
 
 
56 Even if an event is still ongoing with the imperfective, I assume that there is an (abstract) 
proving-ideal that implies a complete realization of that event, i.e. the existence of a proof for an 
embedded proposition. This proving-ideal is the basis for defining realized parts of events 
denoted by imperfective reveal-type predicates. 
57 Importantly, the PAT-restriction is not meant to enforce the existence of a direct object in the 
world of evaluation, which is crucial for gradual effected patients, as in: ‘write a book’ or ‘build 
a house’. In the case of the imperfective variants, the physical existence only applies to parts of 
an object. The PAT-condition says that an incremental event needs an incremental theme in 
order to be instantiated. The REAL-condition specifies to what extent an incremental event has 
been realized in the world of evaluation, and lexical properties of the VP determine whether the 
existence of an object depends on the existence of an event or not. For example, in the case of 
‘write a book’, PAT says that ‘a book’ – to be understood as a particular object – enables the 
realization of a writing-event and contributes to its natural culmination (an event of writing 
cannot take place without an object that is being written). PAT further refers to an ideal 
development of an event; in the above-mentioned example, the completion of the process of 
writing implies the existence of a book. 
58 The fact that realization of subevents needs to be assumed for imperfective incremental theme 
verbs results from the unacceptability of sentences like #Czytał.IPFV książkę, ale nawet nie 
zaczął ‘He was reading a book, but he did not even start {reading it}.’ / #Udowadniał.IPFV, że 
Iza nie pracuje należycie, ale nawet się do tego nie zabrał ‘He was proving that Iza is not 
working appropriately, but he did not even get down to it.’ 
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The advantage of this analysis is that it does not define how homomorphism from 
objects to events is to be realized. In other words, it does not enforce the object to be 
divided into parts. It only enforces a relation between parts of events and parts of 
objects, but the partition can be stated on a more abstract / indirect level as proposed in 
the standard analyses for incremental themes. This makes it possible to include 
propositional complements in the analysis. 
As was mentioned above, the incremental character of reveal-type predicates is based 
on the composing of a proof. The proof consists of single pieces of evidence / proof 
steps. Composing a proof can be compared to the creation of a new object. For example, 
we can build a bed from parts bought at Ikea or collected in a forest. Both options can 
result in the creation of a bed – there are many possible ways of constructing x. 
Similarly, there are many possible ways of proving p. As was said above, imperfective 
reveal-type predicates imply the existence of some pieces of evidence that are not 
sufficient to establish a proof. In contrast, sufficient amounts of evidence are turned into 
a proof in the case of the perfective counterparts. More precisely, the latter are veridical, 
because they imply the existence of a proof for the proposition expressed by the 
subordinate clause. 
Imagine a proof-chain as shown in (399). 
 
(399)   
 
 
In contrast to a mathematical proof (Schroeder-Heister 1991, Martin-Löf 1998, 
Schroeder-Heister 2006 among others), the truth of a proposition embedded under a 
reveal-type predicate does not depend on single steps in a proof-chain, nor do the single 
pieces of evidence depend on each other (for instance, booking flights to Italy does not 
depend on buying an Italian SIM-card). Single pieces of evidence are, however, 
summed in order to make progress in a proof-chain; having two pieces of evidence 
towards the same conclusion makes evidence stronger that having only one piece of 
evidence. 
Now I will propose semantic representations for clause-embedding reveal-type 
predicates. Consider (400) and (401) for the perfective variant of ‘prove.PFV that p’, and 
(402) and (403) for its imperfective counterpart. (400) and (402) are final results of the 
derivation, (401) and (403) show single steps. (400) is to be interpreted as follows: 
evidence1 
evidence2 
evidence1+2 
evidence3 
proof 
t 
s 
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Lambda e, e is an event of proving that is realized in w0 and there is a propositional 
argument p (a patient) of e in w0.
59 
 
(400)  in w0: 
λe[udowodnić(w0)(e) ∧ REAL(w0)(e) ∧ PAT(w0)(e,p60)] 
 
with existential closure: 
∃e[udowodnić(w0)(e) ∧ REAL(w0)(e) ∧ PAT(w0)(e,p)]61 
 
Single steps of a derivation do not differ from the previous analyses. The only 
refinement is the nature of the complement. 
 
(401)  AspP 
 
AspPFV 
VP 
V 
(5)= λe[udowodnić(w0)(e) ∧ REAL(w0)(e) ∧ PAT(w0)(e,p)] 
(4)= λPλe[P(w0)(e) ∧ REAL(w0)(e)](λe[udowodnić(e) ∧ PAT(e,p)]) 
(3)= λPλe[P(w0)(e) ∧ REAL(w0)(e)] 
(2)= λe[udowodnić(e) ∧ PAT(e,p)] 
(1)= λPλe[P(e)](udowodnić) 
 
A complete realization of a proving event in the case of the perfective requires a 
complete realization of the patient argument, since a patient argument is an argument of 
a complete event. In the case of reveal-type predicates, this means the reveal of a truth-
conditional object; there is a proof for the validity of an embedded proposition. 
In contrast, only partial events of proving are realized in the case of the imperfective 
(only some pieces of evidence are available, but there is no proof). (402) is to be 
interpreted as follows: Lambda e’, lambda e, e is an event of proving that has a partial 
 
59 According to my analysis, that-clauses denote propositions. However, clausal complements 
were lately shown to behave as modifiers (properties of individuals with a propositional 
content), cf. Moulton (2009) for English among others. Assuming that a CP is a modifier would 
make it possible to maintain the same type of a direct object argument for all kinds of 
incremental relations. Despite this technical advantage, in Polish, it seems more reasonable to 
keep the propositional status of CPs that are object complements of reveal-type predicates. First, 
testing for ‘nouniness’ of a CP is much more easy / transparent in English than in Polish. In 
English, only modifiers can bleed Condition C – stating that R-expressions must be free, cf. 
Chomsky (1993) – which is why CP-fronting can be used as a diagnostic for establishing the 
category of a clausal expression. In Polish, however, all CPs can be fronted, regardless of 
whether they are arguments or not. Second, in my proposal, a that-clause that receives a 
propositional status reveals a truth-conditional object, i.e. it carries a particular truth-value if 
embedded by the perfective matrix verb. Since I treat veridicality as a counterpart to total 
affectedness, the truth-value-based meaning of a that-sentence seems to be its most natural 
representation. Third, in line with Moulton (2009), I analyze a subject argument of ‘prove’ (the 
proof itself) as nouny: single pieces of evidence are individuals with propositional contents 
(evidence 1 such that…, evidence 2 such that etc.). The formal implementation of this idea will 
be the subject of future research. 
60 p stands for ‘propositional complement’. 
61 If the complete event exists in a world of evaluation, this means that the truth-conditional 
object is completely revealed. 
188 
 
event e’ that is realized in w0 and there is a propositional patient argument p of e in w0. 
Since a patient argument is an argument of an entire event, it cannot be completely 
revealed; only those parts of the patient that correspond to the realized parts of the 
proving event are realized too. This means that there is a 1:1-mapping between single 
subevents of proving and single pieces of evidence that are results of these subevents. 
 
(402)  in w0: 
λe'λe[udowadniać(wo)(e) ∧ e'⊑e ∧ REAL(w0)(e’) ∧ PAT(W0)(e,p)] 
 
with existential closure: 
∃e’∃e[udowadniać(wo)(e) ∧ e'⊑e ∧ REAL(w0)(e’) ∧ PAT(W0)(e,p)] 
 
(403) is equivalent to the derivation of imperfective incremental theme verbs that take 
nominal complements. The only difference, again, is the nature of the patient argument. 
 
(403)  AspP 
 
AspIPFV 
VP 
V 
(5)= λe'λe[udowadniać(wo)(e) ∧ e'⊑e ∧ REAL(w0)(e’) ∧ PAT(W0)(e,p)] 
(4)= λPλe’λe[P(w0)(e) ∧ e'⊑e ∧ REAL(w0)(e’)](λe[udowadniać(e) ∧ PAT(e,p)]) 
(3)= λPλe’λe[P(e) ∧ e'⊑e ∧ REAL(w0)(e’)] 
(2)= λe[udowadniać(e) ∧ PAT(e,p)] 
(1)= λPλe[P(e)](udowadniać) 
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13 Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I investigated a systematic interaction between the perfective aspect 
of clause-embedding predicates in Polish and a truth-related meaning of these 
predicates, i.e. their factive, veridical or implicature-based interpretations. I have shown 
that, regardless of the semantic class a matrix clause-embedding verb belongs to, a that-
sentence tends to be interpreted as true if it is embedded by the perfective verb, but not 
if it is embedded by its imperfective counterpart. More precisely, all utterances X 
guessed.PFV / proved.PFV / said.PFV that Y is a con man systematically suggest that Y is 
a con man. The imperfective alternatives do not influence/determine the truth-value of 
an embedded proposition, i.e. from the semantic point of view, it is left open whether a 
that-sentence is true or not. My objects of investigation were (im)perfective minimal 
pairs, i.e. sentences that only differ in the aspectual marking on the main verb. 
I investigated three groups of verbs: the presupposition, the entailment and the 
implicature group. The members of each group differ with respect to the stability of the 
truth-inference they trigger. The ‘strongest’ truth-inference can be observed within the 
presupposition group. Here, a that-sentence holds true not only in the affirmative 
environment, but also under negation (X did not guess.PFV / sense.PFV / predict.PFV that 
Y is a con man → Y is a con man) and in question constructions (Did X guess.PFV / 
sense.PFV / predict.PFV that Y is a con man? → Y is a con man). I analyzed the 
following lexemes: zgadnąć.PFV – zgadywać.IPFV ‘guess’, przeczuć.PFV – 
przeczuwać.IPFV ‘sense’, wyczuć.PFV – wyczuwać.IPFV ‘sense’, rozgryźć.PFV – 
rozgryzać.IPFV ‘work out’ and przewidzieć.PFV – przewidywać.IPFV ‘predict’. According 
to the common terminology, I referred to the perfective variants as factive. Within the 
entailment group, a that-sentence holds true in the affirmative environment, but not 
under matrix verb negation or in question constructions. I investigated the following 
aspectual pairs: udowodnić.PFV – udowadniać.IPFV ‘prove’, dowieść.PFV – 
dowodzić.IPFV ‘prove’, pokazać.PFV – pokazywać.IPFV ‘show’, wykazać.PFV – 
wykazywać.IPFV ‘reveal’ and potwierdzić.PFV – potwierdzać.IPFV ‘confirm’. Based on 
the above-described inference pattern, I called the perfective counterparts veridical. 
Due to the fact that ‘confirm’ behaved differently than other verbs from the entailment 
group, I did not treat its perfective variant as an entailment verb in the end. Because all 
other members of this group share their lexical-semantic features, I called them reveal-
type predicates. The ‘weakest’ inference – truth-implicature – was attested for the 
communication verbs. Here, the inference is non-systematic and pragmatic in nature, 
which is why it did not build the core part of my thesis. I examined the following 
communication verbs: obwieścić.PFV – obwieszczać.IPFV ‘announce’, 
poinformować.PFV – informować.IPFV ‘inform’, powiedzieć.PFV – mówić.IPFV ‘say’, 
zakomunikować.PFV – komunikować.IPFV ‘announce’ and zawiadomić.PFV – 
zawiadamiać.IPFV ‘notify’. 
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In order to verify the influence of aspect on the truth-oriented interpretation of clausal 
complements, I conducted an acceptability judgement study with 51 Polish native 
speakers. Participants were instructed to mark the acceptability of (im)perfective 
minimal pairs in (non-)factive scenarios. In factive scenarios, the state of affairs 
described by a particular aspectual pair matched a situation that was presented as a fact 
(information that was said to be taken for granted). In non-factive scenarios, the state of 
affairs described by the aspectual alternatives matched a situation that did not 
correspond to a ‘fact’, i.e. that did not hold. The perfective was expected to score higher 
in factive contexts and lower in non-factive ones. The opposite was supposed to hold for 
the imperfective. It further seemed reasonable that the strength of the truth-inference 
would determine the extent to which participants prefer the perfective and reject the 
imperfective in factive environments, and prefer the imperfective and reject the 
perfective in non-factive contexts. 
The results have shown that there is a general tendency for the perfective aspect to 
trigger the truth-related meaning of a propositional complement. However, the most 
significant difference between (im)perfective forms in (non-)factive scenarios was 
found within the entailment group. Here, the perfective received the highest acceptance 
rates in the factive context and was clearly rejected in the non-factive scenario. In 
contrast, the imperfective received the highest acceptance rates in the non-factive 
environment and tended to be rejected in the factive setting. This means that it is not the 
strength of the inference itself (its resistance against negation or changing the sentence 
type) which determines the size of the effect; otherwise the most significant result 
would have arisen within the presupposition group. 
I have shown that veridicality of perfective and neutrality of imperfective reveal-type 
predicates result from their event-structural properties, i.e. from the incremental 
character of the processes denoted by these predicates. Imperfective reveal-type 
predicates relate to ongoing events of proving, showing or revealing, i.e. they imply the 
existence of partial (non-maximal) evidence for an embedded proposition. Because the 
evidence is not sufficient in order to establish the truth-value of a that-sentence, an 
imperfective verb does not receive a veridical interpretation. In contrast, perfective 
reveal-type predicates imply the presence of maximal evidence for a clausal 
complement. The perfective semantically builds upon the imperfective by closing the 
incremental processes of proving, showing or revealing. This closure – the availability 
of maximal evidence – translates to the presence of a proof for a that-sentence. As soon 
as there is a proof, a that-sentence holds. As a result, a perfective clause-embedding 
reveal-type predicate receives its veridical meaning. In brief, incrementality of reveal-
type predicates is based on the incremental creation of proof; there is a 1:1-mapping 
between subevents of proving and single pieces of evidence that were established during 
these subevents. 
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Following the above observations, I showed that there are similarities between 
incremental theme verbs that take nominal (like in ‘build.(I)PFV a house’) and 
incremental theme verbs that take clausal complements. I proposed to treat veridicality 
as a counterpart to total-affectedness of a nominal incremental theme that is an 
argument of a perfective incremental theme verb. More precisely, I compared a gradual 
creation of a proof to a gradual creation of an object. I further developed a unified 
analysis of different types of incremental relations, where incrementality is only defined 
on the level of events. The advantage of this analysis is that it does not require an object 
argument to be divided into parts, which was previously proposed for nominal 
incremental themes. Importantly, in the case of clause-embedding reveal-type 
predicates, an object argument – a that-clause – cannot be divided into parts the way a 
nominal object can be. This is because it is not a that-clause that has parts, but a proof 
for it. Restricting incrementality to the level of events makes it possible to include 
propositional arguments in the analysis. 
My future research plans include the creation of a database of cross-linguistic 
information about (non-)veridicality of (im)perfective reveal-type predicates. 
Furthermore, I am interested in incorporating morphological formation patterns into my 
analysis. I am also planning acceptability judgement studies on the relationship between 
(im)perfectivity and exhaustivity in Polish. In general, it seems that the answers to wh-
questions are less accessible for aspect than embedded propositions. It is further worth 
investigating whether perfective clause-embedding verbs that were not analyzed in my 
dissertation – for instance the so-called manner of speech verbs like wyszeptać.PFV 
‘whisper’, wykrzyczeć.PFV ‘shout’, wyśpiewać.PFV ‘sing’, wybełkotać.PFV ‘mumble’ or 
wymamrotać.PFV ‘mutter’ – go along with any kind of truthfulness. 
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Abbreviations 
1 first person 
2 second person 
3 third person 
a.c. 
ACC 
author’s comment (my comment) 
accusative 
AG agent 
ATEL atelic 
CL clitic (pronoun) 
COMP complementizer 
DAT dative 
DEM demonstrative 
ERG ergative 
EXP experiencer 
FUT future 
GEN genitive 
INDEF indefinite 
INS instrumental 
IPFV imperfective 
M masculine 
MN basic syntactic category of numerals 
N noun 
NEG negation 
NP noun phrase 
PAR partitive 
PAT patient 
PFV perfective 
PL plural (number) 
PRS present 
PST past 
QVE quantificational variability effect 
REFL reflexive 
SG singular (number) 
STI stimulus 
SUK gradual (successive) patient 
TEL telic 
V verb 
VP verbal phrase 
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Single test items 
There are five groups of contexts, depending on the semantics of the matrix verb. Each 
name appears only once in the experiment. Contrasting verb forms were not extra 
highlighted in the questionnaire; alternatives (a) and (b) were marked in bold. 
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Presupposition verbs (1–5) 
 
Context A 
 
(Verb pair) 1. 
 
Factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Marek ukradł nasz służbowy 
komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that it was Marek who stole our company computer. 
Księgowa Majewska i programista Adamczyk niezależnie od siebie wytypowali 
sprawców. 
Tylko programista Adamczyk wskazał właściwą osobę – 
Accountant Majewska and programmer Adamczyk independently of each other bet on who the thief was. 
Only programmer Adamczyk picked out the right person – 
 
(a) zgadł, że Marek jest winny. He guessed.PFV that Marek was guilty. 
idealnie ideal O O O O O O O bardzo źle very bad 
(b) zgadywał, że Marek jest winny. He guessed.IPFV that Marek was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
 
Non-factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Krzysztof ukradł nasz 
służbowy komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that it was Krzysztof who stole our company 
computer. 
W czasie trwania śledztwa programista Król wytypował Izę, a księgowa Zabłocka 
wytypowała Krzysztofa. 
Programista Król był wyraźnie rozczarowany – 
During the investigation programmer Król picked out Iza, and accountant Zabłocka Krzysztof. 
Programmer Król was clearly disappointed – 
 
(a) zgadywał, że Iza jest winna. He guessed.IPFV that Iza was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) zgadł, że Iza jest winna. He guessed.PFV that Iza was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle   
207 
 
2. 
 
Factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Grzegorz ukradł nasz 
służbowy komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that it was Grzegorz who stole our company 
computer. 
Księgowa Witkowska i programista Pawlak niezależnie od siebie wytypowali 
sprawców. 
Tylko programista Pawlak wskazał właściwą osobę – 
Accountant Witkowska and programmer Pawlak independently of each other bet on who the thief was. 
Only programmer Pawlak picked out the right person – 
 
(a) przeczuł, że Grzegorz jest winny. He sensed.PFV that Grzegorz was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) przeczuwał, że Grzegorz jest winny. He sensed.IPFV that Grzegorz was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
 
Non-factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Dariusz ukradł nasz 
służbowy komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that it was Dariusz who stole our company 
computer. 
W czasie trwania śledztwa programista Nowakowski wytypował Halinę, a księgowa 
Szewczyk wytypowała Dariusza. 
Programista Nowakowski był wyraźnie rozczarowany – 
During the investigation programmer Nowakowski picked out Halina, and accountant Szewczyk Dariusz. 
Programmer Nowakowski was clearly disappointed – 
 
(a) przeczuwał, że Halina jest winna. He sensed.IPFV that Halina was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) przeczuł, że Halina jest winna. He sensed.PFV that Halina was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
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3. 
 
Factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Ireneusz ukradł nasz 
służbowy komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that it was Ireneusz who stole our company 
computer. 
Księgowa Baranowska i programista Michalak niezależnie od siebie wytypowali 
sprawców. 
Tylko księgowa Baranowska wskazała właściwą osobę – 
Accountant Baranowska and programmer Michalak independently of each other bet on who the thief was. 
Only accountant Baranowska picked out the right person – 
 
(a) wyczuła, że Ireneusz jest winny. She sensed.PFV that Ireneusz was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) wyczuwała, że Ireneusz jest winny. She sensed.IPFV that Ireneusz was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
 
Non-factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Janina ukradła nasz 
służbowy komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that it was Janina who stole our company computer. 
W czasie trwania śledztwa programista Bąk wytypował Janinę, a księgowa Zawadzka 
wytypowała Zbigniewa. 
Księgowa Zawadzka była wyraźnie rozczarowana – 
During the investigation programmer Bąk picked out Janina, and accountant Zawadzka Zbigniew. 
Accountant Zawadzka was clearly disappointed – 
 
(a) wyczuwała, że Zbigniew jest winny. She sensed.IPFV that Zbigniew was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) wyczuła, że Zbigniew jest winny. She sensed.PFV that Zbigniew was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
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4. 
 
Factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Feliks ukradł nasz służbowy 
komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that it was Feliks who stole our company computer. 
Księgowa Chmielewska i programista Jasiński niezależnie od siebie wytypowali 
sprawców. 
Tylko księgowa Chmielewska wskazała właściwą osobę – 
Accountant Chmielewska and programmer Jasiński independently of each other bet on who the thief was. 
Only accountant Chmielewska picked out the right person – 
 
(a) rozgryzła, że Feliks jest winny. She worked out/cracked.PFV that Feliks was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) rozgryzała, że Feliks jest winny. She worked out/ cracked.IPFV that Feliks was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
 
Non-factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Malwina ukradła nasz 
służbowy komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that it was Malwina who stole our company 
computer. 
 
W czasie trwania śledztwa programista Wilk wytypował Malwinę, a księgowa Baj 
wytypowała Marcela. 
Księgowa Baj była wyraźnie rozczarowana – 
During the investigation programmer Wilk picked out Malwina, and accountant Baj Marcel. 
Accountant Baj was clearly disappointed – 
(b) rozgryzała, że Marcel jest winny. She worked out/cracked.IPFV that Marcel was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(a) rozgryzła, że Marcel jest winny. She worked out/cracked.PFV that Marcel was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
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Context B 
 
5. 
 
Factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Wczoraj okazało się, że to Jerzy zabił panią 
sprzątaczkę. 
Consider what follows a fact: Yesterday it became clear that it was Jerzy who killed our cleaning lady. 
Wcześniej dyrektor Pawłowski czuł, że Jerzy kogoś zabije, a grafik Wieczorek, że 
Tomasz. 
Tylko dyrektor Pawłowski wskazał właściwą osobę – 
Earlier, director Pawłowski was sensing that Jerzy might kill someone, and graphic designer Wieczorek 
was sensing that Tomasz might do so. 
Only director Pawłowski picked out the right person – 
 
(a) przewidział, że Jerzy jest mordercą. He predicted.PFV that Jerzy is a murderer. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) przewidywał, że Jerzy jest mordercą. He predicted.IPFV that Jerzy is a murderer. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
 
Non-factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Wczoraj okazało się, że to Bartosz zabił panią 
sprzątaczkę. 
Consider what follows a fact: Yesterday it became clear that it was Bartosz who killed our cleaning lady. 
Wcześniej grafik Jaworski czuł, że Bartosz kogoś zabije, a dyrektor Dudek, że Jacek. 
Dyrektor Dudek nie miał racji – 
Earlier, graphic designer Jaworski was sensing that Bartosz might kill someone, and director Dudek was 
sensing that Jacek might do so. 
Director Dudek was wrong – 
 
(a) przewidywał, że Jacek jest mordercą. He predicted.IPFV that Jacek is a murderer. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) przewidział, że Jacek jest mordercą. He predicted.PFV that Jacek is a murderer. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
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Entailment verbs (6–10) 
 
Context C (same for 6–9) 
 
6. 
 
Factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Alicja ukradła nasz służbowy 
komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that it was Alicja who stole our company computer. 
Komisarz Jankowski oraz komisarz Nowak niezależnie od siebie prowadzili śledztwo w 
tej sprawie. 
Komisarz Nowak jako jedyny w sposób niepodważalny udokumentował winę Alicji – 
Commissioner Jankowski and commissioner Nowak investigated the case independently of each other. 
Only commissioner Nowak irrefutably documented that Alicja was to blame – 
 
(a) udowodnił, że to jej sprawka. {He} proved.PFV that she was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) udowadniał, że to jej sprawka. {He} proved.IPFV that she was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
 
Non-factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Fryderyk ukradł nasz 
służbowy komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that it was Fryderyk who stole our company 
computer. 
W czasie dochodzenia komisarz Malinowski wskazywał na Józefa, a komisarz Stępień 
na Fryderyka. 
Komisarz Malinowski z trudem przyjął swoją porażkę – 
During the investigation commissioner Malinowski suspected Józef, and commissioner Stępień – 
Fryderyk. 
Commissioner Malinowski could hardly accept that he was wrong – 
 
(a) udowadniał, że Józef jest winny. {He} proved.IPFV that Józef was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(a) udowodnił, że Józef jest winny. {He} proved.PFV that Józef was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle  
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7. 
 
Factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Aldona ukradła nasz 
służbowy komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that it was Aldona who stole our company computer. 
Komisarz Krupa oraz komisarz Przybylski niezależnie od siebie prowadzili śledztwo w 
tej sprawie. 
Komisarz Przybylski jako jedyny w sposób niepodważalny udokumentował winę 
Aldony – 
Commissioner Krupa and commissioner Przybylski investigated the case independently of each other. 
Only commissioner Przybylski irrefutably documented that Alicja was to blame – 
 
(a) dowiódł, że to jej sprawka. {He} proved.PFV that she was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) dowodził, że to jej sprawka. {He} proved.IPFV that she was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
 
Non-factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Alojzy ukradł nasz służbowy 
komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that it was Alojzy who stole our company computer. 
W czasie dochodzenia komisarz Kania wskazywał na Ernesta, a komisarz Chojnacki na 
Alojzego. 
Komisarz Kania z trudem przyjął swoją porażkę – 
During the investigation commissioner Kania suspected Ernest, and commissioner Chojnacki – Alojzy. 
Commissioner Kania could hardly accept that he was wrong – 
 
(a) dowodził, że Ernest jest winny. {He} proved.IPFV that Ernest was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(a) dowiódł, że Ernest jest winny. {He} proved.PFV that Ernest was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
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8. 
 
Factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Julita ukradła nasz służbowy 
komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that it was Julita who stole our company computer. 
Komisarz Jarosz oraz komisarz Kowalik niezależnie od siebie prowadzili śledztwo w tej 
sprawie. 
Komisarz Jarosz jako jedyny w sposób niepodważalny udokumentował winę Julity – 
Commissioner Jarosz and commissioner Kowalik investigated the case independently of each other. 
Only commissioner Jarosz irrefutably documented that Alicja was to blame – 
 
(a) wykazywał, że to jej sprawka. {He} revealed.IPFV that she was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) wykazał, że to jej sprawka. {He} revealed.PFV that she was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
 
Non-factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Benedykt ukradł nasz 
służbowy komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that it was Benedykt who stole our company 
computer. 
W czasie dochodzenia komisarz Zięba wskazywał na Benedykta, a komisarz 
Markowski na Nikodema. 
Komisarz Markowski z trudem przyjął swoją porażkę – 
During the investigation commissioner Zięba suspected Benedykt, and commissioner Markowski – 
Nikodem. 
Commissioner Markowski could hardly accept that he was wrong – 
 
(a) wykazał, że Nikodem jest winny. {He} revealed.PFV that Nikodem was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) wykazywał, że Nikodem jest winny. {He} revealed.IPFV that Nikodem was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
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9. 
 
Factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Jagoda ukradła nasz 
służbowy komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that it was Jagoda who stole our company computer. 
Komisarz Domański oraz komisarz Ciesielski niezależnie od siebie prowadzili śledztwo 
w tej sprawie. 
Komisarz Domański jako jedyny w sposób niepodważalny udokumentował winę 
Jagody – 
Commissioner Domański and commissioner Ciesielski investigated the case independently of each other. 
Only commissioner Domański irrefutably documented that Alicja was to blame – 
 
(a) pokazywał, że to jej sprawka. {He} showed.IPFV that she was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) pokazał, że to jej sprawka. {He} showed.PFV that she was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
 
Non-factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Dziś stało się jasne, że to Fabian ukradł nasz służbowy 
komputer. 
Consider what follows a fact: Today it became clear that it was Fabian who stole our company computer. 
W czasie dochodzenia komisarz Tomczak wskazywał na Fabiana, a komisarz Stasiak na 
Rudolfa. 
Komisarz Stasiak z trudem przyjął swoją porażkę – 
During the investigation commissioner Tomczak suspected Fabian, and commissioner Stasiak – Rudolf. 
Commissioner Stasiak could hardly accept that he was wrong – 
 
(a) pokazał, że Rudolf jest winny. {He} showed.PFV that Rudolf was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) pokazywał, że Rudolf jest winny. {He} showed.IPFV that Rudolf was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
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Context D 
 
10. 
 
Factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Wczoraj stało się jasne, że Olga rzeczywiście jest 
mężatką. 
Consider what follows a fact: Yesterday it became clear that Olga is actually married. 
Detektyw Kaczmarek i detektyw Grabowski od jakiegoś czasu sugerowali, że 
dziewczyna mówi prawdę. 
Wieczorem detektyw Kaczmarek rozwiał wszelkie wątpliwości – 
Detective Kaczmarek and detective Grabowski have been suggesting for some time that the woman was 
telling the truth. 
In the evening, detective Kaczmarek resolved all the doubts. 
 
(a) potwierdzał, że Olga ma męża. {He} confirmed.IPFV that Olga has a husband. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) potwierdził, że Olga ma męża. {He} confirmed.PFV that Olga has a husband. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
 
Non-factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: Wczoraj stało się jasne, że Borys rzeczywiście jest 
kawalerem. 
Consider what follows a fact: Yesterday it became clear that Borys is actually a bachelor. 
Detektyw Szulc sugerował, że chłopak mówi prawdę, a detektyw Borowski, że kłamie. 
Detektyw Borowski, nie mając na to żadnych dowodów, 
Detective Szulc was suggesting that the man was telling the truth, whereas detective Borowski that the 
man was lying. 
Detective Borowski, without having any proof, 
 
(a) potwierdził, że Borys ma żonę. confirmed.PFV that Borys has a wife. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) potwierdzał, że Borys ma żonę. confirmed.IPFV that Borys has a wife. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
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Implicature verbs (11–15) 
 
Context E (same for 11–15) 
 
11. 
 
Factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: To pewne, że to Patryk ukradł pieniądze z kasy. 
Consider what follows a fact: It is certain that it was Patryk who stole the money from the register. 
Dyrektor Sikorski i księgowa Dziedzic opowiadali każde co innego w sprawie 
potencjalnego sprawcy, ale jedynie księgowa Dziedzic przekazuje dalej dokładnie 
sprawdzone informacje. 
To ona 
Director Sikorski and accountant Dziedzic each said different things about who the potential culprit was, 
but only accountant Dziedzic is passing on the exactly proved information. 
She 
 
(a) obwieszczała nam, że Patryk jest winny. accounced.IPFV that Patryk was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) obwieściła nam, że Patryk jest winny. accounced.PFV that Patryk was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
 
Non-factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: To pewne, że to nie Sandra ukradła pieniądze z kasy. 
Consider what follows a fact: It is certain that it was not Sandra who stole the money from the register. 
 
(a) Grafik Pawlik niby obwieścił nam, że Sandra jest winna, wszyscy jednak wiemy, że 
ma on tendencję do zmyślania. 
Graphic designer Pawlik kind of announced.PFV that Sandra was guilty, but we all know that he is usually 
making things up. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) Grafik Pawlik niby obwieszczał nam, że Sandra jest winna, wszyscy jednak wiemy, 
że ma on tendencję do zmyślania. 
Graphic designer Pawlik kind of announced.IPFV that Sandra was guilty, but we all know that he is 
usually making things up. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
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12. 
 
Factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: To pewne, że to Jędrzej ukradł pieniądze z kasy. 
Consider what follows a fact: It is certain that it was Jędrzej who stole the money from the register. 
Dyrektor Wawrzyniak i księgowa Kruk opowiadali każde co innego w sprawie 
potencjalnego sprawcy, ale jedynie księgowa Kruk przekazuje dalej dokładnie 
sprawdzone informacje. 
To ona 
Director Wawrzyniak and accountant Kruk each said different explanations about who the potential 
culprit was, but only accountant Kruk is passing on the exactly proved information. 
She 
 
(a) informowała nas, że Jędrzej jest winny. informed.IPFV us that Jędrzej was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) poinformowała nas, że Jędrzej jest winny. informed.PFV us that Jędrzej was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
 
Non-factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: To pewne, że to nie Laura ukradła pieniądze z kasy. 
Consider what follows a fact: It is certain that it was not Laura who stole the money from the register. 
 
(a) Grafik Urbaniak niby poinformował nas, że Laura jest winna, wszyscy jednak 
wiemy, że ma on tendencję do zmyślania. 
Graphic designer Urbaniak kind of informed.PFV us that Laura was guilty, but we all know that he is 
usually making things up. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) Grafik Urbaniak niby informował nas, że Laura jest winna, wszyscy jednak wiemy, 
że ma on tendencję do zmyślania. 
Graphic designer Urbaniak kind of informed.IPFV us that Laura was guilty, but we all know that he is 
usually making things up. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
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13. 
 
Factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: To pewne, że to Teodor ukradł pieniądze z kasy. 
Consider what follows a fact: It is certain that it was Teodor who stole the money from the register. 
Dyrektor Karpiński i księgowa Gajda opowiadali każde co innego w sprawie 
potencjalnego sprawcy, ale jedynie dyrektor Karpiński przekazuje dalej dokładnie 
sprawdzone informacje. 
To on 
Director Karpiński and accountant Gajda each said different things about who the potential culprit was, 
but only director Karpiński is passing on the exactly proved information. 
He 
 
(a) mówił nam, że Teodor jest winny. told.IPFV us that Teodor was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) powiedział nam, że Teodor jest winny. told.PFV us that Teodor was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
 
Non-factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: To pewne, że to nie Brygida ukradła pieniądze z kasy. 
Consider what follows a fact: It is certain that it was not Brygida who stole the money from the register. 
 
(a) Grafik Klimek niby powiedział nam, że Brygida jest winna, wszyscy jednak wiemy, 
że ma on tendencję do zmyślania. 
Graphic designer Klimek kind of told.PFV us that Brygida was guilty, but we all know that he is usually 
making things up. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) Grafik Klimek niby mówił nam, że Brygida jest winna, wszyscy jednak wiemy, że ma 
on tendencję do zmyślania. 
Graphic designer Klimek kind of told.IPFV us that Brygida was guilty, but we all know that he is usually 
making things up. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
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14. 
 
Factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: To pewne, że to Kajetan ukradł pieniądze z kasy. 
Consider what follows a fact: It is certain that it was Kajetan who stole the money from the register. 
Dyrektor Madej i księgowa Romanowska opowiadali każde co innego w sprawie 
potencjalnego sprawcy, ale jedynie dyrektor Madej przekazuje dalej dokładnie 
sprawdzone informacje. 
To on 
Director Madej and accountant Romanowska each said different things about who the potential culprit 
was, but only director Madej is passing on the exactly proved information. 
He 
 
(a) komunikował nam, że Kajetan jest winny. announced.IPFV that Kajetan was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(a) zakomunikował nam, że Kajetan jest winny. announced.PFV that Kajetan was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
 
Non-factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: To pewne, że to nie Arleta ukradła pieniądze z kasy. 
Consider what follows a fact: It is certain that it was not Arleta who stole the money from the register. 
 
(a) Grafik Świątek niby zakomunikował nam, że Arleta jest winna, wszyscy jednak 
wiemy, że ma on tendencję do zmyślania. 
Graphic designer Świątek kind of announced.PFV that Arleta was guilty, but we all know that he is usually 
making things up. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) Grafik Świątek niby komunikował nam, że Arleta jest winna, wszyscy jednak wiemy, 
że ma on tendencję do zmyślania. 
Graphic designer Świątek kind of announced.IPFV that Arleta was guilty, but we all know that he is 
usually making things up. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
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15. 
 
Factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: To pewne, że to Sergiusz ukradł pieniądze z kasy. 
Consider what follows a fact: It is certain that it was Sergiusz who stole the money from the register. 
Dyrektor Kosiński i księgowa Rogowska opowiadali każde co innego w sprawie 
potencjalnego sprawcy, ale jedynie księgowa Rogowska przekazuje dalej dokładnie 
sprawdzone informacje. 
To ona 
Director Kosiński and accountant Rogowska each said different things about who the potential culprit 
was, but only accountant Rogowska is passing on the exactly proved information. 
She 
 
(a) zawiadamiała nas, że Sergiusz jest winny. notified.IPFV us that Sergiusz was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) zawiadomiła nas, że Sergiusz jest winny. notified.PFV us that Sergiusz was guilty. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
 
Non-factive scenario 
 
 
Potraktuj co następuje jako fakt: To pewne, że to nie Judyta ukradła pieniądze z kasy. 
Consider what follows a fact: It is certain that it was not Judyta who stole the money from the register. 
 
(a) Grafik Rybak niby zawiadomił nas, że Judyta jest winna, wszyscy jednak wiemy, że 
ma on tendencję do zmyślania. 
Graphic designer Rybak kind of notified.PFV us that Judyta was guilty, but we all know that he is usually 
making things up. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
(b) Grafik Rybak niby zawiadamiał nas, że Judyta jest winna, wszyscy jednak wiemy, że 
ma on tendencję do zmyślania. 
Graphic designer Rybak kind of notified.IPFV us that Judyta was guilty, but we all know that he is usually 
making things up. 
idealnie O O O O O O O bardzo źle 
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